The CCV and the Infantry

[R031button]

Kirkhill seems to be trying to find a way for modern forces to emulate Napoleonic / 19th Century military designations, who really gives a crap if the Infantry current preforms roles once preformed by Cavalry? I would propose instead that it is best for one Arm to maintain one focus. The RCAC focuses on destroying the enemy through maneuver and firepower, then Infantry (to my knowledge there is no such thing as an RCIC i'm a moron) focuses on taking and holding ground / closing with and destroying the enemy. My argument against the idea of RCAC crewing APC / IFVs is simply this, what happens when the driver is killed by a mortar round in a leager or patrol base? Or breaks an ankle taking a dump in the bush? If he's a totally different trade then the rest of the guys, presumably they aren't qualified to crew the vehicle, then how do they move it? In a current mechanized battalion, it's a simple issue of the alt driver taking over, following that argument, why not maintain a spare crew force? Because then we're taking the close with and destroy specialists, that we're not training to the crew the vehicle because we want that specialization, and kicking them out of the back of the vehicle, and limiting the dismounted force of the ground. Or I suppose the CQ could have an HL filled with spare crew, hardly seems ideal though.

Regarding the original point of "training bill," do you really think that retraining Armoured Crewmen to preform what is essentially an Infantryman (the term assaulter was used) has no training bill?

That being said, I don't see an MRAP style vehicle doing well in the Recce role, or actually any "conventional war" setting. They are by nature very tall vehicles, designed to get stand off from the ground, the side effect is that they present very large targets, and are not well equipped to take direct fire. I much prefer the idea of a CV90 in that role.

 

[Kirkhill]

PPCLI Guy:

I understand that the role of the "Infantry" IS to "close with and destroy the enemy, by day and by night, regardless of season or terrain"  (I believe I remember the phrase correctly).

I also understand that the "Infantry" is an arm of manouevre and needs to manouevre to achieve its assigned objectives. 

I was trying to suggest that Historically "Infantry" was not an arm of manoeuvre, in my opinion, and did not become so, in the modern sense until it became motorized.

The fact that dragoons were raised and cavalry adopted rifles and then incorporated dragoon regiments into the cavalry family, while the infantry learned to ride horses in South Africa and camels in Egypt suggests to me that the discussion over roles, titles and equipment has gone on a very long time.

Equally the fact that the Coldstream Guards have ridden horses, camels and Sherman Tanks suggests that titles win over roles.  The "family ties" are considerably stronger than any tactical consideration when it comes to regiments and roles.

With that in mind, and believing that the Government needs more than 6 large LAV Bns at its finger tips in order to act on the world stage,  I am proposing to enhance the Government's options by taking the RCAC and ensuring that all the RCAC members are gainfully employed riding in fighting vehicles rather than sitting on the sidelines waiting for a chance to drive and shoot armoured trucks - as some proposed force structures I have seen seem to suggest.  Or alternately the number of Squadrons in the RCAC is reduced.

At the same time the RCIC is bemoaning the fact it does not have enough people to do its current jobs and wants to add more..... At the same time they want to tank on the administrative and logistical burden of an addition F-vehicle.

It seems like a no-brainer to me (and there are no doubt those that will say I qualify) that IF a CCV is needed, and IF the Infantry is short of Manpower, and IF the RCAC has more people than vehicles - I stipulate that I don't know any of those assumptions to be true but your planning documents certainly seem to suggest that some some of your friends and associates believe them to be true - IF those statements are true THEN it would seem to me to be logical to assign the new vehicle to the available manpower that has the skills in place to support the new vehicles and incorporate them into deployment ready Units just as the Infantry does.

Tango2Bravo:

Point taken on the tanks.  But isn't it not true that tanks, like all other arms, are most effective when mutually supporting.

Equally isn't it also true that it takes time and training to build an effective, mutually supporting combined arms team?

Therefore, doesn't it follow that integrating arms at the lowest possible level ensures the most effective training and employment?

WRT the CCV as a Recce Force rather than an Assault Force - I see your point. 

Old Sweat:

Stipulated that this may be another one of my strange ones  ;D

Having said that isn't it fair to say that WW2 lasted 11 months for most of the Canadian Army (June 6, 1944 to May 8, 1945); that many vehicles were destroyed either by enemy action or use; that many similar vehicles of differing makes and models from a variety of manufacturers (some enemy) were in use; and above all there were a whole lot more vehicles in service?

This to my mind means that the logistical challenge of maintaining an operational fleet was vastly different in WW2 where a broken down Daimler might be replaced by repaired Chevrolet or a purloined Bren Carrier than the current challenge of maintaining a small number or vehicles in operating condition for a period of decades.

In the current environment might it not be acceptable to achieve an "indifferent" result (neither better nor worse)?


R031button:

You're not totally wrong.  I do enjoy clarity and a particular interest and peeve of mine is the way that vocabulary changes meaning over time thus making it difficult to "learn from history so that we're not all doomed" - to paraphrase.

In point of fact I accept the notion of Light Infantry fighting in Light Tanks or as Royal Marines.  Or as noted above - Guardsmen riding camels and horses. 


For me this is all about generating the largest number of effective intervention options for our Government with the available resources.

I don't believe an all LAV army is the answer.

Cheers.

PS WRT Light/Para/Helo troops

If there is a lack of manpower to effectively man 3 Hvy BGps and 6 Med BGps I would sooner that those ranks were filled first (complete with Mors, Pnr-Sprs, and DFS) then I would sacrifice man the Lt Bns.

Additional, supernumary numbers I would assign to CSOR where they could be formed into non-traditionally sized and formed raiding squadrons in the fashion of the 1st SSF.

 

[Kirkhill]

R031button:

http://army.ca/inf/

FYI

 

[R031button]

I stand corrected, my bad.

 

[Infanteer]

R031 Button is correct in the administrative advantages of the infantry's vehicles belonging to them.  As a Platoon Commander, I rotated guys through positions to give them a change.  When we had one driver evac'd, I had a ready pool of spares.  When the vehicles weren't required, those crew easily transitioned into the dismounted role and provided additional bayonets.  Just as I wouldn't want some guy to bring me my C6 when I needed it, I don't need my vehicle to be loaned to me on occasion.

As for the roles of Infantry and Armour, they are both very similar.  Yes, the Infantry "close with and destroy the enemy" while the Armour "destroys the enemy through maneuver and firepower".  But the Infantry also destroys the enemy through maneuver and firepower while armoured forces do indeed close with and destroy the enemy (ever see tanks in intimate support?).  Both are maneuver arms forces and both focus on "find, fix, strike."

What differentiates between the two is, likely, the nature of the objective and the terrain on which the objective lies.  Sometimes, it will suit the Armour and sometimes it will suit the Infantry.  In either case, one supports the other in finding, fixing and striking.  There are some tasks (fighting in mountains, counter-attacks) that create situations where Armoured/Infantry forces will act on their own, but in most situations against a competent enemy, some form of combined arms fighting will be required.

 

[Infanteer]

I was trying to suggest that Historically "Infantry" was not an arm of manoeuvre, in my opinion, and did not become so, in the modern sense until it became motorized.

Infantry has always been an arm of maneuver.  Prior to the 19th century, maneuver was simply a matter of getting to the site of the battle and moving on after that.  The growth of armies and the motorization of battle have changed warfare (not war, though), so the concept of maneuver has changed as battle moved away from the concept of "strategy of a single point".  This is why we don't view Infantry and Armour doctrine and organization in the same context as a bunch of guys chasing Scottish hillbillies around the marches.... 

As for your concern for the Armoured Corps being sat on the sidelines, your fears are unfounded.  The most heavily tasked unit throughout the Afghan mission was Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians).

 

[R031button]

A few points regards that force structure you'r proposing. First and for most in man power. Where do we find the manning to turn an RCAC regiment into an infantry battalion with one company replaced by a squadron? That is essentially what you're getting at isn't it? Two CCV Squadrons essentially acting as mechanized infantry companies and a leopard squadron. So now we need to bring these Regiments up to that strength. While at the same time, we still need some form of armoured recce, where do we draw that from? You paint a picture of loads upon loads of armoured crewmen just "sitting on the sidelines waiting for a chance to drive and shoot armoured trucks," now I don't know much about what manning is like on that side of the fence, but I doubt it's really that rosey. Similarly I wouldn't called armoured recce just driving armoured trucks. What's you're proposal for armoured recce units? Where do they fit in?

Personally I'm less worried about how many units we have, and more worried about what those units consist of and whether or not they're up to strength.

 

[Kirkhill]

Infanteer:

I think we're circling again.

I accept that troops do better with equipment they know intimately and that the best way to get to know your kit is to live with it.  That is equally true for the RCAC as it is for the Gunners, Sappers and RCIC.  Accepted and agreed.

Equally we both agree that on the modern battlefield (I think we can accept agreeing to disagree on the ancients and when they became modern), on the modern battlefield both the RCIC and the RCAC use a combination or manoeuver and firepower to close with and destroy the enemy.  (A debate for another day is whether Patton's 3rd Army in 1944 and the 3rd ID in 2003 destroyed or merely disrupted their enemies).

Strangely, I find myself agreeing that the terrain and the vehicle constitute the deciding factors.

Accordingly I bring myself back to the position that a "tracked" CCV  - nod to PPCLI Guy, tracks or wheels has not yet been decided - should be operated by the RCAC.  If a "wheeled" CCV is selected then, to my mind, that becomes another RCIC vehicle. 

But is the Marginal Advantage to the Government of a wheeled CCV over the LAV III Up sufficiently great to justify PWGSC supplying the RCIC with a slightly better protected and equally mobile (tactically, operationally and strategically) vehicle?

Or is the money better spent on a tracked vehicle that increases the Government's options?

My preference would be that PWGSC spend its money on the tracked CCV for the RCIC, complete with logistical support.

The LAV III LRSS system would be best operated by the RCIC, which already operates LAVs, or by the Arty which is handling the FSCC, FOO, UAV, Radars, Sound Rangers and mapping the battlefield for the guns, aircraft and all other "projectiles" - commandos, infantry platoons or tank troops.


The TAPV should be acquired as an A/B Echelon vehicle as part of the LVM programme and employed as rover/liaison/LOC protection/ACP.

As for the fortuitous slap at Scots Hillbillies - you have to have worn a kilt before you're allowed to make those kind of disparaging remarks about Scots.  ;D

 

[Kirkhill]

A few points regards that force structure you'r proposing. First and for most in man power. Where do we find the manning to turn an RCAC regiment into an infantry battalion with one company replaced by a squadron? That is essentially what you're getting at isn't it? Two CCV Squadrons essentially acting as mechanized infantry companies and a leopard squadron. So now we need to bring these Regiments up to that strength. While at the same time, we still need some form of armoured recce, where do we draw that from? You paint a picture of loads upon loads of armoured crewmen just "sitting on the sidelines waiting for a chance to drive and shoot armoured trucks," now I don't know much about what manning is like on that side of the fence, but I doubt it's really that rosey. Similarly I wouldn't called armoured recce just driving armoured trucks. What's you're proposal for armoured recce units? Where do they fit in?

Personally I'm less worried about how many units we have, and more worried about what those units consist of and whether or not they're up to strength.

WRT manpower - somewhere along the way I saw a ppt presentation describing a balanced 2013 Force, a Heavy West Force, a Heavy Split Force (A and B) and finally the decision.

All of the proposals generate 39 Combat Arms Sub-Units - 27 RCIC and 12 RCAC.  In all of those scenarios bar one the RCAC had 3 or 4 MBT Squadrons and 7 to 9 Recce Squadrons.  Those Recce Squadrons were TAPV equipped nominally but up to 5 of those Squadrons were Troops without Vehicles.

Meanwhile the Infantry was having LAVs replaced by CCVs in 3 or 4 Sub-Units.

Ultimately, apparently, the final decision decreed that the RCAC would lose 2 Sub-Units (down to 10 from 12) and that instead of the RCAC having Troopers without Vehicles the Infantry would have Lt Infantry troops with a few TAPVs as Weapons Carriers and 3 Sub-Units of troops scattered across 3 RCIC Regiments available for Parachute training - presumably if Aircraft were available.

Now while I agree it makes more sense to have Troops without Vehicles in the RCIC than it does in the RCAC, I have to say I would rather have those Lt Sub-Unit troops (9 Sub-Units in Total) reallocated to create 3 Deployable RCAC Regiments, 6 Deployable RCIC Battalions and a Full Strength CSOR Regiment.

Further to manning - an RCAC Sub-Unit (Recce) doesn't have to look like an RCIC Sub-Unit (Infantry).

Where Infantry starts with an assumption of 8-13 pairs of boots on the ground and 2-3 crewmen manning the vehicle, the RCIC can start with 2-4 crewmen manning the vehicle and 2-4 dismounts with whatever weapons they can load into the back of their bus.

14 LAVs may carry 140 RCIC types.  14 LAVs/CCVs may only carry 84 RCAC types.  In both cases both Sub-Units would make valuable and complementary contributions to the battle. Even if their capabilities overlapped their focuses would be different as would be their operating envelope. 

With respect to the last point about Number of Units vs Strength of Units.

There will never be enough resources to be able to do all things.  Everybody ends up doing what they can with what they have.  Infantry Battalions vary in size from 250 to 1250  (almost all of them have mortars and pioneers)

On the other hand the Number of Units reflects the number of teams that can train together for specific situations.  The more Units available the more situations that can be covered: the more options available to HMG to respond.

I would rather have options.  In particular I would rather have to choose amongst 9 Units trained for a particular environment and that have to be augmented by an additional sub-unit or two at a lower level of readiness, than have to choose amongst 6 larger units that are prepared for exactly the same environment.

 

[GnyHwy]

I'll throw this topic way out in left field for a bit. 

From a FOO perspective, I would welcome and armoured turret Cmdr and Gnr.  With this, I would need an independent hunter killer sight and the understanding that I am IC of the vehicle.  The CF armoured troopers are uncontested in the turret.  I will be the first to admit that.  The Infantry, that can match them, are few and the rest are probably naive.  The Arty and Eng cannot match them at all with exception of very few.

As far as the Inf go, it may not be a bad idea either.  The Inf Sgt is IC of the vehicle and the turret Cmdr (MCpl/Sgt) fights the turret and answers to him.

Assuming the FOO or Sect Cmdr will dismount.  If we don't have a solid turret Cmdr, what are our Zulu  LAVs doing?

 

[R031button]

Where Infantry starts with an assumption of 8-13 pairs of boots on the ground and 2-3 crewmen manning the vehicle, the RCIC can start with 2-4 crewmen manning the vehicle and 2-4 dismounts with whatever weapons they can load into the back of their bus.

I would rather have options.  In particular I would rather have to choose amongst 9 Units trained for a particular environment and that have to be augmented by an additional sub-unit or two at a lower level of readiness, than have to choose amongst 6 larger units that are prepared for exactly the same environment.

This is where we disagree. If the CCV is being purchased to provide dismounts to support the Leo 2s, which is my understanding of why we're buying it, then having it bring only 2-4 dismounts is pointless. The amount of "weapons they can load into the back" is also pointless, who will use them? Will they clear the objective with an 84 and a C6 strapped to their respective backs?

This is where we get into the other point of this argument, if a unit or sub unit doesn't have the man power to do the job, then what is the point of having it, out side of saying "oh look we have 12 armoured sub units, look how relevant we are!" Similarly, I would rather be trained to operate in a variety of environments, rather then specifically one and be shit out of luck when I do deploy to the wrong one.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Or is the money better spent on a tracked vehicle that increases the Government's options?

Track is merely about tactical mobility (usually at the expense of operational or strategic mobility).  How does pre-deciding that the vehicle must be tracked "increase the Government's options"?

 

[vonGarvin]

TANGENT
I did note that link to the page about the Infantry.  It is titled incorrectly.  It hasn't been the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps for quite some time.  It is the correctly known as the Infantry Branch.  As well, some of the titles of the Regiments on that page are shown incorrectly.  As well, the regiments from the Supplemental Order of Battle aren't displayed.  They are:
1.The Canadian Guards
2.The Perth Regiment
3.Royal Rifles of Canada
4.The South Saskatchewan Regiment
5.The Victoria Rifles of Canada
6.The Winnipeg Grenadiers
7.The Yukon Regiment


I have the link for the reference at work.  Anyway, back to the CCV/No CCV argument.  And for what it's worth, the role of the Infantry is "To close with and destroy the enemy."  No mention of by day or by night or anything else. 

 

[Infanteer]

And for what it's worth, the role of the Infantry is "To close with and destroy the enemy."  No mention of by day or by night or anything else.

Good, because I rather like getting 8 hours of sleep.

 

[R031button]

I'll be sure to bring this up next time I'm in Wainwright in February.

 

[Infanteer]

You're going to be in the NWT in February, my friend....

 

[ArmyRick]

Kirkhill,

1. The RCIC really does exist anymore (unless this government makes that change as well), just the Infantry will do;
2. maneuver warfare (and thus maneuver arms), do you understand it? There is attrition warfare, where you wear down the enemy thorugh fire power, man power and continous battles. maneuver warfare is attacking the enemy's center of gravity (such as killing an enemy leader or cutting off his supply line or destroying a weapon system they are dependent on). In that sense, you can understand maneuver warfare and recognize the infantry has always being a maneuver arm. It has nothing to do with horses, vehicles, tanks, etc, etc.

Good to go?

 

[Infanteer]

2. maneuver warfare (and thus maneuver arms), do you understand it? There is attrition warfare, where you wear down the enemy thorugh fire power, man power and continous battles. maneuver warfare is attacking the enemy's center of gravity (such as killing an enemy leader or cutting off his supply line or destroying a weapon system they are dependent on). In that sense, you can understand maneuver warfare and recognize the infantry has always being a maneuver arm. It has nothing to do with horses, vehicles, tanks, etc, etc.

Close enough.  But before we bring MW in here, one would have to explain how a junk theory filled with bad history and opaque concepts is relevant to modern warfare.  To date, I haven't seen Lind do it....

 

[McG]

And for what it's worth, the role of the Infantry is "To close with and destroy the enemy."  No mention of by day or by night or anything else. 

... and, coming out of the Second Word War, that is what we (the Canadian Army) felt was the role of both the infantry and the armoured. 
Ref: Canadian Army Publication 10M-10-48(1629) Military Science Part I and Part II. 1948

 

[Haligonian]

Kirkhill, I'm not terribly knowledgeble on this, and perhaps I'm misunderstanding the Cavalary's role, but isn't what your proposing something different from traditional Armoured Cavalary?  I was under the impression that Cavalry forces were reconnaissance forces which had a great deal of firepower and protection in order to be able to fight for information, but they ultimately handed the fight off to larger forces so they could carry on locating the next objective. It seems to me that your proposal is slightly more ambition than 3 "heavy reconnaissance regiments" but a (in your terms) "cavalry" regiment that could be employed more flexibly than just destroying enemies via firepower and maneuver.  Would what you envisage still constitue as cavalry?