NavyShooter said:
I was the one who suggesting the MANPADS as an interim solution....in reading the doctrine points that were provided....I concur with them. Having a weapon without a proper, effective means to employ them within our doctrine is...not a solution.
The British, thrust directly from a 'theoretical peace time Anti-Air mode' (kind of like us now), were rudely surprised by the realities imposed upon them by Argentinian air force, which very nearly cost them the war. Sound joint services doctrine, backed by the right training, weapons and other gear, at all levels, is clearly essential:
"The Battle for San Carlos lasted 21 to 25 May. The British called the waters around the landing area and the beachhead “Bomb Alley” because of the aggressive Argentine air attacks. Flying just above the wave tops, the Argentine based attack aircraft made repeated attacks on the British Task Force with bombs and Exocet anti-ship missiles.
The Argentine air attacks proved devastating. From 21 to 25 May the Argentine air attacks sank one British destroyer, 2 frigates and one container ship (Atlantic Conveyor). Additionally, two more destroyers, three frigates, and three logistic landing ships were damaged.
In addition to the air attacks on British fleet, the Argentine air force attacked the beach head which was defended by Rapier surface to air missiles. The Rapiers were also intended to protect the British naval ships around San Carlos. Once ashore, three Skyhawks dropped twelve bombs on the brigade maintenance area, killing six men, wounding twenty-seven, and starting a major fire in 45 Commando’s heavy weapons ammunition dump. Brigadier Thompson visited the area, profoundly alarmed. The entire brigade’s operations had been planned on the assumption of keeping its logistics afloat. The [Argentine’s] air assault had forced them to instead to create huge dumps [on land] at Ajax Bay. Where else could they go? …The answer was nowhere. It was fortunate for the land force that the enemy never attacked Ajax again after inflicting the one, deadly fright.
Effects of the air attacks immediately impacted the British land forces timeline. Establishing the British Army Falklands Beach Support Area took much longer than expected because after the initial attacks at San Carlos the various stores ships were withdrawn with only those unloading allowed in the area. Enemy action had an effect on the build up in a way that was simply not envisaged.
These delays meant naval vessels had to endure more punishment in Bomb Alley and ammunition dumps established at various locations which because of the slow build up were vulnerable. Clearly, the inability to build up the Beach Support Area at speed was having a very real impact on losses and if the Argentine commander was sharper and used this delay to counter attack who knows what would have happened."
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/area-denial-falklands-war-lessons-learned-implications-for-land-warfare-2030-2040-after-the
