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Canada doesn’t matter to the rest of the world - and it’s our own fault

In fairness, Trudeau et al have increased defence spending quite a bit, but what they haven't done is increased capability.

I really don't care what the government spends- it's what they do and how they do it. There are lots of little things they could do right now if they wanted to- increase ammunition production for example. Fix military housing. Set up industry to better supply and domestically manufacture parts, bullets, missiles, ammunition of all sorts in general, licensing from off shore suppliers to make our own weapons. Essentially setting up a defence industry again, but this time more permanent and adaptable.

There is too much bureaucratic inertia and way too much f*ckery going on with procurement- they can solve those problems by firing obstructionists, radically revising procurement protocols, fast tracking and streamlining the contract process, accepting a lot more risk, statutorily limiting the interventions by third parties, dispensing with social experimentation, just so many things.. Just get on with it.

All of that is going to take a change of government and a ruthless overhaul of the status quo, challenging lawyers, special interests, unions, bureaucracy, media and public sentiment head on, and more generally having the wherewithal and sense of responsibility to just get things done. Defence is a sole federal government responsibility - the one thing they truly have carte blanch over and they have completely messed it up. Without the US as our security gaurantor, we would have lost our country by now.
 
In fairness, Trudeau et al have increased defence spending quite a bit, but what they haven't done is increased capability.

I really don't care what the government spends- it's what they do and how they do it. There are lots of little things they could do right now if they wanted to- increase ammunition production for example. Fix military housing. Set up industry to better supply and domestically manufacture parts, bullets, missiles, ammunition of all sorts in general, licensing from off shore suppliers to make our own weapons. Essentially setting up a defence industry again, but this time more permanent and adaptable.

There is too much bureaucratic inertia and way too much f*ckery going on with procurement- they can solve those problems by firing obstructionists, radically revising procurement protocols, fast tracking and streamlining the contract process, accepting a lot more risk, statutorily limiting the interventions by third parties, dispensing with social experimentation, just so many things.. Just get on with it.

All of that is going to take a change of government and a ruthless overhaul of the status quo, challenging lawyers, special interests, unions, bureaucracy, media and public sentiment head on, and more generally having the wherewithal and sense of responsibility to just get things done. Defence is a sole federal government responsibility - the one thing they truly have carte blanch over and they have completely messed it up. Without the US as our security gaurantor, we would have lost our country by now.
He promised NATO he would do 2% then made cuts.

He’s a shister.
 
Bold move NATO

Bold move indeed, but if I were the head of NATO I would be prepared to be let down by Mr. Trudeau...

It's his final year in office (in theory) so if he hasn't done it by now, I wouldn't get my hopes up for him to do it at all. Why would he make good on that promise when he knows he won't be around a year from now?
 

Is Canada failing to meet its pledge to NATO? | Power Play with Vassy Kapelos

Typical political pundits talking except everyone agreed to the following:
  • since the signing of the commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence spending in 2014, no gov't since then has spent even close to 2% or made a budget plan to reach this goal.
  • yes, the current gov't has spent more on defence since the previous gov't but PM Trudeau has no plans to try to achieve this commitment. In fact under his ldrshp, military capabilities and capacities has markedly diminished despite increasing demand
  • there is a increasing pressure by NATO Allies, especially the Americans for Canada to reach this goal soon yet, Canada blithely ignores military and political dangers from Russia and China

While not mentioned in this round table discussion was the fact that neither the LPC, CPC, or NDP will promise to reach the 2% defence spending goal. They all make grandiose statements about the importance of NATO and how Canada is actively contributing on NATO exercises, defence and aid to Ukraine and how important the CAF is BUT .... from what I have read and understand:
  • LPC / NDP - pharamcare is more important and there will be no more money to spend on defence. Social programs will make Canadians more happy but spending money on something abstract as defence and national security.
  • CPC - the LPC/NDP spent money like drunken sailors on leave in a foreign, now balancing the budget, paying down the debt and trying to grow the economy are the priorities. Once this is done, perhaps some more money can be allocated to defence.
  • no party is willing to increase the procurement staff and modernize the procurement system to enable DND to spend all of its funds.

Note the last time Canada spent 2% of its GDP was under PM PET in 1972.
 

Is Canada failing to meet its pledge to NATO? | Power Play with Vassy Kapelos


Support across the board - particularly from the Toronto Star and Tom Mulcair (to be fair he has been strong on this file for a long while).

The Arctic Intersectionality.

It plays to national pride.
It plays to indigenous affairs.
It plays to NORAD.
It plays to NATO.
It plays to JEF.
It plays to the G7


France 3,048 BUSD 1.9% (Shortfall 3.048 BUSD)
Italy 2,478 BUSD 1.6% (Shortfall 9.912 BUSD)
Germany 4,424 BUSD 1.5% (Shortfall 22.120 BUSD)
Canada 1,832 BUSD 1.3% (Shortfall 12.824 BUSD)
Japan 5,126 BUSD 1.0% (Rising to 1.4%) (Shortfall 51.260 BUSD)

It plays to the 5 Eyes and AUKUS, ABCA and ABCANZUS

US 21,132 BUSD 3.5%
UK 3,028 BUSD 2.3%
Australia 1,279 BUSD 2.1 %
Canada 1,832 BUSD 1.3%
New Zealand 220 BUSD 1.3%

If we want to belong to these clubs then it is time to stump up the dues.

Where might our 12.824 BUSD (17.320 BCAD) have the greatest impact?

JEF - Joint Expeditionary Force

UK 3,028 BUSD 2.3% (2021 Budget - 69 BUSD)
Netherlands 993 BUSD 1.4% (Rising to 1.7%) (2021 Budget - 13.9 BUSD)
Denmark 354 BUSD 1.4% (Rising to 1.7%) (2021 Budget - 5.0 BUSD)
Norway 368 BUSD 1.7% (2021 Budget - 6.3 BUSD)
Sweden 558 BUSD 1.3% (Rising to 1.5%) (2021 Budget - 7.3 BUSD)
Finland 275 BUSD 1.9% (Rising to 2.5%) (2021 Budget - 5.2 BUSD)
Estonia 51 BUSD 2.0% (Rising to 2.7%) (2021 Budget - 1.0 BUSD)
Latvia 60 BUSD 2.1% (Rising to 2.3%) (2021 Budget - 1.3 BUSD)
Lithuania 110 BUSD 2.0% (Rising to 2.5%) (2021 Budget - 2.2 BUSD)

JEF's 2021 Defence Budget - 111.2 BUSD
Canada's Shortfall 12.8 BUSD
Budget Increase if Canada added 12.8 BUSD to the Defence of the Arctic - 11.5%

Or adding the combined budgets of Sweden and Finland (12.5 BUSD) , or Denmark, Finland, Estonian and Latvia (12.5 BUSD).

Jens Stoltenberg is from Norway. His replacement, Mark Rutte, is from the Netherlands. Both are charter members of JEF. JEF is focused on the Arctic. JEF is moving past the 2% limit and pushing for 2.5%
 
I think you overestimate JEF, and out to lunch about what Arctic means to them, because they wouldn’t want Canada, nor the giant undefended territory it brings.

Furthermore, Canada has no business in JEF, it’s Eurocentric, more importantly the latest player in the Defense game is with Canada in NORAD and NATO. The giant monster that is the US Military that shares common borders is the guardian of Canada.

You might want to look at most of your budget data again, as most of the other laggards have bumped up, and using 2021 data is fairly pointless because that was pre Putin invasion of Ukraine, which shocked Europe out of its coma for the most part.
 
I think you overestimate JEF, and out to lunch about what Arctic means to them, because they wouldn’t want Canada, nor the giant undefended territory it brings.

Funny, because the Scandinavians were lobbying Trudeau pretty hard on Iceland this summer to join them. JEF's interest in the Arctic is the GIUK Gap, Nova Zemlya, Svalbard and Nord Kapp. All pretty close to Alert.

Furthermore, Canada has no business in JEF, it’s Eurocentric, more importantly the latest player in the Defense game is with Canada in NORAD and NATO. The giant monster that is the US Military that shares common borders is the guardian of Canada.

USA!

You might want to look at most of your budget data again, as most of the other laggards have bumped up, and using 2021 data is fairly pointless because that was pre Putin invasion of Ukraine, which shocked Europe out of its coma for the most part.

Agreed that the budgets have been pumped. As I noted. 2021 was used because it was a common base line supplied by your CIA's World Fact Book and a reasonable basis of comparison at that time.

Other countries have bumped their contributions. Canada hasn't. Canada's shortfall is now that much greater and the target has shifted to 2.5% from 2%. Canada's shortfall is probably similar on the order of the entire 2021 defence budget for Scandinavia. A Canadian focus on defending Canada's Arctic and the NW Atlantic would probably go down well with JEF, NATO and NORAD.

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Maybe we should just do our job. Eh?
 

Why Canada's NATO pledge matters | Power Play with Vassy Kapelos - 21 Feb 24

 

Why Canada's NATO pledge matters | Power Play with Vassy Kapelos - 21 Feb 24


To pick up on what General Lawson was saying -

Dual Use.

Retain the military budget as is. Relieve the military budget of civil defence responsibilities that can be apportioned under NATO rules to National Defence expenditures.

As the General said, and the Admiral agreed, there are dual purpose opportunities.

Logistics
- docks, wharves, airfields, tank farms, roads that can double as runways, watering stations for loading up mass quantities of water quickly

Vehicles
  • More of the MILCOTS trucks, pickup trucks, Beowulfs - make them available for Emergency Preparedness and SAR.
  • Buy another 24 Hercs and another 24 Chinooks with fire fighting gear out of Federal coffers and make them available to the provinces or civilians on government contracts
  • Subsidize the purchase of air freighters and open ocean ferries, along with surplus crews

Security
  • Relieve the CAF of all Cyber discussions and tuck that money into the CSE envelope.
  • Expand CSIS duties and capabilities
  • Expand the RCMP for domestic policing and VP work.

Transport Canada
- Expand its surveillance and port security budget.

Global Affairs
- Budget for meeting alliance commitments on warstocks, combined transport fleets

You can quickly add another 10 BCAD in new expenditures there that address both Canadians' domestic concerns and which will make Canada a more effective partner.

With responsibilities removed from the CAF it can focus its efforts on Warfighting.

It can start with recruiting and training. I would put retention down the priority list.
As has been mentioned by lots of folks - refurbish the existing fleets, buy spares and consumables, including munitions, invest in civilian supply chains.
Invest in sensors.

Invest in more of what is already in service.

Then you can start adding new capabilities. I would but missiles and UAVs very high on that list. I would also focus on things that can be containerized and are platform independent.

But that's just me.
 
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Ottawa’s 1980s system of buying weapons long past obsolete​

Canada’s military is short 16,000 troops, its branches are operating below readiness thresholds half the time and its budget is being cut as wars erupt worldwide. In this series, National Post examines the dangers of Undefended Canada, and how to regain our security

  • National Post - 22 Feb 2024
  • Richard Shimooka Richard Shimooka is senior fellow at the MacDonald Laurier Institute where he researches defence and procurement policy.
PHOTO: HMCS Yellowknife, a Kingston-class defence vessel, is shown. An estimate by the Parliamentary Budget Officer suggests a plan to acquire 15 combat ships could cost up to $80 billion — 33 per cent higher than DND’S estimate.

Of all the areas of public policy, defence procurement is perhaps the greatest source of frustration and misunderstanding. Canadians know something is amiss: they see constant reports of cost overruns, delays and poor performance. But they have little understanding of the underlying issues and challenges.

Those challenges include a complex buying process for military hardware that is largely stuck in the 1980s, a risk-averse bureaucracy, and a lack of political will, which all threaten our national security.

One approach to understanding procurement is to look at the defence budget, which is made up of three parts. The first is personnel: the soldiers, sailors, aircrew and support staff that make up the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Next is operations and maintenance: the fuel, food, ammunition and spare parts that keep a military moving, training and fighting.

Procurement is the third leg of this stool — without modern, effective equipment the military is useless.

A modern military requires a well-planned and properly funded process to replace obsolete equipment and adopt innovative technologies. Typically, the benchmark is that procurement should be sustained at 20 to 30 per cent of the defence budget to ensure an orderly renewal.

Underspending has several consequences, the most serious being that existing equipment becomes obsolete and worn out as replacements are delayed.
But military procurement is unique and highly complex: its operation is fundamentally different from any other area of government activity. The “defence market” operates differently from almost any other market.

Think about buying a car. There are dozens of manufacturers, offering hundreds of models, selling to millions of potential buyers in Canada. Yet the defence market is much more constrained. Canada is usually the sole buyer, and there is frequently only one or two suppliers for a product because of the highly complex nature of the solution.

One of the most challenging aspects of military procurement for governments is that it often entails acquiring capabilities at the cutting edge of technology. The cost to develop and acquire such systems are far different than buying a car off the lot. Military procurement involves a contract for a future capability incorporating immature technologies, with high levels of technical risk, resulting in increased costs, delayed deliveries and possibly less performance.

Canadians need to understand that procurements are costly programs, entailing high levels of risk: the challenge is determining what is acceptable. For example, the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) program is critical for the future of the Royal Canadian Navy and likely the costliest government procurement program since the Second World War.

The current estimate by the Department of National Defence is that acquiring 15 combat ships will not exceed $60 billion.

However, an estimate by the Parliamentary Budget Officer suggests it may reach $80 billion — an eye-watering 33 per cent increase, if accurate.

But predictions about increased costs are not out of the ordinary. The U.S. Congressional Research Service predicts buying the first 10 of America’s Navy Constellation-class frigate may go 40 per cent over the U.S. Navy’s estimated budget and be delivered several years late. Another program, to buy the U.S. Navy’s next generation destroyer, is predicted to go 33 to 40 per cent over budget.

Problems with Canada’s CSC’S program should not be accepted uncritically — the program has encountered a number of issues that need to be identified, addressed and mitigated. However, these challenges are not necessarily out of line with other programs worldwide.

One would assume that the unique nature of defence procurement would result in an equally unique system to oversee it. Yet, that is not the case. In Canada, it is not the military or even DND that oversees procurement, but Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC).

PSPC essentially acts as a purchasing agent for all federal procurements and frequently attempts to apply processes and systems for buying bridges to supersonic stealth fighters. It aims to be transparent, accountable and responsible in its management, as well as obtaining the best value for government. These are laudable ideals, but in practice they leave much to be desired. This is probably most evident in how the system deals with risk — which is to say it attempts to avoid it at all costs.

PSPC passes along responsibility for risk to defence contractors, who essentially manage it by charging a substantial premium back to government to cover any contingencies.

In reality, the PSPC’S primary interest has largely been to protect the political leadership from any embarrassments. Over the past several decades it implemented layer upon layer of processes and regulations to avoid potential problems.

All of this has resulted in a much more ponderous and Byzantine system that has led to increased delays and driven up program costs.

A recent example is the Remotely Piloted Air System program, which will provide Canada with an armed reconnaissance drone that required 17 years to acquire. PSPC took that long to settle on roughly the same option that the Air Force had originally desired 17 years earlier. It will require another five years to bring into service.

Most of Canada’s allies took four years or less to undertake the same process.
Yet the problem goes further than just PSPC, which is responsible for bringing together all the relevant stakeholders from across the government, including the Treasury Board, DND, the military, and the Innovation, Science and Economic Development Department.

The thinking goes that by having all of them at the table, various representatives can ensure their interests are met through the collaborative process. The reality has shown this is not the case. The result is usually greater discord and delays to procurements with questionable benefits.

The most important outcome, delivering effective systems to the military in a timely manner, quickly becomes crowded out by these other concerns.
The problem was evident in the past year when DND launched several “urgent operational requirements” that included new man-portable (that is, shoulder-launched) anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems. Instead of making a quick sole-sourced acquisition that would immediately address the deficiency, the government decided to run a competition, delaying delivery for at least another two years.

It typifies the challenges the CAF faces in trying to obtain even critical systems in a timely fashion.

In response, DND has tended to pursue fewer projects. Instead, it “gold plates” the requirements — making them more capable to cover a number of mission sets, where several programs would be more appropriate. These gold-plated programs have much greater technical risk and are more likely to encounter problems later.
A decade ago, the procurement system was seen as a problem but not a lethal threat. Today, it is a bona fide threat to Canada’s security considering the changing nature of war.

Mirroring the dramatic shifts in civil innovation such as with AI and the internet, military technological development has advanced at an accelerated rate over the past decade. One of the ways is the nexus between high-bandwidth battlefield networking, high-fidelity sensors and data-analysis systems.

Integrating the three into battlefield capabilities has started to revolutionize how wars are fought. There are other developments that have emerged, such as hypersonic missiles, semi-and even fully autonomous drones, and cyber warfare. Taken collectively, the pace of warfare’s technological development has increased dramatically and can quickly render modern militaries obsolete if they fail to adapt.
In order to manage this reality, Canada’s allies have initiated a fairly comprehensive series of reforms to bring new technologies into service more quickly and potentially at a lower cost. That has not occurred in Canada, as the procurement system has largely retrenched back to the approaches of the 1980s.

There is no single solution to the issues surrounding defence procurement — any particular program potentially faces a myriad of different issues. A key issue has been insufficient defence spending over the past decade, despite the CAF playing a more active role internationally as well as in domestic emergencies.

Instead of spending 20 to 30 per cent on capital programs, Canada has been spending about 10 to 15 per cent over the past decade. This has forced the military to soldier on with obsolete and worn-out equipment while it waits for replacements.

One commonly discussed idea is the creation of a defence procurement agency, which was part of the Liberal party campaign plank during the 2019 election. This is not a new idea, nor will it be successful on its own. Slathering on another layer of bureaucracy and recreating all the existing structures and relationships will only perpetuate the same failures.

A better approach would be to leverage a governmentwide reorganization with some of the reforms Canada’s allies have implemented. One idea would be to empower program managers, giving them greater responsibility and authority to oversee programs.

This would exclude many of the delays and issues that afflict current programs and empower managers to make decisions that balance competing interests without the excessive process that typifies the current procurement system. It would also sharpen accountability, as a single point of contact is much easier to manage than the group setting.

Canadian civil society needs to better understand defence procurement, but there is simply not the depth of understanding or diversity of opinion in the country needed to improve our collective knowledge.

A final essential ingredient is necessary: sustained political leadership.
Like the public, successive governments have identified the problems surrounding defence procurement, but have not come up with good solutions or the motivation to expend political capital to fix the problems. Given the uncertain international environment, and the challenges facing the CAF, this is something political leaders must understand immediately. Canada no longer has time to waste.
 
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