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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

China’s looming decline could be a threat to the world​





The wounded dragon scenario. I believe they culminated a few years ago, and the tacit agreement or compact between the people and the CCP that the Chinese people would exchange increasing prosperity for decreasing freedom is no longer valid.....
I believe that the greatest factor in their potential/likely decline will be demographics. Productivity somewhat, but demographics…almost as bad as those living the Grand Rus dream…
 
The way it’s going, Russia will have far more women than men, and China will have far more men than women.

Rise of the Eurasians!
OK Mr Underworld ;)

sexy blue eyes GIF
 
Well this is getting to a great start… :rolleyes:


If the victims of Beijing’s intimidation, influence and interference campaigns are boycotting the inquiry, how legitimate is it?
 
Well this is getting to a great start… :rolleyes:


If the victims of Beijing’s intimidation, influence and interference campaigns are boycotting the inquiry, how legitimate is it?

Does the article say why ? It's behind a paywall.
 
Does the article say why ? It's behind a paywall.

Justice Hogue, a judge on the Quebec Court of Appeal who heads the inquiry, granted standing to former Ontario Liberal cabinet minister Michael Chan, now deputy mayor of Markham, Ont., and independent MP Han Dong. Standing means they can cross-examine witnesses and gain access to all evidence collected, including whatever is presented to the inquiry outside of hearings.

Justice Hogue also granted intervenor status to Independent Senator Yuen Pau Woo, which allows him to participate in the hearings examining foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections.

The Human Rights Coalition, an umbrella body of Canadian groups that have spoken out against China’s foreign interference and human-rights abuses, says the three politicians have long had ties to Chinese diplomats and expressed pro-Beijing views.

“I am very pessimistic about this inquiry,” said Mehmet Tohti, executive director of the Uyghur Human Rights Advocacy Project. “This is a dead start for me. We are going to withdraw.”

Mr. Tohti said the three men have “acted like Chinese officials in Canada so I am not ready to make myself available to be cross-examined by them.”
 

Justice Hogue, a judge on the Quebec Court of Appeal who heads the inquiry, granted standing to former Ontario Liberal cabinet minister Michael Chan, now deputy mayor of Markham, Ont., and independent MP Han Dong. Standing means they can cross-examine witnesses and gain access to all evidence collected, including whatever is presented to the inquiry outside of hearings.

Justice Hogue also granted intervenor status to Independent Senator Yuen Pau Woo, which allows him to participate in the hearings examining foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections.

The Human Rights Coalition, an umbrella body of Canadian groups that have spoken out against China’s foreign interference and human-rights abuses, says the three politicians have long had ties to Chinese diplomats and expressed pro-Beijing views.

“I am very pessimistic about this inquiry,” said Mehmet Tohti, executive director of the Uyghur Human Rights Advocacy Project. “This is a dead start for me. We are going to withdraw.”

Mr. Tohti said the three men have “acted like Chinese officials in Canada so I am not ready to make myself available to be cross-examined by them.”

Of course. JFC, this is a circus.
 
The jury's still out...

The Long Tail of China’s Zero-COVID Policy​

As the costs of China’s pandemic experience are tallied, younger generations are confronting a disconcerting new reality.​



SUMMARY Although it has been almost a year since China rescinded its strict zero-COVID policy and allowed normal economic activity to resume, the costs of the country’s pandemic experience are still being tallied. As job and pay cuts continue alongside slowing economic growth, younger generations are confronting a disconcerting new reality.


For three years, China’s zero-COVID policy consistently received high-profile media coverage from the Chinese and the international press. During the first phase of the pandemic, China’s mass mobilization of resources and strict region-wide lockdowns were seen as highly effective—a testament to the advantages of autocratic power. But after vaccines arrived and Western countries resumed normal economic activities, China’s ongoing restrictions became a source of growing concern.

Then, when the restrictions were finally lifted in late 2022, the press coverage dissipated, and the official Chinese position was silence. Just as the Chinese people were starting to regain their economic footing and reckon with the emotional fallout of the previous three years, the world stopped paying attention.

Yet the legacy of zero-COVID will not soon be forgotten. For three years, nearly every city was under various forms of lockdown, with as many as 370 million people isolated in their homes at the policy’s peak. Shanghai, China’s economic hub, was among the cities subjected to the most severe lockdowns. When it was shuttered for two months in 2022, economists worried that national GDP would fall by several percentage points.
Today, the pain is felt more broadly, with remuneration and jobs being cut across the urban economy. Salaries in typically high-paying tech and finance jobs have been slashed by 40 percent, and even civil-service jobs, which pay less but are considered more stable, are experiencing substantial pay cuts. Such reductions are especially painful in a country with an already low baseline income level. In 2022, urban China’s median per capita disposable income (after taxes) was $6,224, compared with $55,832 in the United States. (Of course, prices are higher in the U.S., but not by a factor of 8.97.)

Worse, the mass layoffs that started in the Chinese tech sector in 2021 have increased over time, with more than 200,000 tech jobs eliminated just between July 2021 and March 2022. And that figure does not account for the knock-on effects in closely connected sectors such as finance or law, let alone the broader effect on consumption and wealth accumulation, where these jobs have a disproportionally large impact.
China’s much poorer rural areas have arguably suffered even more. In 2022, rural per capita disposable income was a mere $2,777. Generally, rural households supplement their agricultural income by working as migrant laborers in cities, opening their hometowns to tourists from urban areas or abroad, and selling high-value commodities like tea or flowers in urban markets. But during the zero-COVID period, rural villages were cut off from urban markets and tourists, leaving their inhabitants to eke out a livelihood as subsistence farmers.

 

Flirting with copyright laws on this one. Behind a paywall on The Telegraph.


The West hasn’t grasped the scale of the disaster facing China​

Our treasured illusions about how Xi will react to his country sinking are about to unravel
MATTHEW HENDERSON8 February 2024 • 6:00am



China’s Spring Festival has huge demographic and political significance.

It’s the last surviving relic of a past world, where extended families gathered at their home villages to share respectful greetings to the old, wishes for prosperity (“Gong xi fa cai” in Mandarin) among the younger generation, and joy at the births of new heirs and descendants.

Nearly 40 years of the coercive One Child Policy, not to speak of uncounted deaths from Covid-19 among the elderly last Spring Festival, has taken an irreversible demographic toll on festival jollity.

This year it is snow, not the pandemic, that is disrupting travel and spoiling the party. But this too is a starkly apt metaphor for the wintry grip of Xi Jinping’s authoritarian power. “Good wishes, get rich” rings hollow in these days of economic stagnation and decline.

At home and abroad, much attention was paid on February 6 to an extraordinary Chinese stock market rally, apparently based largely on news that Xi Jinping was in conclave with market regulators over new measures to revive market confidence.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/busines...ergency-intervention-save-china-stock-market/
No doubt the timing of this characteristically command economy intervention was carefully chosen to evoke festive cheer. Anyone in the West buying into it, however, needs to take a step back and think again. After all, the rise was led by recognisably state-directed investors.

Everything serves the state as Mussolini might have said.

For years Xi has made much of his achievements in “lifting millions out of poverty”, quietly ignoring the point that this was more about removing Communist ideological blockers to prosperity than it was implementing a better-balanced economic model.

This year, the other shoe has fallen. Bad loans, rent-seeking by inept local government and state-owned enterprises overproducing led to a disastrous property bubble that has now burst. The 30pc share that the property sector held in the economy is now a millstone dragging it into the mire, with other sectors falling into disarray around it.

Does that bubble extend to Vancouver and Toronto?

Beyond the immediate crisis, things aren’t much better in the longer term. China’s workforce is ageing and shrinking, creating a headwind for growth. Younger generations, meanwhile, are increasingly disaffected. Youth unemployment hit a record high of over 21pc in June 2023. The Government’s response was to stop publishing the figures. Small wonder then that market sentiment is so cautious.

That seems to be a universal trait outside the Muslim world. La Revanche de la Creche?

While Western media outlets are increasingly willing to publish harsh criticisms of the Chinese leadership’s economic ineptitude, international institutions are still treading cautiously. In December, the World Bank published a readable, elegant China Economic Update which outlined in meticulous detail the quantitative evidence for a slew of ills currently afflicting the Chinese economy.

As befits the organisation’s expertise and credibility, the report also offers a series of suggestions as to what it would be “appropriate” for China to do to revive its fortunes. Given the degree to which Xi Jinping has taken personal control of the levers of state power, he is unquestionably the sole arbiter of high-level economic policy. It’s accordingly of note that there is nowhere in the entire 58-page document a single reference to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), let alone Xi Jinping.

Diplomatic niceties
and corporate nerves mean that this failure to name names is replicated in much heavy-weight Western assessment and analysis. The result is a widespread, misguided impression that China has an economy run much like any Western free market, with issues that might “appropriately” be dealt with in a relatively conventional manner.

It is probably true that a well-planned and executed programme of coordinated reforms could lessen a number of China’s current economic headwinds. But they will not be so dealt with, because that is not what Xi Jinping does.

An artificial, short-term surge in market optimism whipped up by the February 6 buying spree does not amount to a credible policy for fixing the mess that the CCP has made of its post-Covid revival, or for liberal economic reforms.

Xi Jinping has a completely different agenda, which includes such economically risky aims as annexing Taiwan, and continuing his support for Putin’s Russia. All his intervention in the stock market has done is highlight how irrelevant conventional market forces are in China.

Most rational Western analysis agrees that economic engagement with the PRC is unavoidable. China’s economy is locked in a population doom spiral, loaded with bad debts. But as bad as the economic situation is, the political risks should weigh even heavier.

China’s national strategy under Xi is driven by a political, military and economic contest with the West. The autocrat has staked his reputation on hard, exclusive Chinese nationalism and independence from the Western-led rules-based order. He has already shown in Hong Kong something of his intentions for Taiwan.

Last year, it was reported that 68pc of major corporations bought political risk insurance in 2022, compared with 25pc in 2019. China, where firms are subject to sudden expropriation, and operate at the whim of political overlords, was seen as a particular risk factor, and one it was increasingly hard to insure.

The US investment bank chief executive who last September said he was “highly cautious” about Chinese risk in late November stated bluntly that if there was war in Taiwan, all bets would be off; his bank would exit China if the US government ordered him to.

Economists and business analysts focusing on the prospects for a rise in GDP or a fall in unemployment are focusing on entirely the wrong issues. Our understanding of the Chinese economy was flawed, failing to see how much was built on debt and thin air.

The next thing to unravel could be our last, treasured illusions about how Xi will react to his country sinking into an economic mire, with a falling population. It’s time to prepare for a new cold war.
 
Last year, it was reported that 68pc of major corporations bought political risk insurance in 2022, compared with 25pc in 2019. China, where firms are subject to sudden expropriation, and operate at the whim of political overlords, was seen as a particular risk factor, and one it was increasingly hard to insure.

🤔

WTF is ‘Political Risk Insurance?’ Can you get it here in Canada? 😆
 
🤔

WTF is ‘Political Risk Insurance?’ Can you get it here in Canada? 😆
Hazarding a guess - if you open a mine in Africa, and the government decides it wants it and takes it then you are insured. Like I said just a guess.
 
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