The swarm navy (split from: The Defence Budget)

[Oldgateboatdriver]

My post was not directed at you GR66, at least not you alone or the point you were making. It seems that every time the issue of number of ships comes up one way or the other, someone pulls out the corvettes of WWII as if it proved that a large number of small, less capable ships works "because it won the battle of the Atlantic". It just isn't the case: The corvettes barely made any difference, and in fact came close to losing the battle in 1942.

Your idea of trading in the concept of 6000 to 7000 tons frigates for more numerous smaller ones in the same 4000-4500 tons range as the Halifax's is certainly a reasonable one. So much so, in fact that the French navy has embraced it with a new class of frigates (the FTI), which is also being developed for the export market - and more specifically the Australian export market. Here's link to it: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/fti-medium-size-frigates

On a more serious note, I think I am getting around to Chris Pook's thinking: We need large number of lightly armed and manned vessels. The ideal one for me is huge fleet of large "ocean-going" RHib's with a crew of six, a .50 cal forward for ASuW and AD, a reelable very long tube stethoscope in the back with a rack of hand grenades for ASW. Imagine: we could get 35 of these for each Halifax we decommission.

 

[Underway]

On a more serious note, I think I am getting around to Chris Pook's thinking: We need large number of lightly armed and manned vessels. The ideal one for me is huge fleet of large "ocean-going" RHib's with a crew of six, a .50 cal forward for ASuW and AD, a reelable very long tube stethoscope in the back with a rack of hand grenades for ASW. Imagine: we could get 35 of these for each Halifax we decommission.

I imagine it's difficult to talk with your tongue so firmly jammed into your cheek.  [. Problem is though that the .50 cal is just a pop gun so right off the bat the Senate will be losing their collective minds on that one.

 

[FSTO]

If you want to see how the smaller crew, plug and play and swarm tactics is working out, the USN is doing it now with the LCS. How about we learn some lessons from them before we go down that path. Please?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I have a feeling any swarm Navy engaging against a larger, better equipped Navy would look something like this:

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=BLj3aYPXEEo

The Navy has its own experience dealing with swarms of smaller boats.  Libyan War in 2011, HMCS Charlottetown thwarted an attack on Port of Misrata.  I know an officer who was the Navigator of the ship at that time.  The engagement was over in about 30 secs due to the overwhelming fire superiority of the Halifax Class frigate.

 

[Kirkhill]

...
On a more serious note, I think I am getting around to Chris Pook's thinking: We need large number of lightly armed and manned vessels. The ideal one for me is huge fleet of large "ocean-going" RHib's with a crew of six, a .50 cal forward for ASuW and AD, a reelable very long tube stethoscope in the back with a rack of hand grenades for ASW. Imagine: we could get 35 of these for each Halifax we decommission.

Should I have ducked on that one?  [

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Chris, I find this entire discussion fascinating.  The biggest detractor IMO against using small ships is the lack of a sufficient energy supply to power the weapon systems, radars, sonars, etc. 

We've pretty much maxed out our energy efficiency with the internal combustion engine so until we find a more efficient power supply that's smaller and more cost efficient, we're stuck with the present construct.

The smaller the ship, the less capable the sensor suite, the less stand off the ship is afforded.

 

[Kirkhill]

Despite the continued effort on the part of some to reduce that argument to absurdities Humphrey I still stand by my point.

If you want a 50 MW power plant then spec a 50 MW power plant and build a hull around it to keep it (and its associated sensors and other kit) afloat then figure out how few people you need to operate it. 

And I will continue to argue against the practice of pricing ships on a per tonne basis as the PBO did and the US does.

From the testimony supplied via the AOPS thread

Warships - 40% ship 60% weapons
Ships - 50% labour 50% materials

Assume, as I did on the other thread, a $1,000,000,000 CAD expenditure.

$600,000,000 for the weapons and sensors
$400,000,000 for the ship.

Now assume that I maintain the weapons and sensors suite - holding that budget fixed but I opt to increase the size of the ship by 50% from, for example 4000 to 6000 tonnes.

That $400,000,000 is $200,000,000 in labour and $200,000,000 in material.

Now a 6000 tonne hull will have more material but it won't have 50% more material.  Its engines will be 50% more powerful but they won't be 50% larger or cost 50% more.  The labour to build the larger vessel will be more but it won't be 50% more.  The engineering MAY be greater but it won't be 50% greater. 

Regardless, let us assume that a 6000 tonne hull will cost 50% more than a 4000 tonne hull.

Your $400,000,000 Ship becomes a $600,000,000 ship.
To that you add the same $600,000,000 weapons suite.

Your total project now costs you $1,200,000,000 instead of $1,000,000,000 and you end up with a more flexible ship with longer legs (and possibly/probably better speed and seakeeping).

And I seriously doubt that the escalator would be near that 20% shown above and more likely be closer to 10%.

At that point you are now debating 10x 4000 tonne hulls at 1 BCAD or 8 to 9x 6000 tonne hulls at 1.1 to 1.2 BCAD.

Meanwhile you have the crewing requirement. 

Let's stipulate a current crew of 225 all in including air dets.

Let's also leave out the discussion of moving all the way down to the Maersk or even LCS levels of crewing and move up the scale.  The Danes and the Dutch manage with 100 or so. 

Is it unreasonable to suggest that technology has progressed enough since 1980 to permit a crew of 225 to be reduced?  Even a reduction from 225 to 175, or even 150 would free up enough budget to make up the shortfall in the project above so that we could afford to buy all 10 hulls at the higher displacement.

I intentionally push limits so people will tell me why not.  Once that is defined then it is easier to discover that which might be.  :cheers:

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Now I am the one confused, Chris (and left wondering if the date has something to do with your latest post  ;D).

This whole thread started more or less when you brought the notion of numerous smallish type of ships "expandable" as opposed to the type of frigates the RCN is seeking (you specifically referred to the HMCS BRAS D'OR as an example of what you had in mind).

Now it looks like you are supporting the argument (which many of us here have been supporting and explaining for a long time) that a larger design is ok because the difference in size doesn't really cost that much for the extra sea keeping and habitability it gives you.

Do you still support the "large number of small ships swarm" view, or not?

And BTW, smaller crew than the ones we currently have are possible, and actually utilized by some navies, without going down to the unsustainable levels the Americans are attempting on their LCS. The FREMMs have crew of 145 and 147 (Italy) respectively, the Type 26 are planned for a crew of 118, the French upcoming FTI are planned for crew of 123, and as you know the Iver Huitfeld's have a crew of 117.

 

[Kirkhill]

I do indeed still support the notion of a large number of small vessels versus a single mega ship with the entire Navy onboard.

The question for me is where is the acceptable dividing line.  My ongoing concern is that the apparent emphasis on maintaining a particular crew size and extrapolating from 1980s technology is resulting in an ever decreasing fleet size and an ever decreasing capability as well as an ever increasing vulnerability.

To be honest I don't know if the optimum ship size is 100, 1000, 2000, 6000 or 10,000 tonnes.  Nor do I begin to know what the optimum crew size is.  I BELIEVE that technology generates advantages that it is not obvious to me that the RCN (and the Canadian Forces in general) exploits to the fullest. 

In part, I suggest, that the problem arises from 65000 people whose first priority, a rational and well considered priority - it is mine as well, is keeping bread on their tables.  Cutting numbers does not do that.  Given that then the labour budget is fixed and new technologies end up being added to the capital budget - which necessitates an overall increase in the defence budget.

Now, I will agree that we need a larger budget.  I will agree that we can use all 65000 people in support of the national interest.  Where I start having problems is when the money isn't there and hard choices have to be made.

We appear to default to a tendency to fund 65000 people sitting at desks.  (In the spirit of RHIBs and .50s).

Edit: WRT to the MONTREAL experiment - my concern there would be that the experiment is at risk of proving that you can't run MONTREAL without a crew of 225.  Which to my mind tells me nothing about what is possible with a more modern design.

 

[Kirkhill]

One final thought - on the $600,000,000 weapons and sensors suite:

I could also see benefit in splitting that suite up between a number of smaller hulls in the name of flexibility and survivability even though costs would increase through the need to maintain additional power plants.  But I don't necessarily see the need to have all vessels manned with the same set of capabilities.  Auxiliary vessels could, in my opinion, have Maersk style crews or even be uninhabited.

 

[NavyShooter]

The Navy has its own experience dealing with swarms of smaller boats.  Libyan War in 2011, HMCS Charlottetown thwarted an attack on Port of Misrata.  I know an officer who was the Navigator of the ship at that time.  The engagement was over in about 30 secs due to the overwhelming fire superiority of the Halifax Class frigate.

And....what did the NAVO tell you about that occurrence?

I can speak with some certainty that the only rounds that CHA fired during that towards an enemy during that deployment was exactly 11 rounds of .50 cal.  That was during the night time engagement where we were fired at from shore, via truck mounted AAA systems (23mm I think they were decided to be.)

This might be a photo of me taken that night in the AFT ERT:

I was in the OPS room the evening when the Tomahawks zipped over our heads within a few thousand feet of the ship.  It was pretty neat to see them from that close-up watching over the CIWS operator's shoulder.

I was in the AFT SIS when the morning rocket attack happened when they fired a truckload of what we believed were BM-21's at us.  We didn't go to Action Stations that day...the NBP was up on the flight deck doing their morning work-out and they called in the attack...otherwise we'd have had no idea they'd even shot at (and missed) us.

I was operating the SEOSS watching the front lines west of Misratah watching the ambulances drive casualties back to the city from the front, and watching the tracers go both ways across the front, that was interesting to watch. 

I will argue that your impressions of what CHA did during that operation in terms of force employment might be a bit....off.

Like I said, we fired 11 bullets from 1 belt of .50 cal. 

If you're talking in terms of the kinetic effects that we enabled by calling in air strikes?  Oh yes, we called in hundreds of targets, and almost 25% of them encountered...high speed non-linear deconstruction.  We had a lookout one afternoon who noted dust clouds approaching the city through the salt flats SE of the city, checked with his Big Eyes, saw tanks, reported it, which ended up getting called up to the FAC on an Aurora, which ended up getting CF-18's called in to drop on them.  Absolutely saved the city from getting cut-off from the port.  That OSBN did a great job!

All that said....I was onboard for the whole trip, and I don't recall a swarm attack.  I recall there being 3-4 RHIBs launched one evening with 'special' cargo onboard...but we didn't light them up, that was an allied ship that was with us.

Sorry to be so contrary, but again, I think someone's blowing smoke at you.

NS

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

And....what did the NAVO tell you about that occurrence?

I can speak with some certainty that the only rounds that CHA fired during that towards an enemy during that deployment was exactly 11 rounds of .50 cal.  That was during the night time engagement where we were fired at from shore, via truck mounted AAA systems (23mm I think they were decided to be.)

This might be a photo of me taken that night in the AFT ERT:

I was in the OPS room the evening when the Tomahawks zipped over our heads within a few thousand feet of the ship.  It was pretty neat to see them from that close-up watching over the CIWS operator's shoulder.

I was in the AFT SIS when the morning rocket attack happened when they fired a truckload of what we believed were BM-21's at us.  We didn't go to Action Stations that day...the NBP was up on the flight deck doing their morning work-out and they called in the attack...otherwise we'd have had no idea they'd even shot at (and missed) us.

I was operating the SEOSS watching the front lines west of Misratah watching the ambulances drive casualties back to the city from the front, and watching the tracers go both ways across the front, that was interesting to watch. 

I will argue that your impressions of what CHA did during that operation in terms of force employment might be a bit....off.

Like I said, we fired 11 bullets from 1 belt of .50 cal. 

If you're talking in terms of the kinetic effects that we enabled by calling in air strikes?  Oh yes, we called in hundreds of targets, and almost 25% of them encountered...high speed non-linear deconstruction.  We had a lookout one afternoon who noted dust clouds approaching the city through the salt flats SE of the city, checked with his Big Eyes, saw tanks, reported it, which ended up getting called up to the FAC on an Aurora, which ended up getting CF-18's called in to drop on them.  Absolutely saved the city from getting cut-off from the port.  That OSBN did a great job!

All that said....I was onboard for the whole trip, and I don't recall a swarm attack.  I recall there being 3-4 RHIBs launched one evening with 'special' cargo onboard...but we didn't light them up, that was an allied ship that was with us.

Sorry to be so contrary, but again, I think someone's blowing smoke at you.

NS

Well jee whiz, he Def did blow smoke up my butt then.  No names no pack drill! 

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Since there is only one NAVO onboard at any given time, you guys should both know who you are talking about  ;D.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Since there is only one NAVO onboard at any given time, you guys should both know who you are talking about  ;D.

Hencev why my lips are now sealed hahahaha

 

[NavyShooter]

Oh yes. I know.

I was on CHA in 2001 as well when we were doing OP Augmentation, and was on the helm when we had 6-8 small boats suddenly pop up on RADAR and visual at a range of less than 5 miles.  Quite certain that after the fact we ID'd them as Boghammers.  They got....close...and we were....busy....getting people out to the bridge wings to man the .50's.  I recall exactly who the 2OOW was on the bridge that day too.  He kinda panicked a bit....I just wanted someone to relieve me from the helm and give me one of the bridge rifles to help out....in the end they settled for zipping around us a bit, then they went away. 

The likelihood that our new CMS and sensors would give us a better chance to pick them up is reasonably high, so we may not end up as surprised as we were that day. 

 

[jollyjacktar]

tsk, tsk, NS, you're wearing the wrong type of flash gear.  Naughty boy 

 

[Journeyman]

...and 1970 phoned; they want Tom Selleck's moustache back. 

 

[NavyShooter]

It's only gotten tackier as it's gotten longer...

 

[Lumber]

Sorry to be so contrary, but again, I think someone's blowing smoke at you.

NS

In addition, those 11 rounds were fired outside effective range at targets that weren't attacking CHA, weren't closing CHA, and I don't believe even knew CHA was there.

Source: The person who fired these 11 rounds told me all about it multiple times (but, they might not have had a full appreciation of the tactical situation).

 

[NavyShooter]

Ah yes, that person has since been promoted to LS and I believe is now married?

I do believe that they did have a proper appreciation for the 'warning shots' that they fired.  From a range of several miles.