ATOF is Broken! The Managed Readiness System is Born!

[Yard Ape]

Yes, ATOF is broken!   A three year cycle was chosen to fit our 3 x brigade structure, but three years does not work.   One brigade is supposed to be in high readiness for a year, one brigade is supposed to be in a collective training state for a year, and a third brigade is supposed to be in â Å“reconstitution.â ?

â Å“Reconstitutionâ ? is the first problem of ATOF.   Reconstitution is supposed to be a rest.   It is supposed to be that one year that soldiers know they will be home & able to see the family.   However, the reconstitution brigade becomes â Å“the Army's Bit<hâ ? to fill individual (and even whole sub-unit) tasks across the country.   This is also the year that the brigade is to focus on sending its soldiers on career courses in Gagetown or Borden.   However, in one year there is not enough time to send all the people on all the courses they require, and you cannot send someone on a course when they are running another course in house or across Canada on a task.   Some are already referring to the reconstitution phase as the support phase, because there is more supporting than reconstituting.   This leaves the question, when do soldiers get the chance to rest?   Where is the time to ensure everyone gets the required career courses?   Reconstitution needs 4 phases: Support, Reconstitution, Collective Training, High Readiness.

The management of readiness already seems to have fallen apart.   Op Athena was the catalyst, but other deficiencies in our Army were the cause.   Each brigade has 4 x manoeuvre units (2 x Mech Infantry, 1 x Light Infantry, 1 x Armoured).   This means that each brigade can provide the HQs required to sustain 2 x concurrent BG deployments overseas for a full year.   However, because the units themselves are not identical and there are only 1, 2, or 3 of some assets, a single brigade may not actually be able to sustain the 2 x concurrent BG deployments overseas for a full year.   There is also only one Bde HQ and it does not have enough depth to go out the door for a full year.   The result of these shortfalls has been that 2 CMBG & 5 CMBG both deployed units during 2 CMBG's year of high readiness and 1 CMBG is now deploying a unit during 5 CMBG's year of high readiness (stand-by for 2 CMBG to follow with a unit in a year that is supposed to be reconstitution).

What is the solution?  

• 1. ATOF must become a four year cycle and we will require a fourth brigade to do this.
  
  2. The Army must
     
  • a. develop a system to rapidly generate a Bde HQ (either by embedding personel in each existing Bde, in LFCHQ, or in coordination with JOG;   or
    
    b. set a policy that a Bde HQ may be deployed for a full year to support rotating BGs.
       
  3. Increase non-infantry establishments so that they are no longer a limiting factor.   This may include creating more of the politically â Å“coolâ ? sub-units (like Recce Sqn)
  
  4. A contingency readiness plan must exist to replace ATOF the moment Canada is involved in a full Bde deployment (Bde HQ + 3 or 4 Manoeuvre units).

With these changes, we could support 2 x concurrent BG deployments overseas for a full year (picture Op PALLADIUM before downsizing and Op ATHENA on its original scale) indefinitely.   The two BG and Bde HQ could be deployed in the same theatre of separate theatres.   During UNPROFOR we had 2 x BG and a full CER deployed in the same theatre.   Could this be sustainable now?

 

[McG]

In September 04, the CLS issued an Army regeneration plan.  A significant component of this plan included details of the new Managed Readiness System which has replaced (or evolved from) ATOF.  The new system is still based on a three year cycle and the management of twelve task force HQs (same as BG HQs).  What stands out about the new managed readiness is the commitment to maintain a strategic reserve BG in addition to indefinitely sustaining two deployed BGs (in the same or separate theaters).  This stratigic reserve could be deployed as part of Canada's standing commitments to NATO and the UN, or it could be deployed on any other unforcasted operation that the goverment wants to launch on.

 

[Bartok5]

YardApe,

Everything that you said is true.   The "ATOF" did not survive contact with reality, just as everyone in the field force predicted.   Heck - the ink wasn't even dry on the plan before it was thrown into utter irrelevance by the politically-driven Brigade (minus) commitment to ISAF.

McG has a handle on the latest "sustainable" iteration of the now-defunct ATOF.   To whit - the "Managed Readiness Plan".    As he noted, this plan sees 2 x "Task Forces" (not battlegroups - see below) prepared to go out the door at any given time.   They can go together with a formation HQ, or they can go separately to different geographical locations.   Aside from that, there is a 3rd element (not necessarily a unit) ear-marked as the "Surge/Contingency" element to take up the slack should overseas reinforcement or domestic requirements come to the fore.   That is it - that is all that the Army is considered to be capable of on a sustainable basis.

It is critical to note that the "Task Forces" envisioned in the Managed Readiness Cycle have nothing to do with battalions or regiments as they currently exist within the domestic Land Force.   Instead, these "Task Forces" are "plug and play" entities based on a lead unit HQ, and a combination of light infantry companies, mechanized infantry companies, reconnaissance squadrons (or not), engineer elements (or not), and an NSE.   The rotation "plan" is set through the "Interim Army" period to the "Army of Tommorrow".   It takes into account projected equipment fielding (eg.   the DFS "System of Systems" debacle), the implied "bean-counter" limitations of "Whole Fleet Management", etc.  

I suspect that I don't need to specify the implications of such an approach for our existing battalions and regiments.   If you haven't cottoned onto the program by this point, I will make it clear.   Straight from the top, the intent is that our existing field force battalions and regiments are now relegated to "force generation".   Meaning that they are now solely responsible for generating companies and platoons to go out the door under someone else's "task force" command.   Those "Task Force Commands" have been scheduled from now until 2010.   Want to know whether or not your unit command staff is going to lead a "Task Force"?   Look on the DIN - it is all laid out - assuming that that another "Op Athena" doesn't come along to throw everything into utter disarray.  

It is worth noting that even if your unit is scheduled to lead a "Task Force", that doesn't mean that the bulk of the unit itself will be deployed.   As I said, units are now merely "plug and play" force generators. To give you an example, if 2 PPCLI is designated as a Task Force "lead", that entity will most likely only deploy with one of 2 PPCLI's mechanized infantry companies.   The other company(s) will likely come from 3 or 1 PPCLI (if at all).   Other elements of 2 PPCLI such as the Recce and Sigs Platoons may be part of the Task Force, but no guarantees of that.   Likewise the Administration Company - they would likely be rolled into the Task Force NSE.   As it currently stands, we as an Army have just dropped a significant notch.   Whereas Brigades used to force-generate and deploy units augmented by other elements of the brigade, the current plan calls for units to force-generate and contribute sub-units (or sub-sub-units) to a unit-led "Task Force".    This plan understandably raises a whole host of questions.   Cohesion?   Common training standards?   Unit Training?   Etc, etc, etc.

According to the "bean counter" plan, units in Canada will no longer train as battalions, regiments or battlegroups.   A typical infantry battalion will have one of its companies deployed on operations with a "Task Force" led by a different Unit HQ, a second company in the "training phase" under the direction of yet another unit HQ, and its third company in reconstitution just having returned from a deployment as part of yet another unit-led Task Force.   Unit HQs will be relegated to nothing more than "personnel management" in the absence of a "Task Force" HQ role.  

I will leave it at that for now.   If you want to know the "Army Deployment Plan" from now until 2010, you can find it on the DIN.   Of course, all it will take is another government "rush of blood" to throw this latest iteration of the "ATOF" into similar disarray.   The fundamental difference now is that we as an institution have accepted the idea of units as force-generators for sub-unit "plug and play".   This, despite all of the myriad lessons of the past to the contrary.  

Maybe it's just me, but when you are forced to gnaw on your own institutional limbs (eg. units) to "force generate", there is a serious problem.   We are already at the point where we are robbing platoons from multiple units to field these cobbled-together abortions.   3 PPCLI's Recce Platoon is currently in Kabul supporting an LdSH Recce Sqn, along with a Company (-) from 1 PPCLI for contingent security.   So how are those 3 units able to train back in Canada lacking critical components?   The answer is, they aren't.   But that's OK, because 1 PPCLI, 3 PPCLI and the LdSH (RC) are no longer expected nor required to train at unit level.   It is all about "Task Forces".   So what's next - "Force Generation" at the section level?   Wait for it.....

And people wonder why I don't want to be a Reg F unit CO....... Does anyone here remember LCol Shandy Vida's resignation?    Now you know why.....

 

[Infanteer]

assuming that that another "Op Athena" doesn't come along to throw everything into utter disarray.

...which you can almost bet WILL happen.

May you live in interesting times,
Infanteer

 

[pbi]

I echo Mark's concerns. Sometimes it seems to me that we are resolutely determined to ignore, destroy or degrade those few remaining things that keep our head above water in terms of the quality of our units, sub-units and troops. Our advantages were NEVER mass, firepower or huge logistics. Our advantages have always been on the human side: good people, good to excellent training (compared to most of the world' militaries, including in some senses the US) and at at least some cohesion at the unit level. I am no longer sure exactly where we are going with all of this.(Probably the onset of senility...)

However, if we are indeed irrevocably committed to this "plug and play" approach, then we are going to need to make a few changes. We will have to (in the Inf anyway...) focus much more on the integrity of the companies.  Coys will have to be kept up to strength (if not over strength), and there will have to be stability in manning, especially for leaders. The annual "slave trading" and the practice of treating coys as "labour pools" will have to cease or be greatly minimized.Training will have to focus on making the coy more capable of self-sufficiency in ops to the greatest extent possible, keeping in mind that it may go on operations with "foreigners" who do not fully understand it or know best how to employ or support it. There will have to be a much higher criteria applied for the individuals selected for coy command, since the OC will operate away from his parent unit and will not have the luxury of the supervision of senior officers of his own unit to observe and mentor him.

Perhaps, though, there is light at the end of the tunnel if we tackle "plug and play" in a different way, the way in which we used to: make the "socket" an existing unit, which deploys complete or largely complete, then the "plugs" will be only those assets that are needed to add the capabilities for the mission. This is instead of cobbling together a unit from scratch.  (Of course, there's always my idea about the "Combat Branch"...... >  )

All programs are modified, adapted or eventually abandoned under the pressure of reality (look at ATOF, which was heralded with thunderclaps and the trumpets of heaven-where is it now??): the same could be true of this concept. My closing advice on this is to do up our chinstraps and keep trying to train the best possible soldiers, NCOs and officers we can. In the end, that is all we really have. Cheers.

 

[Bartok5]

PBI,

I fully agree with your last paragraph, and will continue to soldier on to the best of my abilities in the face of apparent institutional lunacy.   I must say however, that my personal "chin-strap" is getting awfully tight.   Just how much stress is that particular piece of webbing and buckles supposed to endure?   I truly fear that we are reaching a point where we collectively watch our helmets plummet to the ground while we all float under an institutional canopy that is headed for an awfully "hard landing"....  

But that's just the cynic in me.    

 

[KevinB]

The thing that scares me, is that if Pte's and Cpls can see this and Maj's and LCol's are fighting it -- Then who pray tell me are the idiots espousing this system?

 

[Sandbag]

PBI, Mark thanks for the info for those of us "out of the DIN loop".  To quote Sun tzu: Assess the advantages in taking advice, then structure your forces accordingly, to supplement extraordinary tactics.  Forces are to be structured strategically, based on what is advantageous."  The key work -- strategically seems to be forgotten here.  So this is what I am coming back to?

 

[Infanteer]

The thing that scares me, is that if Pte's and Cpls can see this and Maj's and LCol's are fighting it -- Then who pray tell me are the idiots espousing this system?

Bureaucrats....

 

[pbi]

Bureaucrats....

No, it's not: and that perhaps is the disturbing thing. If these ideas were coming from people who had never served in field units, never commanded anything and had no understanding of how the Army works, one might perhaps understand. That is not the case. The people who have advanced these ideas have worked hard on them and believe that this is the way ahead, and can make cogent arguments as to why it must be. That is the problem.

Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

Now I'm really worried - who's piloting the ship?!?  :-\

 

[KevinB]

I can make a coherent argument for running with scissors - does not make it a wise course of action though.

I keeping hearing Col's and above go on like it is a viable system, and it is, unless of course one is an Army with a mandate for warfighting...

How can we straight faced accept this lunacy?   Regardless of its effect on the regimental system - how can one work up to be an effective fighting force in the time and resource constraints that we have these days.

If we wish to go the plug and play route we should simply create a number Battlegroup sub-units of the Brigade.
1 CMBG would consist of
The First No Fat Latte Irregulars
which are a Battalion sized unit commanded by an Inf LCol and consists of a HQ
a Mechanised Inf Coy
a Light Inf Coy
a Armoured Surveillance Sqn
a Inf Recce Pl
a Mech Engineer Troop
a Field Amb unit of some sort (perhaps mixed with a brothel  )
a Svc Coy deigned to take care of the needs of the TF...
and last and least 2 Mortar tubes and a G Wagon crewed by artillery   :

and a few units like them
  King Ralph's Tainted Pheasants etc.


AT least then one could alongside the troops you are expected to go overseas with an work out SOP's etc.

 

[Infanteer]

If we wish to go the plug and play route we should simply create a number Battlegroup sub-units of the Brigade.

Funny, that's what I've been harping on since I got here....

http://army.ca/forums/threads/19094.0.html

 

[McG]

The strength of ATOF over the current managed readiness system, was that it attempted (to the greatest extend possible and within the confines of our homogeneous branch regiments) to raise standing units to high readiness BGs and limit "plug & play" elements to components of the BG that required a separate organization for FG.

One weakness of ATOF was that it treated all manoeuvre units as equal (light infantry = Armour = mechanized infantry) when clearly they are not (and the question then becomes, could a light infantry BG replace an Armd BG in theater?).   Under the new managed readiness, all TF HQs have become "equal" because they could have any combination of sub-units under control.   The cost of this is unit cohesion and sub-unit interoperability.

While ATOF did have the problem that the wrong type of BG could be in high readiness during a time of need (an Armd BG is available but Canada needs a Mech Inf BG), I'm not sure we have not just pushed the problem down to a lower level (as there is still only a finite number of sub-units of each capability).

 

[Acorn]

Who is responsible? I think we know, as pbi alluded. But should we be slagging them so hard? Are they not trying to retain some sort of viable military capability in the face of a tragic lack of funding combined with interference from other sectors? Most would use the "Titanic deck chair rearrangement" paradigm to describe what is happening, but maybe we should look at it as, say, a Stalingrad model: the powers that be said "hold in place" but ignore attrition and reality, so those of us left on the ground have to make due by eating the brains of our deceased trench-mates and stripping the ammo from the dead. Can you fault the senior officers who are faced with an ever reduced force and a contracting front line? Would you rather they try to cobble together kamfgruppen to hold the line and hope for relief, or do you prefer they surrender?

Sorry for the "Germano-centric" depiction, but I think it's the most recognizable analogy.

Acorn

 

[JasonH]

Bureaucrats....

Always the slimeballs, oh wait.. good on me for throwing dirt on a possible career after the military.

Oops, just gave my secret plan to go from Army to politics and make my own evil plan to actually fund the forces    >

On a related note (Skipping most replies at this moment) take in account, if this wasn't already done, the extra 5000 troops that are 'so called' planned and make that your fourth brigade.  That is if a brigade is 5000 men?  I don't know personally so someone feel free to jump on that comment.

 

[KevinB]

Acorn,

IMHO they are making it worse.  The TF concept ruins the operation capability of the forces.  If they had stuck with the Btl Gp concept at least we would be down a UNIT at a time - not a Brigade crippled by adhoc deployment.

 

[bossi]

IMHO they are making it worse.   The TF concept ruins the operation capability of the forces.   If they had stuck with the Btl Gp concept at least we would be down a UNIT at a time - not a Brigade crippled by adhoc deployment.

Yup - similarly, once upon a time long, long ago ... infantry battalions had their own mortars and pioneers ...

 

[McG]

Mark C. Do you believe that the light battalions will be kept at "war strength" and the mech battalions designed for top up with a lot of reservists? Does this whole plan depend on the 5,000 new recruits joining and being trained? What skill sets would 3 VP need in Afghanistan but 2 VP wouldn't? Is it possible the difficulty of the light "special skill" sets are exaggerated? Do you see the light battalions doing a 6 months in 12 months out rotation in Afghanistan? Or will they supply companies to TF?

The unit is no longersacred.  If, on the eve of deployment, sombody decides that the 2 PPCLI BG needs a light infantry coy, the Army will turn to 3 PPCLI to provide one.  If 3 PPCLI cannot do this, then the army will go to 3 RCR or 3 R22eR.  Every deploying unit will be "task tailored" and may deploy with the majority of its pers having come from other units.

 

[Michael Shannon]

        At the heart of all this is (and I heard the CDS say it) a choice. Do you want fewer but more effective units or fewer infantry LCol positions? This is what it comes down to. We probably could field 6 proper infantry battalions at the cost of 3 sets of senior officers and sgts major. The excess WOs and Sgts could be posted to schools and limit taskings to field units. Units would be cohesive, fleet management not required, readiness improved etc. etc. The only reason we've gone down the current path is careerism. 

        Combat effectiveness at the upper levels of the CF is irrelevant. 

        It's a safe choice. Canada can pick and choice it's deployments. It comes and goes as it likes.

        And why not? None of the potential enemy in Afghanistan have the offensive capability to really threaten a NATO or US fortified camp. We certainly don't expect to find a defensive position that would result in an assault of WW 2 intensity. If something looks particularly dangerous (Gulf War I) we can stay home.       

      We cobble task forces together in the belief that we can get away with it because Canada isn't going to fight another army ever again. We can't imagine participating in ops on the scale of WW 2 or even cold war exercises. 

  In the meantime we can have a Col for every tank and a LCol for every rifle platoon and they can all go to second language school and take masters degrees and write articles about maneuver warfare with lots of Clausewitzian quotes....