Ricks Napkin Forces Challenge Part 2 BIG Numbers

[FJAG]

with 2 being satisfied with a Bde with both forward deployed and pre-positioned/flyover elements. To me that doesn't scream heavy division, airborne infantry bde, or really conventional forces at all

To me it does require a heavy division.

Note that the government in the scenario calls for a "bde size force" for arctic deployment- not "a bde".

Potato-Potahto. That's what the airborne brigade is for. What its weapon set for that role is

To accomplish the requirements within the context of Canadian geography we need the ability to bring air defense, naval/LRPF strike capability, their associated sensors, and a combat force to patrol and defend into littoral environments featuring some very non-permissive terrain- arctic, mountain etc, with the distances involved lending themselves to needing a high level of strategic mobility and being designed to be effective while very dispersed.

I have nothing against any of those including littoral forces. In my napkin above, the two coastal regiments are littoral with amphibious and mountain capabilities for the defence of Canada. It's a littoral force for Scandinavia I thought undesirable.

My airborne brigade forms the land component of northern defence. Because of the vast distances and complexity of terrain involved I think that all the other things that you describe are best RCN and RCAF forces.

...better fulfills the government's ask than a host of conventional Bde's, it also could also provide an expeditionary capability with very meaningful strategic implications.

Don't undervalue conventional forces. The current Ukrainian war is using up conventional forces in large numbers. There's a role for all the magical flim-flam but at the end of the day when the enemy comes at you with people, you will also need people to fight back with. What you have to take into consideration is that those "conventional" forces are for a large part low cost reservists which gives you a capability with potential that can't be easily created from scratch when required.

 

[KevinB]

A key deficiency in the ORBATs offered I think is the lack of theatre sustainment forces.
If we want to sustain a Div in combat we will likely need to have a Bde size theatre sustainment command with elements to open and run a SPOD, an APOD and then move fuel, ammunition, food, spares etc. forward to the Div Sustainment Bde.

Admittedly I never finished my Corps units as I had slightly more than 5k PRes left.

A good point, as I had effectively assumed that any DIV commitment would mean a mobilization of both of my Div’s to expand the training and support side, and grow into a wartime 3-4 DIV Corps.

I can’t figure out how to fix the size of my PPT ORBATS either as when I covert slide to jpg’s they are fairly tough to fit in a webpage

 

[FJAG]

A key deficiency in the ORBATs offered I think is the lack of theatre sustainment forces.
If we want to sustain a Div in combat we will likely need to have a Bde size theatre sustainment command with elements to open and run a SPOD, an APOD and then move fuel, ammunition, food, spares etc. forward to the Div Sustainment Bde.

That's a very real question.

In my two div model only 1 Div is deployable so its sustainment brigade would deploy in the Div sustainment role.

CA Two Div model

2 Div, OTOH, is not a deployable div HQ and its forces are seen as deploying as separate entities or to augment other formations. 36 Sustainment Brigade and 37 Engineer Brigade are available for general taskings such as augmenting host nation theatre-level infrastructure, sustainment and medical support for a deployed 1 Div.

To an extent that begs the question as to what happens if 1 Div is deployed with theatre support and 2 Div has to respond to some defence of Canada missions. Will the fixed base infrastructure of the CASG and the various Bde Svc Bns of 2 Div's individual brigades be sufficient for that?

 

[Fabius]

That's a very real question.

In my two div model only 1 Div is deployable so its sustainment brigade would deploy in the Div sustainment role.

CA Two Div model

2 Div, OTOH, is not a deployable div HQ and its forces are seen as deploying as separate entities or to augment other formations. 36 Sustainment Brigade and 37 Engineer Brigade are available for general taskings such as augmenting host nation theatre-level infrastructure, sustainment and medical support for a deployed 1 Div.

To an extent that begs the question as to what happens if 1 Div is deployed with theatre support and 2 Div has to respond to some defence of Canada missions. Will the fixed base infrastructure of the CASG and the various Bde Svc Bns of 2 Div's individual brigades be sufficient for that?

It could work in a pinch to use the Sustainment Bde and Engineer Bde from a combat division but I am not sure ultimately if those formations would have the right mix of equipment, skills and capabilities required for theatre sustainment.

This is a very good read about how the US Army managed theatre level sustainment in OIF and some of the factors.

Sustainment of US Army Forces in OIF

 

[FJAG]

It could work in a pinch to use the Sustainment Bde and Engineer Bde from a combat division but I am not sure ultimately if those formations would have the right mix of equipment, skills and capabilities required for theatre sustainment.

This is a very good read about how the US Army managed theatre level sustainment in OIF and some of the factors.

Sustainment of US Army Forces in OIF

Yup. Got that one.

I think the issue is how you organize those elements. What are the equipment holdings and makeup of each component. I've gone fairly generic with a special troops battalion, a logistics battalion, a transport battalion and a maintenance battalion for each divisional sustainment brigade. Those do not need to be identical battalions. For example the 1 Div tpt bn could have a higher ratio of HET/tank transporters while the 2 Div log bn could have a terminal POL company and a terminal ammunition company. The engineer brigade could have a higher ratio of engr support by way of vertical and horizontal construction companies rather than field engineers.

I tend to see 2 Div's sustainment brigade to be theatre support oriented. The one thing I would like to do with 2 Div's (and in part 1 Div's) sustainment brigades is have them be the source of manning for and the replacement of the dreaded ad hoc NSEs for everything from the deployment of battle groups to a full division so that the organic bde svc bns and can do their design functions and not be stripped of personnel.

This is one of the main reasons why I'm prepared to take about 4,000 RegF inf, armour and arty positions and convert them to sustainment.

 

[ArmyRick]

Yup. Got that one.

I think the issue is how you organize those elements. What are the equipment holdings and makeup of each component. I've gone fairly generic with a special troops battalion, a logistics battalion, a transport battalion and a maintenance battalion for each divisional sustainment brigade. Those do not need to be identical battalions. For example the 1 Div tpt bn could have a higher ratio of HET/tank transporters while the 2 Div log bn could have a terminal POL company and a terminal ammunition company. The engineer brigade could have a higher ratio of engr support by way of vertical and horizontal construction companies rather than field engineers.

I tend to see 2 Div's sustainment brigade to be theatre support oriented. The one thing I would like to do with 2 Div's (and in part 1 Div's) sustainment brigades is have them be the source of manning for and the replacement of the dreaded ad hoc NSEs for everything from the deployment of battle groups to a full division so that the organic bde svc bns and can do their design functions and not be stripped of personnel.

This is one of the main reasons why I'm prepared to take about 4,000 RegF inf, armour and arty positions and convert them to sustainment.

Wolf, I just finished reading your book "Unsustainable at any price".

Very insightful, illuminating and well thought out. I disagree with a few minor things but overall, I really like your plan.

 

[FJAG]

Wolf, I just finished reading your book "Unsustainable at any price".

Very insightful, illuminating and well thought out. I disagree with a few minor things but overall, I really like your plan.

This is the 2nd edition of the book. I wrote the first one three-four years ago in conjunction with a Canadian Military Journal article. The reason there is a 2nd edition is because, with time and with discussions on this forum, I changed my ideas about how to go about it. I'd be very surprised if there weren't many people with differing ideas about how to go about changing things. Some of those ideas I've disagree with in these forums. Others made me move the goalposts of my own ideas.

I'd be happy to hear which things you'd do differently either here or by PM.

 

[ArmyRick]

This is the 2nd edition of the book. I wrote the first one three-four years ago in conjunction with a Canadian Military Journal article. The reason there is a 2nd edition is because, with time and with discussions on this forum, I changed my ideas about how to go about it. I'd be very surprised if there weren't many people with differing ideas about how to go about changing things. Some of those ideas I've disagree with in these forums. Others made me move the goalposts of my own ideas.

I'd be happy to hear which things you'd do differently either here or by PM.

For sure, is there a thread for that?

 

[FJAG]

For sure, is there a thread for that?

There are two that generally talk about that. "Informing the Army's Future Structure" and "Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves." The former is probably the more relevant.

 

[ArmyRick]

There are two that generally talk about that. "Informing the Army's Future Structure" and "Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves." The former is probably the more relevant.

lemme get into that soon, not tonight. I am on both those discussions. I gotta get that other book you recommend by Champion as well.

 

[Kirkhill]

I warned of more to follow....



I have been highlighting this view of the Arctic. It emphasises the position of Canada with respect to Eurasia and the Arctic Ocean and the role of the Arctic in managing the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

Throw in the US/Them line and the impact of aerial assets and you get my NORAD centric view of Homeland Defenc(s)e.



But that isn't the real world.
This is the real world.

World of Change: Arctic Sea Ice Several record-setting summer lows, combined with poor wintertime recoveries, have fueled a persistent decline over the past few decades. earthobservatory.nasa.gov

At least that is part of the real world picture - an ice-cube bobbing around on top of the Arctic Ocean, that shrinks and expands every year.
But that is still not the whole picture.
This is.



At this time of year you could run a dog sled from San Francisco to Kyiv. Or Seoul if you prefer. And at the Iditarod pace of 1800 km in 10 days you could cover the distance in 50 or 60 days. Long before the ice melts for the season. Canada - 9 months of winter and 3 months of hard sledding. Dogs and sleds have been around for at least the last 10,000 years. Reindeers or Caribou will haul more, farther and faster and give you a drink of milk along the way. But I digress.

The important bits are:

The Arctic is Ice.
Ice divides the Sky from the Water.
Ice extends the Land over the Water.
Ice is seasonal.

Canada is a seasonal country and so is its Arctic.

Waterborne transportation in Canada has always been seasonal. Run down river in the spring freshets after break up. Go back up river when the flow slackens. Or wait a little longer until it freezes up again and have your dogs haul you back home. There is a distinctly Canadian rhythm to life up here. A rhythm that extends all the way south to the St Lawrence and the opening of the Seaway.

Canada's Arctic has to be managed according to that rhythm. Summer and Winter.

Air power can assist the efforts on the Ground and those in the Water year round. But it cannot defend Canada unassisted. It needs help from others.

In winter, in particular, it is necessary to penetrate under the Ice.

....

Previously I made note of the strategic importance of the Arctic Ocean as a transit route between the Atlantic and Pacific and also as a Bastion for SLBMs. Everybody's SLBMs. It is also a buffer zone between Eurasia and the Americas, us. Dominating that space is important. As much as our government subscribes to the theory of the Commons I am of the common opinion that that leads to tragedy. Enclosure is a better policy. But if we are going to claim our enclosure then we had best define and control it

....

Most of our Arctic Enclosure is Water. And for most of the year a good chunk of it is covered with Ice, hiding the activity below it. This is what limits the efficacy of aerial assets.

Conventionally water is controlled by ships. But as the RN demonstrated, ships don't fare so well in the Ice. What does work well in the Ice are submarines. In particular nuclear submarines. Very capable, with lots of sensors, and lots of effectors and very expensive. And requiring lots of well trained crew and a massive support system. For a variety of reasons they have not been a popular solution for the RCN.

But are they necessary to control our Arctic?

I said that most of our Arctic Enclosure is Water. A large part of it is actually land. And that land creates passages, channels or, if you might, canals. There are a limited number of routes through the islands of the Arctic from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

This is due to the dominating presence of three islands: Baffin, Ellesmere and our Danish neighbour, Greenland. The gap between Baffin and Ellesmere Island is filled by Devon Island.




So, about those Passages.

Not all of them are viable, even during the summer months. The southern ones tend to be about 50 m deep (0 to 100 m) and can shoal up to 0 m where they don't actually bump into islands. Baffin Island is an island in name only. It functions more like a peninsular extension of the mainland.

The more practicable routes are those north of Baffin Island. Those routes sound out over 100 m deep and can be in the neighbourhood of 500 m deep. But there really are only three of those routes:

Nares Strait between Greenland and Ellesmere which is only 25 km wide at its entrance, adjacent to Alert, 40 km at its southern exit and as narrow as 15 km at Hans Island;

Parry Channel between Baffin and Devon which shoals up to around 100 m in the neighbourhood of Resolute on Cornwallis Island, just west of Devon and;

Jones Sound between Ellesmere and Devon which rises to a depth of about 150 at the 15 km wide choke point between Devon and Ellesmere.

Three routes that might be accessible to submarines with a brave captain and/or an agreeable host.

...

Do we really need submarines to control those choke points?

How about a Gibraltar strategy?

....

Submarines control their environment with torpedoes. They monitor their environment with sound. Sound ranges far and wide. Torpedoes have a functional range of about 50 km from Open Source Intelligence

....

Drawing some 50 km circles around our Arctic choke points yields this map



Call it 8 Choke Points if we include the eastern entrance to Hudson Strait at the south end of Baffin Island, 9 if we take into account the need for a twin capability their due to the limited range of a torpedo.

Now we could park a sub, or even an AOPS, or both, at each of those Choke Points. And build 3 or 4 more to maintain a permanent presence.

Or we could do the other thing.

A submarine sits, listens with microphones and launches torpedoes. It typically has 6 tubes of 21" diameter and 3 or 4 reloads for each tube.

Rather than buying submarines to defend our Arctic Archipelago, to monitor our Passages and control our traffic why not buy a 21" drill?
And at each choke point start drilling, slantwise, from the dry surface, through the living rock until you reach salt water. Drill 8 tubes at each location. Fill 6 tubes with 50 km heavy torpedoes and use two for microphones. Connect all systems to command and the Common Picture by radio, or satellite or Link or whatever works best.

It would be cheaper. By orders of magnitude.
It could be remotely monitored and controlled, from a couch (just like the Valkyrie type UAVs).
And, by tucking everything into tubes you protect all of that sensitive electronic stuff from the risk of ice and rocks ripping your gear apart.

....

Companion effectors for the Arctic. UAVs and Torpedoes. Without the need for aircraft, airfields, ships or submarines. The backyard is secured and the money saved can be expended on expeditionary forces that will buy us some influence internationally.

....

One final point -

Securing the ground.

This is not an army job.

In the US the defence of the Homeland largely falls on the Guard: the Coast GUARD and the National GUARD and the offspring of the National GUARD, the Air National GUARD. The GUARD has a very high civilian component, a large component of part timers and has a broad spectrum of responsibilities that range from intercepting incoming missiles as well as foreign vessels to supplying SAR services, putting out fires and responding to disasters.

In the Canadian context I would suggest looking at our RCMP, our Coast Guard and the RCAF's Yellow Fleet and NORAD response and considering them along with the Canadian Rangers as a domestic Scarlet Force. Expand the Rangers and increase their capabilities. The Rangers are a national institution. Although they are associated with the First Nations they also have a "Settler" component. Newfoundland, the Island, has its own Ranger patrols. And there aren't many Beothuks in evidence on the Rock these days.

Those are the elements around which I would build a national force, that parallels the US Guard forces in both their civil and military roles.

....

The proper role of the CAF, in my view, is more akin to the US Marines. A multidomain force that supports an active Global Affairs policy to increase Canada's influence on the world stage. A Blue Force.

And on that.....

More to follow..

...

PS Why do I include the RCMP in the domestic Scarlet Force, beyond the colour of the uniform and their omnipresence? Because there has been some recent discussion about revisiting the RCMP's roles and perhaps separating its patrolling and local policing duties from national security and investigative duties. I think that organizing that the existing RCMP community policing structure, combined with the RCAF SAR and the Coast Guard as well as an enhanced Ranger component would be complementary.

NORAD, would continue as is, although perhaps there should be a Ranger element in airfield security and local air defence.

Class C, B and A service. All separate from the Blue Force FTE requirements.

 

[KevinB]

I warned of more to follow....

View attachment 83561

I have been highlighting this view of the Arctic. It emphasises the position of Canada with respect to Eurasia and the Arctic Ocean and the role of the Arctic in managing the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

Throw in the US/Them line and the impact of aerial assets and you get my NORAD centric view of Homeland Defenc(s)e.

View attachment 83562

But that isn't the real world.
This is the real world.

View attachment 83563

World of Change: Arctic Sea Ice Several record-setting summer lows, combined with poor wintertime recoveries, have fueled a persistent decline over the past few decades. earthobservatory.nasa.gov

At least that is part of the real world picture - an ice-cube bobbing around on top of the Arctic Ocean, that shrinks and expands every year.
But that is still not the whole picture.
This is.

View attachment 83564

At this time of year you could run a dog sled from San Francisco to Kyiv. Or Seoul if you prefer. And at the Iditarod pace of 1800 km in 10 days you could cover the distance in 50 or 60 days. Long before the ice melts for the season. Canada - 9 months of winter and 3 months of hard sledding. Dogs and sleds have been around for at least the last 10,000 years. Reindeers or Caribou will haul more, farther and faster and give you a drink of milk along the way. But I digress.

The important bits are:

The Arctic is Ice.
Ice divides the Sky from the Water.
Ice extends the Land over the Water.
Ice is seasonal.

Canada is a seasonal country and so is its Arctic.

Waterborne transportation in Canada has always been seasonal. Run down river in the spring freshets after break up. Go back up river when the flow slackens. Or wait a little longer until it freezes up again and have your dogs haul you back home. There is a distinctly Canadian rhythm to life up here. A rhythm that extends all the way south to the St Lawrence and the opening of the Seaway.

Canada's Arctic has to be managed according to that rhythm. Summer and Winter.

Air power can assist the efforts on the Ground and those in the Water year round. But it cannot defend Canada unassisted. It needs help from others.

In winter, in particular, it is necessary to penetrate under the Ice.

....

Previously I made note of the strategic importance of the Arctic Ocean as a transit route between the Atlantic and Pacific and also as a Bastion for SLBMs. Everybody's SLBMs. It is also a buffer zone between Eurasia and the Americas, us. Dominating that space is important. As much as our government subscribes to the theory of the Commons I am of the common opinion that that leads to tragedy. Enclosure is a better policy. But if we are going to claim our enclosure then we had best define and control it

100% agreed so far.

....

Most of our Arctic Enclosure is Water. And for most of the year a good chunk of it is covered with Ice, hiding the activity below it. This is what limits the efficacy of aerial assets.

Conventionally water is controlled by ships. But as the RN demonstrated, ships don't fare so well in the Ice. What does work well in the Ice are submarines. In particular nuclear submarines. Very capable, with lots of sensors, and lots of effectors and very expensive. And requiring lots of well trained crew and a massive support system. For a variety of reasons they have not been a popular solution for the RCN.

In the 80’s the Nuke boat option was very popular in the RCN, it just died on the budget, and then the government change.

But are they necessary to control our Arctic?

I said that most of our Arctic Enclosure is Water. A large part of it is actually land. And that land creates passages, channels or, if you might, canals. There are a limited number of routes through the islands of the Arctic from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

This is due to the dominating presence of three islands: Baffin, Ellesmere and our Danish neighbour, Greenland. The gap between Baffin and Ellesmere Island is filled by Devon Island.


View attachment 83565

So, about those Passages.

Not all of them are viable, even during the summer months. The southern ones tend to be about 50 m deep (0 to 100 m) and can shoal up to 0 m where they don't actually bump into islands. Baffin Island is an island in name only. It functions more like a peninsular extension of the mainland.

The more practicable routes are those north of Baffin Island. Those routes sound out over 100 m deep and can be in the neighbourhood of 500 m deep. But there really are only three of those routes:

Nares Strait between Greenland and Ellesmere which is only 25 km wide at its entrance, adjacent to Alert, 40 km at its southern exit and as narrow as 15 km at Hans Island;

Parry Channel between Baffin and Devon which shoals up to around 100 m in the neighbourhood of Resolute on Cornwallis Island, just west of Devon and;

Jones Sound between Ellesmere and Devon which rises to a depth of about 150 at the 15 km wide choke point between Devon and Ellesmere.

Three routes that might be accessible to submarines with a brave captain and/or an agreeable host.

...

Do we really need submarines to control those choke points?

I think you are discounting a lot of other features that SSNs offers up there.

How about a Gibraltar strategy?

....

Submarines control their environment with torpedoes. They monitor their environment with sound. Sound ranges far and wide. Torpedoes have a functional range of about 50 km from Open Source Intelligence

....

Drawing some 50 km circles around our Arctic choke points yields this map

View attachment 83567

Call it 8 Choke Points if we include the eastern entrance to Hudson Strait at the south end of Baffin Island, 9 if we take into account the need for a twin capability their due to the limited range of a torpedo.

It isn’t just the torpedo that is limited.
Sensors in that sense are primarily acoustic. Moving ice and such in some areas will make them rather problematic from my understanding, one reason that most of the subsurface sensors lines are in open water is that they give a much better picture.

Now we could park a sub, or even an AOPS, or both, at each of those Choke Points. And build 3 or 4 more to maintain a permanent presence.

Keep your mobile options mobile, and static forces to augment.

Or we could do the other thing.

A submarine sits, listens with microphones and launches torpedoes. It typically has 6 tubes of 21" diameter and 3 or 4 reloads for each tube.

Rather than buying submarines to defend our Arctic Archipelago, to monitor our Passages and control our traffic why not buy a 21" drill?
And at each choke point start drilling, slantwise, from the dry surface, through the living rock until you reach salt water. Drill 8 tubes at each location. Fill 6 tubes with 50 km heavy torpedoes and use two for microphones. Connect all systems to command and the Common Picture by radio, or satellite or Link or whatever works best.

It would be cheaper. By orders of magnitude.
It could be remotely monitored and controlled, from a couch (just like the Valkyrie type UAVs).
And, by tucking everything into tubes you protect all of that sensitive electronic stuff from the risk of ice and rocks ripping your gear apart.

Ice moves, so your not going to necessarily have a clear launch path.

I don’t think anyone is willing to leave weapons unattended, so you will need to have a crew, and thus the infrastructure for them, that will be fairly easily noticeable.

Submarines give you mobility and the ability to operate all over the AOR, as opposed to being in a fixed know site that can be more easily neutralized.

....

Companion effectors for the Arctic. UAVs and Torpedoes. Without the need for aircraft, airfields, ships or submarines. The backyard is secured and the money saved can be expended on expeditionary forces that will buy us some influence internationally.

I just don’t see that occurring

....

One final point -

Securing the ground.

This is not an army job.

In the US the defence of the Homeland largely falls on the Guard: the Coast GUARD and the National GUARD and the offspring of the National GUARD, the Air National GUARD. The GUARD has a very high civilian component, a large component of part timers and has a broad spectrum of responsibilities that range from intercepting incoming missiles as well as foreign vessels to supplying SAR services, putting out fires and responding to disasters.

In the Canadian context I would suggest looking at our RCMP, our Coast Guard and the RCAF's Yellow Fleet and NORAD response and considering them along with the Canadian Rangers as a domestic Scarlet Force. Expand the Rangers and increase their capabilities. The Rangers are a national institution. Although they are associated with the First Nations they also have a "Settler" component. Newfoundland, the Island, has its own Ranger patrols. And there aren't many Beothuks in evidence on the Rock these days.

Those are the elements around which I would build a national force, that parallels the US Guard forces in both their civil and military roles.

I think you are conflating the issues.
The National Guard, and Reserves are not solely a domestic tool. In fact Domestically they are primarily a tool for Natural Disaster Response. As far as a Military Force, they are primarily Expeditionary.

....

The proper role of the CAF, in my view, is more akin to the US Marines. A multidomain force that supports an active Global Affairs policy to increase Canada's influence on the world stage. A Blue Force.

Pre 2018 I would have agreed, but the USMC now has been transformed into a very Pacific oriented force. They have given the ‘Army role’ over to the Army, and pivoted hard back to Amphibious and Littoral operations.

Canada can’t afford to do that. As it also needs an Army to do Army things.

And on that.....

More to follow..

...

PS Why do I include the RCMP in the domestic Scarlet Force, beyond the colour of the uniform and their omnipresence? Because there has been some recent discussion about revisiting the RCMP's roles and perhaps separating its patrolling and local policing duties from national security and investigative duties. I think that organizing that the existing RCMP community policing structure, combined with the RCAF SAR and the Coast Guard as well as an enhanced Ranger component would be complementary.

The RCMP isn’t organized anymore as a force with cannon and cavalry. You’d need to greatly increase its numbers and budget to make it a viable force for that.

Yellow SAR isn’t a military tool, even though it’s conducted by the RCAF, you’d need to dramatically increase its capabilities and budget to use as a patrolling force or anything beyond its current mandate.

The CCG, well it’s been very clear it doesn’t want any sort of LE role, and you’d be hard pressed to dramatically change its culture.

Agreed on the Rangers, but I think you also need to be realistic in what they offer, and I think you’d get a lot more bang for one’s buck with have Arctic Coy’s that go out routinely with Ranger patrols.

NORAD, would continue as is, although perhaps there should be a Ranger element in airfield security and local air defence.

I don’t think you would find a lot of Rangers who have any interest in that.

Class C, B and A service. All separate from the Blue Force FTE requirements.

 

[KevinB]

I will say that both @FJAG and @Kirkhill give a lot of stuff to think about. I don’t agree 100% but it’s given me a bunch of ideas to revamp my Napkin Force.

 

[Kirkhill]

100% agreed so far.

Good stuff! So you recognize that I take note of the Ice.

In the 80’s the Nuke boat option was very popular in the RCN, it just died on the budget, and then the government change.

It was popular with some of the RCN. And not so popular with much of the USN. Even now, even on this forum, there are numerous voices talking about the effect on all other capabilities due to the resource draw necessary to sustain a nuclear fleet. Something that the Aussies are discovering now. We have got a bunch of places where we could spend that money.

I think you are discounting a lot of other features that SSNs offers up there.

I am. Intentionally. My question is what do I need to accomplish up there.

Zooming out for a bit.

The Arctic Ocean is connected to the Pacific Ocean by way of the Bering Strait, the Diomedes and the Aleutians. If you lot don't want the Russians or Chinese to transit that route they won't. I don't have to worry about it. It is all Alaskan, US, 3rd Fleet waters.

There are two possible routes to the Atlantic from the Arctic. The wide, deep and easy one is the GIUK Gap. That is a problem for the Brits, Norwegians and Danes. The other route is through our archipelago and into the Labrador Sea by way of Baffin Bay and Davis Strait. We are responsible for the security of that route. Fortunately we are assisted in the task by the presence of a natural obstacle: The Archipelago. The Archipelago blocks and channels traffic.

But like any obstacle it needs to be covered by fire to be effective. My aim is to cover it by fire.

Because the Ice acts like a membrane and separates the two environments, or domains if you prefer, the domain above the ice and the domain below the ice then my intention is to cover the two separately. Above the ice the coverage is by means of air and space assets. Below the ice the coverage is by naval assets.

Above the ice the range of assets available to observe the obstacle include Cyber, Sigint and EW assets, Satellites and Radars. The obstacle can be dominated by standing patrols by manned and unmanned aircraft, unarmed and armed. The UAVs of the Valkyrie type make for a cheap and flexible response force that may or may not be present. The opposition will have difficulty what and how many are delivered, or are on station, and what station they are on, if they are delivered in seacans. They will be further confused as to the nature of the munitions, if any, that the UAVs might be carrying. The range of options include ISR loads, SAR loads, AAM loads and ASM loads or even Mines (land and sea). They play nice. We play nice.

Below the ice I see the barrier of the Archipelago penetrated by a limited number of well defined, but hard to navigate, routes. My intention is to enhance the barrier by locating listening posts through out the barrier, focusing on the passage routes, and to place off route mines at appropriate choke points. The purpose is to discourage passage and control it. As with the UAVs the enemy will have no surety as to whether the mines (the torpedoes) are actually in place or not. Like the UAVs they are deliverable in seacans. And if they are unloaded into hangars over the tubes then the movement is hidden from enemy observation.

With that barrier fortified then Canada's naval responsibility is to cover Baffin Bay. That is navigable water that is open to surface vessels and conventional submarines. At worst they will have to follow the ice north and south but the patrol zone and the direction of the threat would remain the same. To back stop the Baffin Bay effort a secondary patrol zone in the Labrador Sea could be established. And I don't doubt the USN would backstop that patrol zone further south.

What that means is that by effectively "mining" the archipelago and covering it by air then the navy only needs to patrol Baffin Bay and the Labrador, something that can be done with the existing fleet of AOPS, MCDV, CPF and SSK in their current quantities.

Money not spent on buying 12 SSNs can be spent of any variety of capabilities - including 15 CSCs with half a dozen reloads each, 3 or 4 JSS and a bunch of OPVs and CB90s. And throw some money into the kitty to beef up Marine Atlantic's fleet of ferries, perhaps supplying them with a couple of ice-strengthened hulls as well to extend the northern supply season.

It isn’t just the torpedo that is limited.
Sensors in that sense are primarily acoustic. Moving ice and such in some areas will make them rather problematic from my understanding, one reason that most of the subsurface sensors lines are in open water is that they give a much better picture.

Sensors don't get any better just because they are mounted in subs.

My intention doesn't require every target to be discerned every time. It also doesn't require every target to be engaged. It doesn't require a firing solution everytime.

It is enough that some of the targets are found some of the time and, if a war shot is appropriate, then some of the torpedoes find their targets some of the time and generate a kill some of the time.

That uncertainty is likely to discourage movement in the first place. Tripping the network will alert the Baffin Bay patrol and help them define the route and the target coming their way. Assuming that it is not already a victim.

Keep your mobile options mobile, and static forces to augment.

Not disagreeing. What I am proposing is an effective barrier covered by a mobile force. The RCAF above the ice. The RCN in the water. I am contending that much can be accomplished without worrying about Air Independent Propulsion let alone nuclear boats. I am always about the 80% solution.

Ice moves, so your not going to necessarily have a clear launch path.

See above.

I don’t think anyone is willing to leave weapons unattended, so you will need to have a crew, and thus the infrastructure for them, that will be fairly easily noticeable.

You lot aren't particularly bothered about scattering CAPTORs about the place. I am proposing as system that allows the weapons to be delivered covertly, regularly serviced and secured by the same forces, on the same terms, as the North Warning System radars. Each of the Choke Points identified is in proximity to a local community. Many of them have existing Ranger patrols.

Submarines give you mobility and the ability to operate all over the AOR, as opposed to being in a fixed know site that can be more easily neutralized.

Agreed. But I don't need as many and I don't need the expensive model.

I just don’t see that occurring

I do.

I think you are conflating the issues.
The National Guard, and Reserves are not solely a domestic tool. In fact Domestically they are primarily a tool for Natural Disaster Response. As far as a Military Force, they are primarily Expeditionary.


Pre 2018 I would have agreed, but the USMC now has been transformed into a very Pacific oriented force. They have given the ‘Army role’ over to the Army, and pivoted hard back to Amphibious and Littoral operations.

Canada can’t afford to do that. As it also needs an Army to do Army things.

The RCMP isn’t organized anymore as a force with cannon and cavalry. You’d need to greatly increase its numbers and budget to make it a viable force for that.

Yellow SAR isn’t a military tool, even though it’s conducted by the RCAF, you’d need to dramatically increase its capabilities and budget to use as a patrolling force or anything beyond its current mandate.

The CCG, well it’s been very clear it doesn’t want any sort of LE role, and you’d be hard pressed to dramatically change its culture.

Agreed on the Rangers, but I think you also need to be realistic in what they offer, and I think you’d get a lot more bang for one’s buck with have Arctic Coy’s that go out routinely with Ranger patrols.

I don’t think you would find a lot of Rangers who have any interest in that.

I'll tackle all of this stuff in detail in another missive.

One thing that I think you constantly fail to recognize is that while the National Guard can be federalized and can be despatched to meet federal policy requirements that is not its primary purpose. The number of heavy brigade suitable for that type of expedition is quite limited, fewer than half-a-dozen or so. That is a distinct minority when considered against all the light infantry, MP, Aviation, Transportation, Manoeuver Enhancement, Sustainment, Support and Air Defense brigades that number close to 200 or so. And the force is not permanently engaged.

It comprises citizens with families and jobs. It is employed by the States to provide emergency response within the state. That requirement is entirely congruent with the heavy emphasis on logistics and transportation. That capability is well exercised domestically. It doesn't sit idle in a warehouse, gathering dust, waiting for the next expedition by the federal force.

The citizens can support the federal force when the need is there. But how much of the citizenry do you call out and how often before they decide they don't really need to be dodging bullets in Iraq. They have got kids to raise and bills to pay.

It is one thing to sign up to manage floods and fires and the occasional riot, or even the once in a generation war. It is quite another thing to find yourself being rattled around the inside of an MRAP for the third time.

The National Guard is an emergency response force of militarized civilian volunteers engaged by their state.

 

[Kirkhill]

Related - The Fortress Fleet.

The impact of long range fires.

The Army and the Fortress Fleet: Reimagining Landpower in Maritime Warfare - Modern War Institute

On the evening of April 13, 2022, two Neptune antiship missiles streaked out from the northern coastline of the Black Sea to fatally strike the Russian cruiser Moskva. The flagship […]

mwi.westpoint.edu

 

[KevinB]

Good stuff! So you recognize that I take note of the Ice.



It was popular with some of the RCN. And not so popular with much of the USN. Even now, even on this forum, there are numerous voices talking about the effect on all other capabilities due to the resource draw necessary to sustain a nuclear fleet. Something that the Aussies are discovering now. We have got a bunch of places where we could spend that money.



I am. Intentionally. My question is what do I need to accomplish up there.

Zooming out for a bit.

The Arctic Ocean is connected to the Pacific Ocean by way of the Bering Strait, the Diomedes and the Aleutians. If you lot don't want the Russians or Chinese to transit that route they won't. I don't have to worry about it. It is all Alaskan, US, 3rd Fleet waters.

There are two possible routes to the Atlantic from the Arctic. The wide, deep and easy one is the GIUK Gap. That is a problem for the Brits, Norwegians and Danes. The other route is through our archipelago and into the Labrador Sea by way of Baffin Bay and Davis Strait. We are responsible for the security of that route. Fortunately we are assisted in the task by the presence of a natural obstacle: The Archipelago. The Archipelago blocks and channels traffic.

But like any obstacle it needs to be covered by fire to be effective. My aim is to cover it by fire.

Because the Ice acts like a membrane and separates the two environments, or domains if you prefer, the domain above the ice and the domain below the ice then my intention is to cover the two separately. Above the ice the coverage is by means of air and space assets. Below the ice the coverage is by naval assets.

Above the ice the range of assets available to observe the obstacle include Cyber, Sigint and EW assets, Satellites and Radars. The obstacle can be dominated by standing patrols by manned and unmanned aircraft, unarmed and armed. The UAVs of the Valkyrie type make for a cheap and flexible response force that may or may not be present. The opposition will have difficulty what and how many are delivered, or are on station, and what station they are on, if they are delivered in seacans. They will be further confused as to the nature of the munitions, if any, that the UAVs might be carrying. The range of options include ISR loads, SAR loads, AAM loads and ASM loads or even Mines (land and sea). They play nice. We play nice.

Below the ice I see the barrier of the Archipelago penetrated by a limited number of well defined, but hard to navigate, routes. My intention is to enhance the barrier by locating listening posts through out the barrier, focusing on the passage routes, and to place off route mines at appropriate choke points. The purpose is to discourage passage and control it. As with the UAVs the enemy will have no surety as to whether the mines (the torpedoes) are actually in place or not. Like the UAVs they are deliverable in seacans. And if they are unloaded into hangars over the tubes then the movement is hidden from enemy observation.

With that barrier fortified then Canada's naval responsibility is to cover Baffin Bay. That is navigable water that is open to surface vessels and conventional submarines. At worst they will have to follow the ice north and south but the patrol zone and the direction of the threat would remain the same. To back stop the Baffin Bay effort a secondary patrol zone in the Labrador Sea could be established. And I don't doubt the USN would backstop that patrol zone further south.

What that means is that by effectively "mining" the archipelago and covering it by air then the navy only needs to patrol Baffin Bay and the Labrador, something that can be done with the existing fleet of AOPS, MCDV, CPF and SSK in their current quantities.

Money not spent on buying 12 SSNs can be spent of any variety of capabilities - including 15 CSCs with half a dozen reloads each, 3 or 4 JSS and a bunch of OPVs and CB90s. And throw some money into the kitty to beef up Marine Atlantic's fleet of ferries, perhaps supplying them with a couple of ice-strengthened hulls as well to extend the northern supply season.



Sensors don't get any better just because they are mounted in subs.

My intention doesn't require every target to be discerned every time. It also doesn't require every target to be engaged. It doesn't require a firing solution everytime.

It is enough that some of the targets are found some of the time and, if a war shot is appropriate, then some of the torpedoes find their targets some of the time and generate a kill some of the time.

That uncertainty is likely to discourage movement in the first place. Tripping the network will alert the Baffin Bay patrol and help them define the route and the target coming their way. Assuming that it is not already a victim.




Not disagreeing. What I am proposing is an effective barrier covered by a mobile force. The RCAF above the ice. The RCN in the water. I am contending that much can be accomplished without worrying about Air Independent Propulsion let alone nuclear boats. I am always about the 80% solution.



See above.



You lot aren't particularly bothered about scattering CAPTORs about the place. I am proposing as system that allows the weapons to be delivered covertly, regularly serviced and secured by the same forces, on the same terms, as the North Warning System radars. Each of the Choke Points identified is in proximity to a local community. Many of them have existing Ranger patrols.



Agreed. But I don't need as many and I don't need the expensive model.



I do.



I'll tackle all of this stuff in detail in another missive.

One thing that I think you constantly fail to recognize is that while the National Guard can be federalized and can be despatched to meet federal policy requirements that is not its primary purpose.

If you actually believe that you have been asleep since WW2 and willfully the 1980’s.

The number of heavy brigade suitable for that type of expedition is quite limited, fewer than half-a-dozen or so. That is a distinct minority when considered against all the light infantry, MP, Aviation, Transportation, Manoeuver Enhancement, Sustainment, Support and Air Defense brigades that number close to 200 or so. And the force is not permanently engaged.

So set up for Expeditionary.
Or perhaps to support Expeditionary if you prefer to look at it that way.

It comprises citizens with families and jobs. It is employed by the States to provide emergency response within the state. That requirement is entirely congruent with the heavy emphasis on logistics and transportation. That capability is well exercised domestically. It doesn't sit idle in a warehouse, gathering dust, waiting for the next expedition by the federal force.

But it’s heavily augmented by Federal funding even when not Federalized.

Let’s be honest the Guard was initially a check on the Federal Government. But now it’s simply a method of expansion for the active military.

The citizens can support the federal force when the need is there. But how much of the citizenry do you call out and how often before they decide they don't really need to be dodging bullets in Iraq. They have got kids to raise and bills to pay.

It is one thing to sign up to manage floods and fires and the occasional riot, or even the once in a generation war. It is quite another thing to find yourself being rattled around the inside of an MRAP for the third time.

The National Guard is an emergency response force of militarized civilian volunteers engaged by their state.

Again, that isn’t the driving purpose anymore. There are still guard units being deployed overseas. The Guard has shifted…

 

[Kirkhill]

< The growing discontent within the National Guard​

DECEMBER 15, 2021 7:15 PM ET

https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1064679135

MCKNIGHT: I was in the United States Marine Corps, and then I transferred into the United States Army.

He served in Idaho's National Guard for almost a decade.

My entire life, the recruiting National Guard message has been one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer. And when we served, we used to say one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer, my ass. You know, when we went to Afghanistan, we were gone for 18 months - 18 months.

Dan says when he got to Afghanistan, none of the soldiers in the army that he had to work with even wanted National Guard members like him there.

MCKNIGHT: They thought we were part-time soldiers, and so we really fell under nobody's chain of command. We were kind of on a - out on a limb.

HERSHIPS: The problem Dan was facing is kind of a workplace problem, but it's a really serious one. He's already working on what you could safely call the longest overtime shift ever. Then there are all these coworkers who don't want him there, and there's all this confusion about who's in charge.

WOODS: As a result, Dan says he couldn't get a lot of the supplies he needed. The guard members he was with were down to threadbare uniforms, holes, mismatched boots, no goggles to protect their eyes.

MCKNIGHT: We had all the bullets we needed, all the helicopters and tanks and all the things like that that we needed. But basic human survival equipment was - we couldn't get to the normal supply system because we didn't belong to the 10th Mountain Division and we didn't belong to the 82nd Airborne Division. We belonged to the state of Idaho, but the state of Idaho wasn't at war with - in Afghanistan.

WOODS: The problems weren't just about their old uniforms or the conditions that they were having to face while on deployment because they knew that there were also conditions that they'd had to face when they got home.

HERSHIPS: Yeah. There are all these laws in place that are meant to protect service members from losing their jobs while they're away on these deployments. But there can be other problems. The pay from National Guard varies from state to state, and it can be lower than what you earn in your civilian life. So you could end up losing your home because maybe you can't make a mortgage payment. If you're away, it could break up your marriage because you're gone for so long. And of course, there are also consequences that can be way more serious.

MCKNIGHT: It's our lives on the line. We're writing a check up to and including the value of our own life.

As of January 2023, there are about 450,000 guard members in total, serving in fifty-four separate organizations across the fifty states; Washington, DC; and three U.S. territories: Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

Recruiting Continues to Be Challenging

Fiscal 2023 proved to be another rough year for recruiting across much of the U.S. military, including the National Guard.

www.ngaus.org

 

[KevinB]

And?

The support wasn’t solely an issue related to the NG, that was issues related to any of the units that didn’t have an umbrella entity supporting them. Believe me you can find very similar complains about the supply in the detached regular army entities as well.

As for the other issues. Well, the did fix the Guard pay issues, as well as the other issues related to finance, as they forced mortgage companies and banks to freeze loans and mortgages for deployed members, so they wouldn’t need to pay while away.

As far as being gone for 18months, well a lot of units did that, not just ARNG.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I will say that both @FJAG and @Kirkhill give a lot of stuff to think about. I don’t agree 100% but it’s given me a bunch of ideas to revamp my Napkin Force.

I think a modern torpedo fort has value, coupled with sensors. If you have good OPSEC about it's capabilities and limitations, its mere presence puts a wrinkle in your opponents plans, which is really a forts primary purpose. A fort should be strong enough or capable enough to never have to fire a shot in anger.
Underestimating such coastal defense can come at great cost.

 

[KevinB]

I think a modern torpedo fort has value, coupled with sensors. If you have good OPSEC about it's capabilities and limitations, its mere presence puts a wrinkle in your opponents plans, which is really a forts primary purpose. A fort should be strong enough or capable enough to never have to fire a shot in anger.
Underestimating such coastal defense can come at great cost.

I don’t disagree in that. But I’d rather have additional purposes to fixed structures as well. As I don’t see an unmanned option viable for that.