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Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

Or build Reg F units of varying readiness levels - 1 PPCLI is always the high readiness Bn in 1 CMBG; 2nd Bn the medium, 3rd Bn the low.  Pers can be rotated between the Bns to give the Bns the desired manning levels and the personnel relief from high-readiness tasks.  The same model could be used with other types of units as well, though it may require sub-unit level readiness levels (less than ideal).

If the High-readiness Bn is deployed, work begins to bring the medium readiness to high readiness, including activation of Reservists, and so on.

That would better leverage the existing Res F strucutre which is heavily weighted towards cbt arms.


The other challenge in determining a force structure is training: given the limited training time available for Reservists, which skillsets are most easily trained and retained within those time constraints?  Any force structure review of the Army needs to include that consideration.
 
Kirkhill said:
I can see taking full time personnel that want to get out of the Regs and training them for those types of roles prior to their conditional release.  I can't see taking people like myself (or the younger, sleeker, fitter version) and training them up to the requisite standards, "half-days, two days a week or up to 12 days a year".
For something like IA or Int, (merely as examples; I'm sure there are more options) that we cannot use against Canadians and quite frankly, contribute little to ongoing RegF capability, why not store the skill sets in the "two-nights a week/one weekend a month" mode?

I'm not saying all Int, IA, etc., merely the larger conglomerations -- IA Coys, ASICs, etc -- to save on personnel costs.
 
I recall being impressed with the Navy's use of Reservists in specific tasks, such as harbour defense and manning the Kingston class ships. This translated into a paper ("A New Role for the Reserve"), which was an early version of the Territorial Defense Battalion concept (although since one of the talking points was to increase the size of a Reserve unit to over 300 all ranks, this is not the TBD as it eventually evolved).

Since the paper was given in 1998, I can see there is a burning desire to examine the problem and enact changes (</snark>). Once there is an actual desire to examine the issue, there will be some pretty interesting answers developed.
 
Journeyman said:
For something like IA or Int, (merely as examples; I'm sure there are more options) that we cannot use against Canadians and quite frankly, contribute little to ongoing RegF capability, why not store the skill sets in the  mode?

I'm not saying all Int, IA, etc., merely the larger conglomerations -- IA Coys, ASICs, etc -- to save on personnel costs.

Point taken on something like All Source Intelligence.  I'm sure that some portion of that effort could be handled by "two-nights a week/one weekend a month" civilians.  And there is likely to be some other skill sets as well.

But trades like Air Defence, LRPRS, IED clearance..... wouldn't we be better served with fully trained soldiers in those roles? Having said that: "storing"  those capabilities in nights and weekend commitments from released soldiers does make sense.  That would mean a two tier Militia system though.  Some people would be able to enter certain trades off the street but other trades would require a Reg Force history for entrance.

Or you go with GR66's original thought of Reserve Sub-Units integrated within the Reg Force regimental structure.  I believe I remember reading that the French use (or used to use - it was a while ago I read it) that structure for units like their Para-Hussards.


Edit: Apparently it is still true - http://www.rhp1.terre.defense.gouv.fr/m2_OE_5esc.html  5th Squadron of the Para-Hussards are all Reservists.
 
Journeyman said:
For something like IA or Int, (merely as examples; I'm sure there are more options) that we cannot use against Canadians and quite frankly, contribute little to ongoing RegF capability, why not store the skill sets in the "two-nights a week/one weekend a month" mode?

I'm not saying all Int, IA, etc., merely the larger conglomerations -- IA Coys, ASICs, etc -- to save on personnel costs.

Just wanted to point out that IA, by doctrine and design, augments everything that a military does from full on combat, to peace keeping, to foreign natural disaster response, to domestic ops. A military commander that chooses to not use IA is actively choosing to leave very important and capable tools on the wall back home in the shop. I am not sure that the argument that IA "... contribute little to ongoing RegF capability..." really holds water.

Storing that particular skill set on a CL A basis would be a colossal mistake.
 
Journeyman said:
Oh, so you're one of them    >:D


  ;D  <-----  seriously

Yarp! And I am one of them that is trying to get more RegF buy in for IA. My dream is not as grand as the Americans or Chinese, but I do dream of a much more robust IA capability which can only happen when the RegF jumps on board.
 
dapaterson said:
Or build Reg F units of varying readiness levels - 1 PPCLI is always the high readiness Bn in 1 CMBG; 2nd Bn the medium, 3rd Bn the low.  Pers can be rotated between the Bns to give the Bns the desired manning levels and the personnel relief from high-readiness tasks.  The same model could be used with other types of units as well, though it may require sub-unit level readiness levels (less than ideal).

If the High-readiness Bn is deployed, work begins to bring the medium readiness to high readiness, including activation of Reservists, and so on.

That would better leverage the existing Res F strucutre which is heavily weighted towards cbt arms.


The other challenge in determining a force structure is training: given the limited training time available for Reservists, which skillsets are most easily trained and retained within those time constraints?  Any force structure review of the Army needs to include that consideration.

That worlks if the entire Bde is co=located - not so much when it is split between two provinces and 1200 kms....
 
Teeps74 said:
A military commander that chooses to not use IA is actively choosing to leave very important and capable tools on the wall back home in the shop. I am not sure that the argument that IA "... contribute little to ongoing RegF capability..." really holds water.

Is there any objective analysis that proves this to be true?  Over the last decade, I've seen some pretty big tire pumping of certain enablers, but nothing actually substantive indicating that there were deceive effects in an engagement or campaign derived from their activities.
 
Teeps74 said:
Yarp! And I am one of them that is trying to get more RegF buy in for IA. My dream is not as grand as the Americans or Chinese, but I do dream of a much more robust IA capability which can only happen when the RegF jumps on board.

Teeps 74 - Does IA need to be a military function at all?  Or could it be one of those Whole of Government activities?

In the days of the Raj (why does that sound like "When I was in Poona.....") In the days of the Raj what is now called influence affairs was handled by the Colonial Office through District Commissioners.  They were civilians willing to go to hot, exotic and dangerous places, usually armed for personal defence but generally relying on the local British officered police force and military forces as well as a battalion or two of British troops to hold the line.

In an era of shrinking budgets I would be inclined to add IA and ASIC to the Foreign Affairs purview and hire suitably minded individuals in that department.  That would allow the Soldiery to concentrate on doing what they do best.  What was it RH said? "We're not the public service of Canada, we're not just another department. We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people."

Edit: There is also the possibility of commissioning the Foreign Affairs types, in the same manner that Doctors, Lawyers and Chaplains hold commissions so that they hold a recognizable position in the military hierarchy, they have some understanding of the military's requirements and they have sufficient military training so that they are able to defend themselves and not be a liability to the mission.
 
Nice to see that the British seem to think we are a good example of how regular and reserve forces can work together:


Army restructuring faces big challenges

By James Blitz, Defence and Diplomatic Editor

There has never been a comfortable relationship between the full-time regulars in the British army and the part time reserves.

“Weekend Warriors” is the most polite term used by regular troops to describe their Territorial Army counterparts. “Dad’s Army” is another.

Yet, the condescending air that regulars occasionally display towards the reserves will soon have to change. For in the next few weeks, the army will unveil the biggest overhaul of the relationship between the regulars and the reserve since the TA was founded in 1908 – one which will see reservists playing a far more significant role in front-line operations.

The army is being forced to restructure itself because of the immense budgetary squeeze it faces. The size of the regular force is coming down from 102,000 to 82,000 in 2020. The size of the reserve is moving up from 15,000 to 30,000, making it a far larger proportion of UK land forces.

But the transformation is qualitative, too. At present TA reservists tend to be deployed as individuals on the front line and can negotiate with employers and families over when they are deployed. About 20,000 have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003, often with distinction.

But under new plans, the army wants to mobilise whole units of TA – often specialising in areas such as medical, communications and logistics support – at a moment’s notice.

“It is going to be a hell of a challenge to achieve this,” says General Sir John Kiszely, a former senior commander, now national president of the Royal British Legion. “You need to find enough people to double the reserve and train them to a high standard and get employers to be far more flexible about suddenly losing staff for long periods. You have to ask whether this can seriously be achieved.”

Leading figures in the reserve see this transformation as a huge opportunity. “Someone who is part-time infantryman who does a bit of shooting with the TA every other weekend will never be as good as a full-time combat professional,” says a TA colonel. “But if you give a unit of surgeons some additional training in personal protection, you end up with far more capability than the army could generate within its own ranks.”

Evolution of ‘force of last resort’

Britain’s land forces have had a large component of volunteers in their midst for centuries, often made up of infantry, artillery and yeomanry, writes James Blitz. But it was only in 1908, that Richard Haldane, then secretary for war, brought together a body called the Territorial Force, the precursor to today’s Territorial Army, with an overall strength of 269,000 men.

The word “territorial” signified the volunteers who served were under no obligation to serve overseas. Yet within weeks of the outbreak of the first world war in 1914, about 70 territorial battalions had volunteered for service in France, their soldiers fighting alongside, and indistinguishable from, regulars.

As the former soldier and historian Allan Mallinson writes in his book The Making of the British Army, the territorials were soon “blooded” by the experience of battle. “The London Scottish were the first territorials to go into action at the battles of Messines Ridge losing half their strength in the process.”

As war clouds loomed over Europe in the early months of 1939, the government authorised the “duplication” of all Territorial Army units, thereby doubling its size. On the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939, the TA was mobilised and its units absorbed into the British army.

The TA provides much of the anti-aircraft cover for the UK until 1956. During the 1950s and 1960s, however, the government allowed the reserve to become seriously undermanned and poorly equipped. By the 1990s, the TA was regarded as a “force of last resort”.

It is only in the last decade that its fortunes have again flourished. About 6,900 TA personnel were mobilised for the invasion of Iraq, and the TA continues to provide about 1,200 troops each year to support the regular army in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans.
That said, many senior military figures are concerned about the scale of the challenge ahead. One fear is that British companies will be unwilling to shift from the current loose arrangement – where a reservist gets occasional leave and training – to one which might involve up to nine months deployment every five years.

Some defence experts may view the British army’s growing reliance on reserve forces as a dilution of professionalism. But the reforms would bring the UK more closely into line with the way land forces operate in countries such as Canada and Australia, both of which have had proud combat records in recent conflicts.

“In both Canada and Australia the reserves are fully integrated with regular units, with common training standards, the use of the same equipment and similar benefit structures” says Mark Phillips of the Royal United Services Institute, a think tank, who has just completed a study of the UK reserves.

“In both countries, you even have a single chain of command. At any level of command, you tend to find that where the person in charge is a regular soldier, his deputy is often a reservist.”

Mr Phillips says one of the biggest lessons from both states is that “the capability provided by reserve forces improves when they are trained, mobilised and integrated properly with the regular professionals.”

The US has also leaned heavily on reservists during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“In the US, reserves are often of the highest quality because so much time and investment has been put into their training,” says General Kiszely. “But in the US, you have a tremendous culture of employer support, what I call the triumph of patriotism over avarice. We don’t have that kind of culture here.”

Business figures are wary. “The army likes to rehearse lots of arguments about improving the life experience of employees,” says one senior executive. “But this is a big ‘ask’. Small and medium sized businesses will suffer badly if they suddenly lose small numbers of staff.”

What many in the military believe is that if the new model for the British army is to work, everyone – government, business and the military – will have to get behind the change. “The army is currently enjoying a ‘help for heroes’ tide of goodwill,” says a brigadier in the regular forces. “But while the army is getting lots of sympathy there needs to be a lot more empathy about where we go as an institution.”


http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a1d9e826-b6ef-11e1-8a95-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2IIkX8hRy
 
daftandbarmy said:
Nice to see that the British seem to think we are a good example of how regular and reserve forces can work together:



Some defence experts may view the British army’s growing reliance on reserve forces as a dilution of professionalism. But the reforms would bring the UK more closely into line with the way land forces operate in countries such as Canada and Australia, both of which have had proud combat records in recent conflicts.

“In both Canada and Australia the reserves are fully integrated with regular units, with common training standards, the use of the same equipment and similar benefit structures” says Mark Phillips of the Royal United Services Institute, a think tank, who has just completed a study of the UK reserves.

“In both countries, you even have a single chain of command. At any level of command, you tend to find that where the person in charge is a regular soldier, his deputy is often a reservist.”

Mr Phillips says one of the biggest lessons from both states is that “the capability provided by reserve forces improves when they are trained, mobilised and integrated properly with the regular professionals.”
The authors suggest we are a model, but our military is something between how the authors describe us and how they describe their own military.
 
Kirkhill said:
Teeps 74 - Does IA need to be a military function at all?  Or could it be one of those Whole of Government activities?

Apologies for the delay, I'll address these questions over the weekend in a new thread and link to here. The one armed paper hanger just got busy fast is all...

 
Can anyone sum up what the reservists job is in Canada. I recently got into a bit of an argument and was told that reserves are not there to support reg F in areas of need that they cannot otherwise fullfil themselves. Just want to see the otherside of things before I go back.
 
UnwiseCritic said:
Can anyone sum up what the reservists job is in Canada. I recently got into a bit of an argument and was told that reserves are not there to support reg F in areas of need that they cannot otherwise fullfil themselves. Just want to see the otherside of things before I go back.

From the Army website:

Role of Reserve Force

The primary role of the Reserve Force is to augment, sustain, and support the Regular Force. In recent years, Reservists have made substantial contributions to Canada's expeditionary (international) and/or domestic operations.

Many Reservists serve full-time within the Canadian Forces on employment contracts. Since the year 2000, more than 4,000 Primary Reservists have been deployed in Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan, Haiti, and other international expeditionary operations.

Among the many ways that Reservists have participated in domestic operations, they have:

supported the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver;
assisted with flood relief efforts in Quebec and Manitoba;
participated in recovery efforts following ice storms in eastern Canada;
fought forest fires in Alberta and British Columbia; and
assisted with hurricane relief efforts in Newfoundland and Labrador.
In addition, Reservists often help at or participate in cultural events, parades, festivals and other public events in their own and neighbouring communities across Canada.

Many Reservists have full-time careers outside the Canadian Forces in a wide range of civilian occupations. Others are full-time students.

Role of the Army Reserve

The Army Reserve has three roles:

Existing Reserve units are the framework or structure the Army would use to mobilize or expand the Army should the nation ever need to respond to a large crisis as in the World Wars.
Located in over one hundred communities across Canada, the Army Reserve connects Canadians with their Army.
The Army Reserve augments the Regular Force by providing soldiers, units or specialists to the Canadian Army.
 
Teeps74 said:
Apologies for the delay, I'll address these questions over the weekend in a new thread and link to here. The one armed paper hanger just got busy fast is all... 
I can't help but notice he never did come back to enlighten us.

Maybe he's got a point; I know I'm further "influenced" on their utility.    >:D
 
I haven't gone through all the previous comments on this thread so if I'm restating something that's already been said then I do apologize.

Financially what might make the most sense would be to make all reserve regiments into out lying companies of  a reg force affiliated regiment. For example right now we have 4 RCR based in London, and if all the infantry units in 31 brigade were made into out lying companies of 4 RCR it would eliminate a lot of unnecessary upper echelon clag. You wouldn't have all these reserve Lt. Colonels and RSM's running around pretending that they're commanding an infantry battalion when in actuality at best they're commanding a heavy company. It would also eliminate all these expensive orders of regimental dress from the clothing budget and put everyone in DEU's.

 
O said:
I haven't gone through all the previous comments on this thread so if I'm restating something that's already been said then I do apologize.

For example here: http://Forums.Army.ca/forums/threads/24381/post-1011164.html#msg1011164

An interesting twist to this argument has come out in the CMJ Vol 13 No 2: Redefining the Army Reserves for the 21rst Century by Dan Doran.

This is an expanded version of the Terretorial Defense Battalion concept, which emphasises the role of local knowledge and personal connections between members of a local reserve unit and the people and places where they live and serve. This is perhaps even more extreme than many other proposals, since both normal training and even courses/professional training would be directly linked to the regions of service (instead of studying AOC and practicing the concepts vs the Lemgonians in "Final Drive" in Kingston, the 31 CBG "Final Drive" would be an exercise based on and conducted in SW Ontario, for example). As well, there is a call for much of the other professional raining to be married to the TBG concept, for example practicing road moves and convoy drills in the context of short moves through urban areas rather than long logistical moves with packet spacing etc.

While there are some very good ideas within I think the author overstates the point. I would want the Reserve units to have more flexibility than being tied exclusively to TBG tasks, otherwise they will become too overspecialized and inflexible to respond to unanticipated situations, and of course an ongoing fiscal burden to the Regular force.

 
Negative Ghostrider, I would stay away from further reserve integration into the Reg force.

My experience with having our platoon/Coy be part of a Reg force command structure has been somewhat negative.

While there have been some pretty Gucci tasking and exercises, which normally would have been difficult for us to send troops on, the squeeze has not been worth the Juice. Lost of control over assets and budget. Loss of long term vision/continuity. No control over our local training/operations. Longer OODA loop. Less flexibility and getting loss in what I consider minutia/administration.

Don't get me wrong, the Reg force is not wrong in the way they do things, it just has not worked well for us/me at the local level. It is really (REALLY) difficult for me to watch good troops walk away from the platoon when I know they are fed up by things which are out of my control and due to what really boils down to Res/Reg friction in Coy/Regimental Ops.
 
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