• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

Is there a point any more? What does the Res F provide that couldn't be provided by a Reg F capable of preparing roto 1 soldiers off the streets in 6 months?
 
Is there a point any more? What does the Res F provide that couldn't be provided by a Reg F capable of preparing roto 1 soldiers off the streets in 6 months?

The Korean War's 'Special Force enters the chat ;)

Special Force​

Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, then Chief of the General Staff was in favour of Canada providing an infantry brigade for the 1st Commonwealth Division. Since Foulkes favoured keeping the Canadian Army's Mobile Striking Force intact for the defence of North America, he recommended recruiting a separate Special Force for the Korean War.

Recruits for the Special Force were enlisted for a period of eighteen months with recruits coming from both the Active Force, World War II veterans and adventure seeking young men. The normal recruitment standards were lowered since "the army would not wish to retain the 'soldier of fortune' type of personnel on a long term basis'". Units of the Special Force would be second battalions of the existing three Permanent Force regiments.


 
I agree a whole lot. I'm a fan of the "regimental" system. One shouldn't throw out the baby with the bathwater but based on the reality of the system, we need to restructure the whole Army to make the most use of it.
Isn't part of the problem that the baby screams every time you try to change the water?

It seems we're almost at the point you DO have to more or less tear the whole decrepit mess down and start fresh.

Here's what Canada really looks like in terms of population. I say you use that as your starting point. If there's some useful pieces left floating around in the wreckage of the old system, by all means use them, but only if they really ARE useful.
Canada - Population Density.png
The problem though is the parent organization needs to be torn down and rebuilt just as much as the Reserves do.
 
I've thought for a couple of decades that would be a better model. Lean macro version of "train-to-need".
 
I agree a whole lot. I'm a fan of the "regimental" system. One shouldn't throw out the baby with the bathwater but based on the reality of the system, we need to restructure the whole Army to make the most use of it.

I'm still tied into having hybrid RegF/ResF units that vary in ratios between high readiness units (100 RegF) to low readiness units (30 RegF/70ResF) with the more esoteric, use only in times of extreme emergency capabilities in the latter. In effect, reservists could expect to rise to being company OCs or CSMs at most. Make each ResF battalion a company with a RegF core and being a part of a 30/70 battalion commanded by a RegF CO and with one RegF company and 2 to 3 ResF companies. The battalion maintains one high readiness company and a headquarters and several low-readiness sub-units.

Besides restructure there also needs to be a fundamental retuning of ResF terms of service.

I simply can't see any other solution to solving the problem of providing effective leadership and resources to the ResF without such integration. Apparently, after 70 years of dicking around, the Army hasn't found a system either.

🍻
For some reason after WW2 we decided each regiment was a sacred cow. Look at the history of a regiment before then and they’ll change names, roles, ect almost a dozen times. For example:

The Royal Regiment of Canada:
The Royal Grenadiers
  • Originated 21 December 1861 in Toronto, Ontario as The Toronto Engineers and Mechanics Rifle Corps
  • First official designation 14 March 1862 as the 10th Battalion Volunteer Militia Rifles, Canada
  • Redesignated 21 November 1862 as the 10th Battalion Volunteer Militia (Infantry), Canada
  • Redesignated 10 April 1863 as the Tenth or "Royal Regiment of Toronto Volunteers"
  • Reorganized 5 November 1880 with the appointment of Colonel Grasett and retirement of Colonel Shaw
  • Redesignated 5 August 1881 as the 10th Battalion "Royal Grenadiers"
  • Redesignated 8 May 1900 as the 10th Regiment "Royal Grenadiers"
  • Served in the Great War as the 123rd Battalion, Royal Grenadiers, and supplied trained hundreds of infantry officers and men to several Canadian Battalions
  • Redesignated 1 May 1920 as The Royal Grenadiers
The Toronto Regiment
The Canadian Scottish Regiment

The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's)Edit

  • Originated 3 September 1912 in Victoria, British Columbia as the 88th Regiment (Victoria Fusiliers)
  • Amalgamated 12 March 1920 with the 50th Regiment "Gordon Highlanders" and redesignated The Canadian Scottish Regiment
  • Redesignated 7 November 1940 as the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment
  • Redesignated 26 March 1942 as the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Machine Gun)
  • Redesignated 1 April 1946 as The Canadian Scottish Regiment
  • Redesignated 29 April 1948 as The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's)
  • Amalgamated 31 December 1954 with the 66th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA and the 62nd Anti-Tank Battery (Self-Propelled), RCA, retaining its designation as The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's)[2]

The 50th Regiment "Highlanders"Edit

  • Originated 15 August 1913 in Vancouver, British Columbia as an "8 company Highland Regiment of Infantry"
  • Designated 21 November 1913 as the 50th Regiment "Highlanders"
  • Amalgamated 12 March 1920 with the 88th Regiment Victoria Fusiliers[2]

66th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCAEdit

  • Originated 1 August 1930 in Nanaimo, British Columbia as the 2nd Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment
  • Amalgamated 15 December 1936 with "A" Company, 11th Machine Gun Battalion, CMGC, and redesignated as the 2nd Battalion (Machine Gun), The Canadian Scottish Regiment
  • Redesignated 7 November 1940 as the 2nd (Reserve) Battalion (Machine Gun), The Canadian Scottish Regiment
  • Redesignated 1 January 1941 as the 2nd Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment
  • Redesignated 15 October 1943 as the 2nd (Reserve) Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment
  • Converted 1 April 1946 to artillery and redesignated as the 66th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Canadian Scottish Regiment), RCA
  • Amalgamated 31 December 1954 with The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's) and the 62nd Anti-Tank Battery, RCA

62nn Anti Tank Regiment (Self Propelled)​

  • Originated 2 February 1920 in Duncan, British Columbia as the 62nd Field Battery (Howitzer), CFA
  • Redesignated 1 July 1925 as the 62nd Field Battery, CA
  • Redesignated 3 June 1935 as the 62nd Field Battery (Howitzer), RCA
  • Redesignated 7 November 1940 as the 62nd (Reserve) Field Battery (Howitzer), RCA
  • Redesignated 1 April 1946 as the 62nd Anti-Tank Battery (Self-Propelled), RCA
Amalgamated 31 December 1954 with The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's) and the 66th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Canadian Scottish Regiment), RCA
 
Sorry I realized I left out my overall point. For some reason after WW2 we decided that the regiments existence was more important that that regiment filling a purpose for the CAF writ large. I do t know that I fully agree with @FJAG ’s 30/70s and 10/90s but I generally agree with the idea of giving an operational capacity to the reserves.
 
Sorry I realized I left out my overall point. For some reason after WW2 we decided that the regiments existence was more important that that regiment filling a purpose for the CAF writ large. I do t know that I fully agree with @FJAG ’s 30/70s and 10/90s but I generally agree with the idea of giving an operational capacity to the reserves.

That's been the case for most non-conscript militaries for centuries, of course.

Their purpose was to, as economically as possible, ensure the sustainability of a nation wide framework to quickly scale up during mass mobilization. Our issue is, of course, that we haven't really changed our methodology since WW1...


Abstract​

While Canadians have been called an "unmilitary people," Canada has played a significant role in many wars, from South Africa to Korea, and has been able to mobilize its resources to meet the demands of war. This paper concentrates entirely on the mobilization of military personnel: the process of moving armed forces from peacetime to wartime levels. Its analysis centers on the internal and external factors that influence force requirements and availability and on the means of filling the inevitable gaps between peacetime and wartime needs. Canada's mobilization policies are currently emerging from a period of neglect and must resolve the traditional tendencies of an unmilitary people with the demands of modern conventional war.

 
Name one element of the CAF that is successfully performing its primary role of effectively defending Canada and its interests?

Has the Canadian army failed to generate a task force for an operation in the last twenty years ?
 
That's been the case for most non-conscript militaries for centuries, of course.

Their purpose was to, as economically as possible, ensure the sustainability of a nation wide framework to quickly scale up during mass mobilization. Our issue is, of course, that we haven't really changed our methodology since WW1...


Abstract​

While Canadians have been called an "unmilitary people," Canada has played a significant role in many wars, from South Africa to Korea, and has been able to mobilize its resources to meet the demands of war. This paper concentrates entirely on the mobilization of military personnel: the process of moving armed forces from peacetime to wartime levels. Its analysis centers on the internal and external factors that influence force requirements and availability and on the means of filling the inevitable gaps between peacetime and wartime needs. Canada's mobilization policies are currently emerging from a period of neglect and must resolve the traditional tendencies of an unmilitary people with the demands of modern conventional war.

Only that’s not really true is it ? We never had a mobilization plan. And I don’t see a “non conscript” army holding on to skeleton regiments without people. Even the British have amalgamated and adjusted structures time and time again since WW2.
 
Only that’s not really true is it ? We never had a mobilization plan. And I don’t see a “non conscript” army holding on to skeleton regiments without people. Even the British have amalgamated and adjusted structures time and time again since WW2.

Yes, and they mainly focused on amalgamating their (under recruited and anemic) Regular Force units, which we have never done IIRC.

300 troops in a Reg F battalion isn't much of a battalion, I'd suggest. Might be time to face the music ...
 
Yes, and they mainly focused on amalgamating their (under recruited and anemic) Regular Force units, which we have never done IIRC.
Short memory: QOR, the Canadian Guards, the Black Watch, FGH, 8th Canadian Hussars, 3 RCHA….

Don’t tell the London Scottish Regiment that. Reality is that having your reserves as Bns of your regular army Regiments allows for a much more flexible approach to things and the British tend to make the company as the centre of gravity for reserve formations with Coys dispersed. We could learn a lot from that.
300 troops in a Reg F battalion isn't much of a battalion, I'd suggest. Might be time to face the music ...

I don’t disagree about our number of Bns, it is however pretty blatant what about ism
 
Short memory: QOR, the Canadian Guards, the Black Watch, FGH, 8th Canadian Hussars, 3 RCHA….

Don’t tell the London Scottish Regiment that. Reality is that having your reserves as Bns of your regular army Regiments allows for a much more flexible approach to things and the British tend to make the company as the centre of gravity for reserve formations with Coys dispersed. We could learn a lot from that.


I don’t disagree about our number of Bns, it is however pretty blatant what about ism

I think the key principle they used in the UK was that the Reg F led the amalgamation effort, and the TA followed.

However, given the state of world affairs these days, the last thing we should be doing is shrinking IMHO!
 
I think the key principle they used in the UK was that the Reg F led the amalgamation effort, and the TA followed.
The army led the amalgamation effort, and it was across the army. Regular / TA / Reserve is just foolish. Do I think the reserves should be the centre of gravity of amalgamation? Yes. Why? Because a unit should be in charge multiple sub units, if there’s not ability to force generate a single sub unit, then why are we paying for it?

However, given the state of world affairs these days, the last thing we should be doing is shrinking IMHO!

You say shrink, I say rationalizing. I’m fairly certain the number or regimental mess committees won’t be the defining factor in our next war.
 
Has the Canadian army failed to generate a task force for an operation in the last twenty years ?
Question reframing- name one element of the CAF that's delivering appropriate capability per dollar relative to comparable peer nations
 
Back
Top