New Budget/New CDS

[LawnDart]

O.K. Believe it or not, I actually have something verging on the positive to say about the CF for a change.

I've been watching the new CDS, Gen Hillier since he was sworn in. I hate to admit it, but he doesn't seem that bad. At the very least, he's quite astute.

I was totally impressed when he came out in public and urged the Govt to spend more on the military. And I like the fact we finally have a leader who realizes that in today's world, the RCAF isn't going to be getting into dogfights with anyone, and the RCN isn't out hunting many u-boats these days.

For those who aren't initiated to the Machavellian ways of NDHQ and Ottawa, Hillier's outspoken comments were significant. They were one of two things.

A) On appointment, he sat down with Defence Minister Graham before hand and worked out a plan to give himself credibility with the defence community by demanding more money in the federal budget, only to recieve it this week when it had  already been  planned for months. Or;

b) He got appointed then scuppered his political masters by launching out on a politically incorrect rant against underfunding at a time when any action they took against him would have been untenable because he was only days into his mandate. And, thereby  forcing Ottawa to pay more attention to the forces.

Either way, he's gotten his way. I think that's good. Sure beats Mr Van Doo "De buck stops wid me... duh, duh, duh. BARIL" or mealy mouthed "it's all my troops fault!" BOYLE. It even beats the reign of Hillier's predecessor, RCAF Gen Ray HENAULT-"Malaise Forever!"

I'm really hoping to see some good things out of this guy.

AIRBORNE!

 

[SeaKingTacco]

LawnDart-

You would be a whole bunch easier to take seriously if you could just avoid chucking out personal insults at people who I'm pretty sure that you have never met.

You actually had a pretty well-reasoned post going on until the second-last sentence...

 

[pbi]

While Lawn Dart could perhaps have been more diplomatic, I agree with his overall assessment (with the possible exception of Gen Henault). I also share his optimism concerning Gen Hillier: IMHO the Gen is an example of a small but important group of Army Generals who will hopefully help us break from the dismal Canadian Army tradition of bland mediocrity amongst our senior leadership. I agree with Lawn Dart's optimism where our new CDS is concerned.

There is a good thread active on this subject at http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/26665.0.html

Cheers

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Must have been a few years since you have been in LawnDart as everyone knows there is no such things as the RCAF and RCN anymore, hasn't been since Hellyer screwed us over.

 

[Nielsen_Noetic]

My grandfather seemed to like him, and my grandfather was a good judge of character.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Nielsen since I don't know your grandfather I can't say but what Hellyer did to the CF was all but destroy it. His meddling in the CF still reverberates til this day and will do so for years.

 

[Nielsen_Noetic]

My grandfather was (he has since passed on) colonel Kenneth Munn commander of the fifteenth medical company (among other things)

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

My condolences about your grandfather but it does not change the fact that Hellyer is a much vilified individual Forces wide.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Villain or not, he seemed to have some sort of vision for the military, unpopular as it was he sure as hell clashed with other liberals on a number of issues regarding the direction of the military. According to Admiral Brock in "Thunder and Sunshine", Hellyer was capable of backstabbing and empire building at the same time. I believe history proves that observation correct, the problem was the empire crumbled with the shattering blow from "Turdeau" a few years later. [spelling error intentional   ]

Brock intimates that a lot of the leadership in the RCN in the 1960's didn't like Hellyer because he had little time or respect for stuffy admirals who did their best to maintain their uppity English accents etc. Bear in mind that Brock was one of those admirals, and naturally portrays the senior Navy staff quite a bit differently. 

Brock talks about a crisis in the Navy long before Hellyer even floated unification, with trades leaving in droves, instances of lower deck insubordination due to unnecessarily poor working and living conditions aboard ships, families virtually starving due to low pay while Senior officers lived high on the hog etc.    He tries to claim that it was "he" and not anyone else that solved those problems, but the fact is Hellyer had to force the RCN to change its attitude the lower deck ranks. The process is apparently still ongoing.

Nevertheless, it appears from Brocks book that Hellyer was manipulative, deceitful and above all else, vengeful for some unknown reason. That being said, it seems that of all the services, the senior admirals in the Navy did their very best to make unification an everlasting mess that has never really resolved itself. It was never about the uniforms, it was about the vision. I quote this portion of a letter from Admiral Brock to Paul Helleyer dated October 31, 1966:

"In summary, I have, together with any number of other professional service men, endeavoured to dissuade you from your headlong rush to bring about a radically new and unsound reshaping of Canadian Defence Forces in a manner untried or discarded by other countries and ministers more experienced in these matters. Even the most persuasive endeavours and cogent military arguments have failed to impress you. All official and legal methods of approaching you have been fully exploited and in many cases have only resulted in your avoiding unwanted advice by the simple expedient of removing public officials from office or by prematurely dispensing with their services altogether.

Because all other methods have failed and because so many of your senior public officials have honourably and consistently done their public duty in full knowledge of the grave personal consequences involved; and furthermore because so many thousands of Canadian citizens in uniform are unable to convey their feelings of grave concern about the future defences of Canada, it has become abundantly clear to me that political action is necessary. To this end, I have come to Ottawa in an endeavour to give some of the other side of the story to as many Members of Parliament as care to listen. I am not attempting to influence defence policy. I am making no attempt to influence decisions upon weaponry or equipment. I hold no strong views concerning the quality, cut or colour of uniforms so long as you do not destroy the highly prized and distinctive characteristics of the three branches of Canada's Armed Forces, or so long as you recognize that the differences between the Navy, Army and Air Force are as great as the environments in which they serve.

I am urging, on the other hand, and will continue to call for a very careful re-examination of unification; for a public accounting of your stewardship since your presentation of the White Paper and for a careful public examination of what you intend to do with one quarter of our national budget in the future before you ask for a further mandate from members of Parliament to continue your pursuit of such highly questionable policies.
One further point. I have written this letter to you without seeking or requiring the advice or collusion of anybody.

Yours truly,

Jeffrey V. Brock"

       

   

 

[FSTO]

Villain or not, he seemed to have some sort of vision for the military, unpopular as it was he sure as heck clashed with other liberals on a number of issues regarding the direction of the military. According to Admiral Brock in "Thunder and Sunshine", Hellyer was capable of backstabbing and empire building at the same time. I believe history proves that observation correct, the problem was the empire crumbled with the shattering blow from "Turdeau" a few years later. [spelling error intentional   ]

Brock intimates that a lot of the leadership in the RCN in the 1960's didn't like Hellyer because he had little time or respect for stuffy admirals who did their best to maintain their uppity English accents etc. Bear in mind that Brock was one of those admirals, and naturally portrays the senior Navy staff quite a bit differently.  

Brock talks about a crisis in the Navy long before Hellyer even floated unification, with trades leaving in droves, instances of lower deck insubordination due to unnecessarily poor working and living conditions aboard ships, families virtually starving due to low pay while Senior officers lived high on the hog etc.    He tries to claim that it was "he" and not anyone else that solved those problems, but the fact is Hellyer had to force the RCN to change its attitude the lower deck ranks. The process is apparently still ongoing.

Nevertheless, it appears from Brocks book that Hellyer was manipulative, deceitful and above all else, vengeful for some unknown reason. That being said, it seems that of all the services, the senior admirals in the Navy did their very best to make unification an everlasting mess that has never really resolved itself. It was never about the uniforms, it was about the vision. I quote this portion of a letter from Admiral Brock to Paul Helleyer dated October 31, 1966:

"In summary, I have, together with any number of other professional service men, endeavoured to dissuade you from your headlong rush to bring about a radically new and unsound reshaping of Canadian Defence Forces in a manner untried or discarded by other countries and ministers more experienced in these matters. Even the most persuasive endeavours and cogent military arguments have failed to impress you. All official and legal methods of approaching you have been fully exploited and in many cases have only resulted in your avoiding unwanted advice by the simple expedient of removing public officials from office or by prematurely dispensing with their services altogether.

Because all other methods have failed and because so many of your senior public officials have honourably and consistently done their public duty in full knowledge of the grave personal consequences involved; and furthermore because so many thousands of Canadian citizens in uniform are unable to convey their feelings of grave concern about the future defences of Canada, it has become abundantly clear to me that political action is necessary. To this end, I have come to Ottawa in an endeavour to give some of the other side of the story to as many Members of Parliament as care to listen. I am not attempting to influence defence policy. I am making no attempt to influence decisions upon weaponry or equipment. I hold no strong views concerning the quality, cut or colour of uniforms so long as you do not destroy the highly prized and distinctive characteristics of the three branches of Canada's Armed Forces, or so long as you recognize that the differences between the Navy, Army and Air Force are as great as the environments in which they serve.

I am urging, on the other hand, and will continue to call for a very careful re-examination of unification; for a public accounting of your stewardship since your presentation of the White Paper and for a careful public examination of what you intend to do with one quarter of our national budget in the future before you ask for a further mandate from members of Parliament to continue your pursuit of such highly questionable policies.
One further point. I have written this letter to you without seeking or requiring the advice or collusion of anybody.

Yours truly,

Jeffrey V. Brock"

       

   

Whiskey 601, I highlighted your comment regarding Adm (ret) Brock. The process of changing the attitudes of the senior Naval Officers began with the release of the Mainguy report in 1949. This document more than any other set the foundations for the Canadianization of the RCN.
As for Hellyer, he (I will reluctantly admitt) maadmit been a visionary or an opportunist (he siezed the idea for change that was sweeping society during the 60's) but his roughshod approach and complete disregard for constructive critiziem criticisme entire unification initiative. It also didn't help him that the new leader of the Liberals was Trudeau and that the costs of defence was going through the roof.



By the way I have an electronic copy of the Mainguy report, could someone tell me how to load it for all to see.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Whiskey 601, I highlighted your comment regarding Adm (ret) Brock. The process of changing the attitudes of the senior Naval Officers began with the release of the Mainguy report in 1949. This document more than any other set the foundations for the Canadianization of the RCN.
As for Hellyer, he (I will reluctantly admitt) maadmit been a visionary or an opportunist (he siezed the idea for change that was sweeping society during the 60's) but his roughshod approach and complete disregard for constructive critiziem criticisme entire unification initiative. It also didn't help him that the new leader of the Liberals was Trudeau and that the costs of defence was going through the roof.

I know about the Mainguy report, which was produced in part as a response to several near mutinies on a few ships at the relevant time in history. From a legal perspective, in retrospect I found the Mainguy report to follow very closely the emerging identification by Canadians of a fair days work in return for a fair days pay governed by generally more humane rules of employment and conditions of service. I think Brock's point was that the government failed to give the RCN the adequate resources to address most of the same issues that Mainguy had previously identified. The point made by Hellyer was the RCN Admirals chose not to expend the resources allocated to improving  the lot of Navy personnel. The truth must surely lay somewhere in between the two poles. I think Hellyer was a tad too opportunistic in his observation, but his position was certainly not without a minimum of foundation. Still, nobody can take away from Brock the fact that "he" attempted to make things a little better, bearing in mind the manpower pool continued to slide far below requirements for many years to come. It was all about keeping the necessary people in the RCN to crew the ships, and in that respect the efforts expended did not produce the expected results- the RCN got what they paid for, which wasn't much.   

Don't get the impression I favour one over the other - to me they were both equally pig headed and in practice used the fleet as pawns in their personal battles with each other. The reference by Brock to resorting to the use of political action to thwart Hellyer is telling of the animosity between the two. I believe the letter was written coincidentally to the time Brock was forced to resign.  Cheers.

 

[FSTO]

Just to move things along a bit. I have been reading Paul Wells (McLean's magazine) and he has been sort of crowing about the increase in our budget. In response to Paul, a blogger (who's rightish politics may make some uncomfortable) has made it his mission to set Paul on the correct path about the smoke and mirrors (usual Liberal fare) the governing party has been spinning.

Anyway here is the link to him.

http://babblingbrooks.blogspot.com/2005/03/can-we-correct-record-please.html#comments

another rant by same author
http://babblingbrooks.blogspot.com/2005/02/how-much-is-liberal-promise-worth.html

and another
http://babblingbrooks.blogspot.com/2005/02/second-verse-same-as-first.html

Enjoy! ;D

 

[big bad john]

Change of Command
Billions in new spending on the military could be wasted if National Defence remains stuck in a Cold War structure
 
Douglas Bland
Citizen Special


Thursday, March 03, 200


KINGSTON - Canada's future defence policy and military capabilities have now been defined by the appointment of Gen. Rick Hillier as chief of the defence staff and by the significant, multi-year defence budget announced by the federal government. Both moves signal an intention to radically transform and rebuild the Canadian Forces. Reaching these goals, however, is not assured and is greatly dependent on how national policy and the transformation of the Canadian Forces are administered.

This applies not only within the Department of National Defence, but also in other government departments and in the central agencies responsible for programs related to national defence. Bringing policy intentions and administrative outcomes together, therefore, is the next great challenge for the minister of national defence.

The current structure for defence administration was built mainly during the 1970s to manage Cold War policies and commitments. In 2003, the then-minister of national defence, John McCallum, commissioned a report called "Achieving Administrative Efficiency." It concluded that, despite incremental changes over many years and the best efforts of officers and officials, the Canadian Forces, National Defence and, by implication, other government departments and the central agencies are "... not well positioned, from a management perspective, to meet the strategic-level challenges (they are) facing. The Committee believes that without fundamental transformation of the national-level management framework and practices of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, the CF will not be able to transform itself rapidly enough to adapt to Canada's changing security environment."

If any new defence policy is to succeed, the federal government must review not only policy objectives, but also every major aspect of the defence organizations, processes and methods as the essential first step to transforming the Canadian Forces. The aim should be nothing less then to build -- from the ground up if necessary -- a modern, proficient, government-wide system of defence administration appropriate to the demands facing the Canadian Forces and responsive to the needs of the government and Parliament.

- - -

The purpose of defence administration is to create, equip and sustain the combat capabilities of the Canadian Forces efficiently and economically with the resources provided by governments. The review should recommend ways to reform organizations, personnel establishments and other resources and direct them towards this objective.

People -- skilled combatants -- are the precious and most expensive element of any operational capability. Poor defence administration hinders the recruitment, training and retention of skilled combatants and can take members of the Canadian Forces away from combatant functions, thus robbing Canada of irreplaceable defence capabilities. A review of defence administration should determine the most efficient way to regulate and supervise all aspects of personnel administration to develop as strong a combat-capable force as possible from the total strength of the Canadian Forces.

The true measure of administrative efficiency is the degree to which national resources allocated to defence policy create useful combat capabilities. The reallocation of resources and defence effort from low- to high-priority missions to enhance combat capabilities for national defence is the defining feature of defence transformation. The defence review should describe how defence resources and people will be reallocated to the high-priority missions, not as another attempt "to do more with less," but a first step in making the sharp end of the Canadian Forces more combat-capable, relevant and responsive to Canada's defence needs.

Canada's national defence is the principal responsibility not only of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence, but of the government as a whole. In many cases, however, defence policy and the needs of the Canadian Forces clash with other departments' policies, interests and procedures, thereby delaying defence planning and adding costs to or even upsetting the production of combat capabilities. A complete defence review would seek to identify the full scope of defence administration across the government and to recommend ways to realign and reform authority, responsibilities and procedures for defence administration to increase the pace of defence transformation and the rebuilding of defence capabilities.

National Defence headquarters is organized on concepts first introduced in 1972. Changes in organization and administrative procedures since that time have been mostly incremental and conditioned by the direction that the basic structure of National defence headquarters could not be reordered. The defence review should clarify the structural and procedural needs for the central administration of defence policy and eliminate burdensome government-wide demands on the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence.

The review should also recommend ways to place authority for all aspects of defence administration as close as possible to the chief of the defence staff and the deputy minister of national defence who are together ultimately accountable for the efficient implementation of defence policy.

Changing the government's policy intentions into credible outcomes cannot be accomplished if administrative organizations and methods are unsuited to the task. A national-level review of the administrative framework for national defence would bring forward fundamental recommendations to streamline and modernize defence administration in Canada to ensure that the transformation of defence policy and the Canadian Forces proceeds quickly, efficiently, and economically. The government has committed billions of dollars for Canada's national defence, but it would be shameful and perhaps dangerous to national security if "the machinery of government," through poor administration, wasted these dollars and this unique opportunity to build a responsive, relevant and modern armed force for Canada.

Douglas Bland is a professor and chair of the Defence Management Studies Program at Queen's University's School of Policy Studies.

E-mail: db26@post.queensu.ca

 

[FSTO]

Being ashore has really opened my eyes to the reasons why the military is in the shape (equiment wise) that it is today. For example:

I wanted to by some new office furniture for the instructors in one of my training cells. We had money at the end of the fiscal year and wanted it delivered by the end of March. Since the cost was to be over 5,000.00 dollars we had to go through PWGSC, and since Public Works is up to eyeballs in procurement items for the ENTIRE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT! it wouldn't be able to get at it until mid April.  For 5,000.00 dollars!?!?!?!?!?!?! This may have made sense when that would buy you a car, but not now when everything to do with the military cost 5k or more.

The reason it takes 15 yrs to get a capital program through rest mainly on Public Works and Government Services. I don't know why it is like that but somebody should clean house in that outfit. How in christ we were able to build the equipment for our forces in WWII without those clowns involved I'll never know. Maybe they froze out the entire dept during the war and once it was over they have been having their revenge on us ever since. 

 

[Kirkhill]

The problem is the Minister in Charge of Everything, C.D.Howe, died, and forgot to tell anybody how he did it..

 

[Cloud Cover]

FSTO: regarding procurement .. surely on the left coast you have heard the story of the contract tendered in the for certain wardroom and mess "parts" for the Bonnie?  ... in 1984? Not a story ... the chairs, the table and the china were actually delivered!!! Now, what happened to them .... is anybody's guess. : 

 

[Cloud Cover]

More musings on the rising skepticism on the budget plan for the CAF :

Source:  Canoe News [online] http://www.canoe.ca/NewsStand/Columnists/Ottawa/Douglas_Fisher/2005/03/06/pf-951636.html
Date:    Sun, March 6, 2005
Title:      Liberals are paving the way to post-military future
Aurhor:  Douglas Fisher

Liberals are paving the way to post-military future

Supposedly the Armed Forces were the big winners in the federal budget. Wow! $12.8 billion in new funding promised for the next five years. Finance Minister Goodale boasted how this represents "the largest such increase in the last 20 years."

So one asks: Has Liberal thinking on defence changed? Does the budget represent a new era for our tattered military?

Well ... my warning -- don't go sending your kids to join Her Majesty's Canadian Armed Forces just yet.

New thinking on defence? Ask yourself: What other nation doesn't provide a separate chapter in its budget for defence? In our 400-page document this bold, new era for our forces got five, buried in a 25-page chapter entitled Meeting our Global Responsibilities. Our military was lumped in with -- and symbolically followed -- tsunami relief and other foreign aid.

And then there is the language used. The budget speaks of "conflict situations" not wars. Our allies may be "fighting a war on terrorism" in Afghanistan but we are there to re-establish "peace and security." If anything, this budget strengthens the notion that our military's true role is to be an alternate delivery mechanism for foreign aid.

The notion the military is receiving an immediate and desperately-needed infusion of cash is a joke. Fully $10.2 billion of the $12.8 billion "promised" won't arrive until 2008-10, which is budgetary never-never land. The minority Liberal government is preening over a promise to deliver cash relief to the forces after its own re-election, and this with the proviso that only if the country is still posting enormous surpluses at that time. This is an empty, despicable boast, given the military's plight.

Harper fudges

That Stephen Harper would actually claim credit for securing such a "commitment" from the Grits is, well ... pathetic. If Martin dithers, Harper fudges.

Only the first two years of this budget's promises can be considered in any way credible, and the cash promised is rather modest -- $1.1 billion. And $920 million of this is for "operational sustainability," a euphemism for keeping our military from further cannibalization. This two-year time frame happens to match the electoral horizons of the government. No accident, of course.

What about the remaining $180 million in new money over the next two years? It is to pay for recruiting 5,000 new peacekeepers and 3,000 new reservists. Two points here: The estimated cost to fully recruit, train and equip a new brigade (i.e. 5,000 soldiers) runs to around $250 million, so even for their favourite military role (peacekeeping) the Liberals are being chintzy.

Second, this cash is to fulfill a Martin promise from the last election that was neither sought by nor discussed with the military brass. So again, the money provides political cover and does not help the military with its priorities.

Perhaps most stunning of all in this budget is its lack of any new money over the next two years for new equipment.

The excuse for not committing cash up front when it is actually available? The government has not yet completed its foreign policy review and with it, the new defence policy, which, taken together, are to guide such purchases.

Ludicrous prevarication

Such prevarication is typical, and ludicrous. The Liberals have been "reviewing" both policies for years. Much of the equipment our military needs is unlikely to be affected by a new policy.

We need new transport aircraft, review or not, and we need them urgently because half our fleet of Hercules aircraft are non-effective while the rest are rapidly using up their remaining flight hours. Will Canada continue to need to defend its airspace from hostile or unknown aircraft? The Liberals insist Canada will continue to be a party to the NORAD, so one assumes we will need a continuing fighter capability. Our CF-18s are old, and a replacement program should be under way.

The reason why it isn't is that Canadians, the Liberally minded believe, see wars and fighting as beyond the pale for an enlightened population such as ours. Better to field a force only capable of building schools and digging wells abroad.

One wishes that the party would come clean, and elaborate on Canada's post-military future. Let it even revel in our unique aptness, so well expressed by Lloyd Axworthy, at cherishing, sharing and caring for those hurt or threatened in the troubled places.

If that's what we have become, primarily pacifistic, why not cast off the guns and bombs and treaties with the U.S. powerhouse and make our way totally as peacekeeping social workers?

 

[Torlyn]

Nice article...  I've been trying to prove this to a few of the kids I TA in PolySci, this might help them see the light. 

T