US Army equipment crisis?

[MarkOttawa]

Sort of reminds me of our LAV III situation in Afstan.
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/59522.0/all.html

Army equipment disaster
April 9, 2007, by Robert H. Scales
http://washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20070408-101852-2680r

During the Cold War the Army stockpiled thousands of weapons and vehicles in warehouses or aboard huge cargo ships in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. These trucks, humvees, tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers constituted our national reserve of weaponry. Soldiers depend on this equipment should we go to war against an enemy outside Iraq and Afghanistan. Except for one brigade set in Korea, it's all gone. We emptied the last set in March. In total, nearly half of the Army's fighting equipment is wearing away in Iraq and Afghanistan or waiting forlornly for repair or disposal. Unclassified sources put the total number of broken or destroyed wheels, tracks and rotors at about 6,000.
   
Most Army brigades are "not combat ready" in part because of equipment shortages. Brigades consist of people and equipment, so the significance of "not combat ready" loses a great deal in translation. If an unready brigade were a ship it would be in dry dock. If it were an aircraft it would be undergoing a complete stripdown and overhaul. Virtually all of our reserve brigades and most of the Army's regular brigades outside of Iraq and Afghanistan fit into this category. The bottom line is that virtually any brigade not in Iraq cannot be equipped for war for a very, very long time...

The Army will continue to wear out its equipment at prodigious rates. The pace of this decline is painful to watch. Usage rates for tanks during peacetime are about 550 miles per tank per year. Today in Iraq tanks average over 5,000 miles per year. At these rates the Army will have no choice but to virtually rebuild itself after Iraq...

...cheap won't work because our Cold War fleet was designed to fight on the plains of Europe in huge tank-on-tank engagements against the Soviets. The heavily armored behemoths necessary for this style of war are not suitable for fighting the "long war." Yesterday's tank weighs more than 70 tons. It cannot move great distances. It consumes a huge amount of fuel that must be transported by vulnerable unarmored convoys from Kuwait to Baghdad. It cannot be easily transported by air. And it takes a multitude of repairmen -- many of them civilian contractors -- and a huge base infrastructure to keep it running in the punishing heat and dust of Iraq.
   
We have learned from painful experience in Iraq and Afghanistan that tomorrow's ground forces must be re-equipped with many more fighting vehicles that are light, mobile, easily transported and capable of keeping more soldiers protected for longer periods [which is not to say that some tanks are needed - MC]...

Retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales is a former commander of the Army War College.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[CougarKing]

During the Cold War the Army stockpiled thousands of weapons and vehicles in warehouses or aboard huge cargo ships in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. These trucks, humvees, tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers constituted our national reserve of weaponry. Soldiers depend on this equipment should we go to war against an enemy outside Iraq and Afghanistan. Except for one brigade set in Korea, it's all gone.

Great,  so all the equipment aboard those SL-7 cargo ships or those Maritime Prepositioning Squadron ships is all gone?   
That would hamper America's ability to respond to another contingency requiring mechanized troops in another part of the world; I would have assumed the equipment aboard these ships would not be touched in order not to neglect preparation for a contingency in another theater of operations, but apparently I was wrong.

So if they're touching that equipment on those Maritime Prepositioning Force Ships, therefore, I assume the US DoD must have already scraped the bottom of the barrel in stateside US Army/US Marine Reserve or Army Guard armories for that equipment? Is this assumption wrong?

 

[GAP]

This might help relieve some of the worry about the US running out of equipment.

Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisition Reports
April 09, 2007
Article Link

          The Department of Defense (DoD) has released details on major defense acquisition program cost, schedule, and performance changes since the September 2006 reporting period. This information is based on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) submitted to the Congress for the December 2006 reporting period.

        SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and performance status. These reports are prepared annually in conjunction with the President's budget. Subsequent quarterly exception reports are required only for those programs experiencing unit cost increases of at least 15 percent or schedule delays of at least six months. Quarterly SARs are also submitted for initial reports, final reports, and for programs that are rebaselined at major milestone decisions.

        The total program cost estimates provided in the SARs include research and development, procurement, military construction, and acquisition-related operation and maintenance (except for pre-Milestone B programs which are limited to development costs pursuant to 10 USC §2432). Total program costs reflect actual costs to date as well as future anticipated costs. All estimates include anticipated inflation allowances.

        The current estimate of program acquisition costs for programs covered by SARs for the prior reporting period (September 2006) was $1,617,710.1million. After adding the costs for two new programs, Longbow Apache Block III and the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) from the September 2006 reporting period, the adjusted current estimate of program acquisition costs was $1,627,687.0 million.

  Current Estimate
($ in Millions)
September 2006 (87 programs)
  $ 1,617,710.1
Plus two new program (Longbow Apache Block III and LUH) +9,976.9
   
September 2006 Adjusted (89 programs)
  $ 1,627,687.0
Changes Since Last Report: 
  Economic  $ +6,957.0
  Quantity  -7,454.6
  Schedule  +22,644.8
  Engineering  +3,188.4
  Estimating  +18,888.6
  Other    -2,319.1
  Support  +14,381.7
    Net Cost Change $ +56,286.8
December 2006 (89 programs) $1,683,973.8

                                                                                                                                               

        For the December 2006 reporting period, there was a net cost increase of $56,286.8 million or +3.5 percent, excluding costs for the aforementioned programs submitting initial SARs. The net cost increase was due to a net stretchout of development and procurement schedules (+$22,644.8 million), higher program cost estimates (+$18,888.6 million), an increase in support requirements (+$14,381.7 million), the application of higher escalation rates (+$6,957.0 million), additional engineering changes (hardware/software) (+$3,188.4 million), and the impacts on LPD 17 from Hurricane Katrina (+$1,075.6 million). These increases were partially offset by a net decrease of planned quantities to be purchased (-$7,454.6 million) and the termination of the Land Warrior program (-$3,394.7 million). Further details of the most significant changes are summarized below by program.

        There are eight programs with Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breaches to their “current” or “original” acquisition program baselines (APBs): C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below Program (FBCB2), Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS), Land Warrior, and Warfighter Information Network–Tactical (WIN-T). That is, the program acquisition or average procurement unit costs for these programs have increased by 15 percent or more to their “current” APB or by 30 percent or more to their “original” APB. For those programs that have increased by 25 percent or more to their “current” APB or by 50 percent or more to their “original” APB (i.e., C-130 AMP, EFV, GMLRS, JASSM, JPATS, Land Warrior, and WIN-T), a determination of whether to certifiscal year the program will be made no later than June 5, 2007, except Land Warrior, which will not require certification because the program was terminated.
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