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Ricks Napkin Forces Challenge Part 2 BIG Numbers

Hey gang, can someone link me to a discussion I thought we had here about the history of the CMBG model? I can't seem to find it
 
I see the adage 2 is 1, 1 is none here a lot.
With that in mind -even with an expanded napkin, reserve reform to go hybrid, and carte blanche to equip it- is designing a force around being able to deploy a division prudent? I get that we "should be able to", but the in my mind there's a very real distinction between "should be able to" and "should do"

If the next war is "come as you are" - are we better off organizing/planning to stretch to send a division with no depth behind for when it inevitably gets degraded by combat, or contribute something more in line with a contemporary 4 CIBG/CMBG (4 maneuver units, Cold War scale Cbt SP Coy's, some capabilities more typically held at division), with proper depth/redundancy in the National Orbat- ie. an identical, fully equipped and trained reserve formation (or two), so that the Canadian Flag on the NATO map board endures for the duration of the war.
 
Since we few, we happy few, we band of brothers are planning the reorganization of the CA. Isn't that the job of NDHQ/government?
We often talk "How I would run the show..." so I present this scenarios. I put weird little caveats in them. I like to see what other peoples point of view is (I am a retired grunt WO so the sapper, gunner, tanker, pilot, sailor, etc all have a different view based on their knowledge and expertise. Its nice to swap ideas.

On that note, I believe officers due similar exercises in some of their PD training. On my DP4, we had to frequently present plans (as though we were thinking like the OC). @Infanteer @TangoTwoBravo as current serving combat arms officers, anything to add on doing these "napkin exercises?"
 
I see the adage 2 is 1, 1 is none here a lot.
With that in mind -even with an expanded napkin, reserve reform to go hybrid, and carte blanche to equip it- is designing a force around being able to deploy a division prudent? I get that we "should be able to", but the in my mind there's a very real distinction between "should be able to" and "should do"

If the next war is "come as you are" - are we better off organizing/planning to stretch to send a division with no depth behind for when it inevitably gets degraded by combat, or contribute something more in line with a contemporary 4 CIBG/CMBG (4 maneuver units, Cold War scale Cbt SP Coy's, some capabilities more typically held at division), with proper depth/redundancy in the National Orbat- ie. an identical, fully equipped and trained reserve formation (or two), so that the Canadian Flag on the NATO map board endures for the duration of the war.
We can't send a division as we are.

Our personnel (RegF and ResF {if properly trained] and staffed to authorized strength) could man up to two divisions but be equipped to probably no more than two brigades. That makes it possible to deploy a brigade and have enough resources to sustain that brigade with personnel replacements and some equipment.

The notion behind some of these napkin forces (like mine) is to create a hybrid structure that will adjust RegF personnel and equipment to:

1) be able to meet peacetime rotational deployments at roughly an SSE scale;

2) facilitate the leadership and training of the ResF by using some RegF pers and equipment;

3) create an establishment structure to facilitate the acquisition of equipment for a future force of one deployable hybrid ResF heavy armoured division and one non-deployable RegF heavier light/mech division.

The first capability outcome is that the heavy division trains for and provides the majority of the rotations for:

1) a forward deployed bde HQ and battle group and flyover forces to round out the Latvia brigade.

2) the forces to sustain that deployed brigade indefinitely; and

3) if necessary a full armoured division.

The second capability outcome is that the light/mech division trains for and provides the forces for the defence of Canada and other discretionary non-European operational deployments as follows:

1) a light/airborne brigade for the defence of Canada - particulalry the north;

2) two coastal regimental groups for the defence of eastern and western coasts;

3) two mechanized brigades for a) other discretionary tasks, b) reinforce and sustain the defence of Canada forces; and c) if the full armoured division deploys, reinforce and sustain the armoured division.

In addition the divisions hold a total of 6 combat support and combat service support brigades as enablers as well as a fixed base support and training structure.

All hybrid brigades are organized with a core of RegF, a body of ResF and the ability to split into three cores to recruit civilians and train up to 3 brigades assuming a procurement plan for equipment is concurrently activated.

Effectively, some folks on this site discuss elements of tactics and military strategy at the operational level for information sharing and the fun of it. Others of us are putting forward outline mobilization plans/structures to put Canada on a footing that caters to day-to-day peacetime missions; foreseeable stage 1 force generation/deterrence postures; stage 2 force enhancement/heightened deterrence postures; stage 3 force expansion/moderate commitments to combat; and a capability for stage 4 national mobilization. Appropriate sustainment at all stages is critical.

Incidentally, a "carte blanche to equip it" is, IMHO, cheating. Part of the problem is to develop a realistic equipping policy that can vet you from point A through B to C without magic.

It's a mental exercise and done for fun.

🍻
 
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Thoughts are still gathering but I am ready to start engaging.

Three preliminary thoughts:

1. We live in MacKinder's world - Eurasian Heartland vs the Islands
2. We live in the Islands and face the Heartland across the Arctic Ocean
3. The Islands are dominated by the United States.

....

I am lazy. I want to know how much can be done without leaving my couch.

....

1. MacKinder's World of the Sino-Russian Eurasian Heartland as Pivot and the Islands of Oceania.

1709394830726.png

MacKinder's Map focused on the British Empire, centered on India and stretching from the UK to Australia. The Americas were a peripheral consideration and Canada was divided as two separate countries, an Atlantic country and a Pacific Country.

Fast forward a few decades and a couple of wars and the focus switches from London and the British Empire to Washington and the American Empire. The American map now looks like this:

1709395290649.png

A subtle shift to the right but still an Atlantean map. Now the center has switched from New Delhi to London. The Americas are now considered as lands unto themselves and not just as a barrier between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The US Navy's Fleet structure reflects the Pentagon's Command structure.

1709395632412.png

7th Fleet supports the Indo-Pacific Command
6th Fleet supports both Europe and Africa Commands
5th Fleet supports Central Command
4th Fleet supports Southern Command

Northern Command, responsible for the defence of the Homeland, which Canada shares, is supported by two fleets:

3rd Fleet on the Pacific coast
2nd Fleet on the Atlantic coast.

Now one of the problems with these maps is that the are based on Mercator's projections and they give short shrift to the Poles, Antarctica and the Arctic Ocean. Some of the problems that creates are associated with time and space. This projection is the projection that people have been building over the age of exploration. People are accustomed to thinking of movement over long distances at nautical speeds and tend to envisage journeys of weeks, if not months, to get from point to point. Even the USN's fleets take weeks to get into position, which explains why they tend to be forward based, stay in position and cycle replacements through those positions.

The other thing that gets lost is the sense of how short distances are at the Poles and how close the contact is between the nations.


Alert Valkyrie.jpg

I am using Valkyrie XQ-58 as a measuring stick. It has a one-way range of 5800 km and a speed of about 1000 km//h so it takes about 6 hours to fly from Canada's most northern post at Alert to the limits of its range. A one way trip could take it to Florida, or California. It could take it to Japan or Gibraltar. It could take it to the Caucasus or the Himalayas.

Did I mention I am lazy?

It may be low and slow but it can be launched from my couch, or Colorado Springs, or North Bay and do stuff. It is also, as these things go, cheap. It is in roughly the same price range as a Tomahawk, or a Harpoon, or an NSM or any other cruise missiles but it has 5 to 10 times their range. And it can carry submunitions like decoys and anti-radiation missiles and small cruise missiles and glide bombs of its own.... as well as top quality sensors and radio relay links.

But back to the measuring stick.

The Valkyrie can be sent on one way missions, and because it is cheap and uncrewed, that presents and array of interesting possibilities. But it doesn't have to be sent on one way missions. It can return to base for reuse. That gives a range of 2800 km with a flight time to bingo of about 3 hours. 3 hours out and 3 hours back. At that range Alert can reach out and touch, with precision and with an observer in the loop, anything in the area of the Arctic Ocean.

Valkyrie RTB.jpg
With that type of reach the Arctic Ocean becomes more like a lake.

Now I am talking about Valkyrie based at Alert under Canadian authority. It could equally be based at Thule on Greenland under Danish authority, or in Alaska under American authority, or Spitzbergen or Svalbard. Or it could be any of a number of Russian, Chinese or Iranian craft.
My preference would be that that lake be a friendly lake.

....

How important is that?

If I go back to the US fleet distribution map what I see is that the seam between Northern Command's 3rd Fleet on the Pacific and 2nd Fleet in the Atlantic is somewhere north of Canada. In the Arctic Ocean. The fleets are separated, or joined, by the Northwest Passage that passes through the archipelago that we claim. The archipelago that also borders that ocean/lake that is used by the Russians as a base for their missile boats to threaten the same territory that a Valkyrie at Alert could threaten. With similar times of flight for cruise missiles. But only minutes for ballistic missiles.

Control of the Arctic Ocean seems like a big thing to me.

....

Valkyrie can also carry Air to Air missiles. Ballistic missiles at launch are vulnerable. They are building speed and they are low in the atmosphere. They are accessible to Air to Air missiles. How many patrolling aircraft with AAMs would it take to counter SLBMs and keep their heads down? Whatever that number is it would be cheaper with UAVs, allowing more of them, and would not require exposing aircrew to a very risky mission.

Again, I use Valkyrie as a measuring stick. Not just in geographic terms but in terms of state of the art capabilities. What is possible currently or in the very near future.

...

So what is Canada's responsibility? We have staked a claim to this land, its waters and all its resources. Our neighbours and allies accept those claims, if we are not overly selfish. If we share our resources, by selling them at a reasonable price, if we allow reasonable access, if we look after their people in our area of responsibility then we get no grief if we exploit our land to provide ourselves with a comfortable life. They let us join all sorts of clubs, so long as we co-operate fairly and pay our fair share.

This is the Area of Responsibility that Canada is given to exploit and serve.


Canada's AOR.jpg

This is what we are expected to service even as we claim its benefits.
The first thing I note about it is how big the area is given how few Canadians we have.
The second thing is that that area is entirely a subset of the USA's Northern Command.
The third thing is that we are a wedge between the USN's 3rd Fleet on the West and 2nd Fleet on the East.
The fourth thing is that the Arctic Ocean flanks both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Control of the Arctic Ocean secures the northern flanks of both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

If we don't control the Arctic on our terms then some one else with control it for us. Russian, Chinese, Scandinavians, AUKUS or the USA on it own.

The Arctic matters. And we have it within our power to control our patch on our terms - and many people are begging us to do exactly that.

One last map before closing this chapter (I told you that you would be sorry).


The Front Line.jpg

The Red Line represents the line between Us and Them.
On our side of the line are the US in Alaska, the Danes on Greenland and the whole of NATO, to include Scandinavia and the Baltic in their entirety. Also on our side of the line is Ukraine, currently leaving a very weak and exposed flank.

What Canada does inside those Yellow Borders matters. People want that ground secured. They want us to do it. But if we won't do it then somebody will do it for us.


.....


More to follow - What happens when Plan A fails.
 
So you're envisioning a weapon to target Russian ballistic missiles in the launch phase or otherwise take out their strategic military assets? Sounds like a potentially destabalizing policy to me. It will take quite a while for a Valkyrie to reach Russian missile launch sites even from Alert...so are you proposing to launch them preemptively when it looks like the Russians are MAYBE about to launch so that the Valkryies are in AA missile range during lift phase? Essentially a decapitation first strike?

One of the things that makes MAD work is the fact that conventionally, Russia, China the USA and the collective Western Europe are too large (both physically and in terms of population) to be physically occupied by any of the other major powers. That means that pretty much any conflict between the states (short of nuclear war) won't be militarily decisive in existential terms for the losing states. It may however create a situation that is a political existential threat.

As much as I'd love to see political change in Russia and China (and North Korea and Iran, etc.) I think that forcing that change militarily (with strategic strike systems like you are suggesting) seriously increases the chance of a nuclear conflict between the powers. Nobody wins that.
 
So you're envisioning a weapon to target Russian ballistic missiles in the launch phase or otherwise take out their strategic military assets? Sounds like a potentially destabalizing policy to me. It will take quite a while for a Valkyrie to reach Russian missile launch sites even from Alert...so are you proposing to launch them preemptively when it looks like the Russians are MAYBE about to launch so that the Valkryies are in AA missile range during lift phase? Essentially a decapitation first strike?

One of the things that makes MAD work is the fact that conventionally, Russia, China the USA and the collective Western Europe are too large (both physically and in terms of population) to be physically occupied by any of the other major powers. That means that pretty much any conflict between the states (short of nuclear war) won't be militarily decisive in existential terms for the losing states. It may however create a situation that is a political existential threat.

As much as I'd love to see political change in Russia and China (and North Korea and Iran, etc.) I think that forcing that change militarily (with strategic strike systems like you are suggesting) seriously increases the chance of a nuclear conflict between the powers. Nobody wins that.

As I said, More To Follow. ;)
 
As I said, More To Follow. ;)
Looking forward to it. The strategic issues I don't disagree with. Valkyries at Alert on the other hand ...

Control means much more than a missile strike. We need realistic surveillance, a realistic confrontation to incursion policy and capabilities and appropriate weapon systems to enforce those.

🍻
 
So to pick up where I left off

The Front Line.jpg
Our Area of Responsibility.

To clarify my use of the Valkyrie.
Again, I see the Valkyrie as a measuring stick. It is a device that can do stuff and it has well defined parameters. Those parameters will be in dispute but I have no reason to believe that they are unrealistic.

General characteristics

  • Capacity: 600 lb (272 kg) internal, 600 lb (272 kg) external
  • Length: 30 ft (9.1 m)
  • Wingspan: 27 ft (8.2 m)
  • Empty weight: 2,500 lb (1,134 kg)
  • Max takeoff weight: 6,000 lb (2,722 kg)
Performance

  • Cruise speed: 476 kn (548 mph, 882 km/h)
  • Range: 3,000 nmi (3,500 mi, 5,600 km) approximate
  • Service ceiling: 45,000 ft (14,000 m)
Putting all of those together what I see is a Half Ton Pick Up that travels at the speed of an A330 and has transcontinental range.

In my view it could either be grey fleet or yellow fleet or civilian. Much like a Twin Otter. The difference being that while a Twin Otter could carry weapons it would expose the crew to ridiculous levels of risk. To counter that risk the Twotter would have to fly higher, faster, be stealthy and carry counter-measures. In other words it would become an F35 and cost a fortune.

The advantage of the Valkyrie is there is no crew to worry about. It is a simple transport. And thus it can stay cheap, stay easy to build and if it is shot down then send another one.

But....

The primary advantage is that it is a transport that can be deployed from any fixed platform at the press of a button.

Which leads me to this map:

Valkyries at Alert, but also at Comox and Gander. First line ISR/SAR response. Potential to locate parties or vessels in trouble and drop SKAD kits. Potential to put eyes on fires. Potential to put eyes on any anomalies. Potential to carry weapons in support of deployed forces. Lots of potential


Valkyries.jpg

And that potential generates both utility and uncertainty. And to my mind uncertainty in an uncertain world is no bad thing. Our enemies need to be uncertain of our capabilities and our actions. It keeps them honest, in my opinion.

....

So, am I recommending replacing crewed vehicles with uncrewed vehicles?
No.
And again. No.
I am looking at them as supplements.

We have a mechanism in place to manage this type of capability. We have a continental Combat Information Center. Colorado Springs. We have a national alternate. North Bay.

The system is in place to launch fighters to counter intruders. The system is also in place to launch the missiles and bombers of Global Strike Force. The system previously supported One Way Attack UAVs - Nike and Bomarc squadrons. The UAVs are now a lot more flexible and have longer range.

.....

So where to from here

1. Tuck Canada's National Defence in under the Continental defence provided by the US's Northern Command.
2. Focus Canada's National Defence on NORAD and the relationship built up between the USAF and the RCAF.

The USAF is the lead in the Northern Command effort.
Noteworthy to me is the large role played by the Air National Guard element in the NORAD effort, both in terms of supplying reaction fighters and in terms of controlling operations.

Class B service from home stations?

Role of the Navy? Continue associations with 2nd and 3rd Fleets?
Role of the Army? Continue with building ties with 11th Division and strengthen the commitment there?

....

Two other areas to pick up on

ISR and GBAD.

ISR first.

We don't need our own satellites, radars, listening stations, SkyGuardians and P8s. The Americans are quite capable of supplying all the intelligence we need. If they want to share it. And if it is available in a timely fashion. And if they don't need the assets somewhere else when we need it.

We need to invest in those situational awareness assets for our own benefit. But does it all have to come under National Defence? Does it all have to be served by full time uniformed personnel? Or could a lot of it be subsumed into an amalgam of CSE, Space Wing and the Canadian Space Agency?

How about the SkyGuardians? They are slow and enduring and they can carry weapons. The fewer weapons they carry the longer they can endure. If they were backed up by a ground based weapons transport like the Valkyrie do they need to be armed? The plan seems to be to tuck them into 14 Wing along with the P8s for deployment to 19 Wing and other parts unknown.

....

Short form for me is that I wouldn't touch the plans for the Sky Guardians, the P8s or the F35s. I would let them stand. They are both a necessary reaction and deployment capability and, more importantly, they keep the humans in the fight. Even if machines could do everything, and we aren't there yet and I hope you never will be, we shouldn't allow that.

....

Next is GBAD

Here I differentiate GBAD as the Army defines it for its expeditionary needs and as I see it as an adjunct to NORAD for domestic defence needs.

I'm sticking with NORAD for now.

1. People live in cities.
2. Cities have airports.
3. The airspace above and between airports is currently managed in a co-operative venture between civil and military authorities.

Don't mess with a good thing.

On the other hand there is an opportunity to beef up Airport Security to cover the airspace over the adjacent city. There is an opportunity to add to the array of effectors already in place to increase the array of responses available. Systems are already in place to control ground and aerial intruders - unauthorized personnel and vehicles, unauthorized aircraft, birds and drones of various types. I would invest in upgrading the existing systems to increase the number of non-lethal effectors and ensure that they had the ability to plug in more kinetic effectors manned by the military authorities. Once again Class B personnel supplied either by the RCAF or the RCA or a combination, perhaps even the RCN given the RCN's likely need for AD assets for convoys and other transports and harbours.

So I would let Air Defence grow out from the existing airspace management systems and then bleed forwards to the RCA and the RCN. Deployable expeditionary forces would be largely full time uniformed personnel with Reserves for follow on forces and auxilliaries.

....

So what type of effectors for Air Defence?

VSHORAD I would build on the Rheinmetall turrets that meld a 30 to 35mm cannon, a pair of SAMs and a laser and add the necessary EW C-UAS measures. Platform mounted, ship mounted, truck mounted or mounted on an armoured vehicle.

SHORAD/MRAD - NASAMS with any available suitable missiles or any containerized systems that can be shipped from the factory in a ready to fire condition.

LRAD - Mk70 PDS Sea Can with any available suitable missiles.


....


NORAD as it stands
Plus Long Range UAVs that are runway independent
With a beefed up ISR capability
And a well thought out Local Air Defence scheme to counter the threats that can be transported in back packs and the bed of a common pick up truck.

....

Naval effort to follow.
 
Okay now for my Army
Canadian Army (15,000 Reg Force, 45,000 Res Force, and 2,500 Civilian pers)

1CDN Corps LtGen (700 personnel in HQ, 300 Reg and 400 Res) - Static HQ in Peacetime.



1 Canadian Armoured Division (HQ Winnipeg)

Div HQ (30/70)

1st Cdn Armoured Bde “Canadian Guards” (3,200 Reg pers) (Latvia)
1 RCHA, 1 RACADA, and a 1 Bde Spt BN attached and predeployed with 1st Armoured Bde

2st Cdn Armoured Bde , Suffield (10/90)
3rd Cdn Mechanized Bde Shilo (10/90)
1st Armoured Sustainment Bde (30/70)
1 Armoured Engineer Bde (30/70)
1 RCA Bde Suffield (15/85)
1 ADA Bde (15/85)
1 MP BN (10/90)
1 CRBN Defence BN (10/90)

*attached Combat Aviation Assets from TSA





Armour Bde’s consists of (M1A2 SepV4 Abrams & CV-90) Combined Arms Battalions
HQ
2 BN Armour Heavy CAB 1BN Inf Heavy CAB
1 Armored Engineer Reg’t
1 Armoured Calvary Troop (Scout PLx2, Tank Troop, RCV Platoon, CBRN Recce Platoon, Mortar Section, UAS Troop, and attached Forward Spt Section)
1 Brigade Signals BN
*1 Brigade Support BN attached from Armour Sustainment Bde

Mechanized Bde’s consists of (M1A2 SepV4 Abrams & CV-90) Combined Arms Battalions
1 BN Armour Heavy CAB 2 BN Inf Heavy CAB
1 Armored Engineer Reg’t
1 Armoured Calvary Troop (Scout PLx2, Tank Troop, RCV Platoon, CBRN Recce Platoon, Mortar Section, UAS Troop, and attached Forward Spt Section)
1 Brigade Signals BN
*1 Brigade Support BN attached from Armour Sustainment Bde


1 RCA Bde
1-3 RCHA (3x8 gun M109A7 Bty’s, 1x FOO/JTAC Bty, 1x STA Bty, 1xSupport Bty, 1xHQ Bty)
4 RCHA (3x8 HIMARS Bty’s1xSupport Bty, 1xHQ Bty)

1 RC ADA Bde
(Bty’s consist of 8 Vehicle/Launchers each)
1-3 RCADA (Armored M-SHORAD CV90) 4 Bty of 12 vehicles each, 3 ADAM Bty, 1xHQ Bty)
4 RCADA (2 bty of TTHAD, 3 Bty of MEADS)







2 Cdn Light Div HQ Edmonton
Div HQ (40/60)
1 CDN Para Bde (Edmonton) 3,720 Reg Force (inc attached Light Spt BN from the Sustainment Bde)
2 CDN Para Bde (Valcartier) 30/70 (1,116 Reg Force, and 2,604 PRes)
1 CDN Arctic Bde BvS-10 (Victoria) 30/70
2 CDN Arctic Bde BvS-10 (Gagetown) 30/70
1 Light Force Sustainment Bde (30/70)
2 RCA Bde (15/85)
2 Combat Engineer Bde (30/70)
2 ADA Bde (15/85)
2 MP BN (10/90)


Para Bde’s consist of:
HQ Coy
3 Airborne Infantry Bn's @ 800 each
1 Light Recce Coy
1 Abn Engineer Reg’t
Bde Sigs Coy
MI Coy
Light Support BN


Arctic Bde’s consist of:
HQ Coy
3 BvS-10 Infantry Bn's @ 800 each
1 Light Recce Coy
Bde Sigs Coy
MI Coy
Arctic Support BN



2 RCA Bde:
5 RALC M777 Airborne 3x8 gun Bty, 1x FOO/JTAC Bty, 1x STA Bty, 1xSupport Bty, 1xHQ Bty
6 RCHA M777 Airborne 3x8 gun Bty, , 1x FOO/JTAC Bty, 1x STA Bty, 1xSupport Bty, 1xHQ Bty
7 RCHA M777 3x8 gun Bty, , 1x FOO/JTAC Bty, 1x STA Bty, 1xSupport Bty, 1xHQ Bty
8 RCHA M777 3x8 gun Bty, , 1x FOO/JTAC Bty, 1x STA Bty, 1xSupport Bty, 1xHQ Bty
9 RCHA HIMARS 3x8 Bty, 1x STA Bty, 1xSupport Bty, 1xHQ Bty

2 RC ADA Bde
5-6 RCADA (Avenger) 4 Bty of 12 vehicles each, 3 ADAM Bty, 1xHQ Bty)
7-8 RCADA (BvS10 MSHORAD) 4 Bty of 12 vehicles each, 3 ADAM Bty, 1xHQ Bty
9 RCADA (2 bty of TTHAD, 3 Bty of MEADS)7-8 RCADA BvS-10 MSHORAD



Training; 96 Reg Force (I ran out of bodies for more) 7,542 PRes.
What was the name of that song? Oh yea, Purple Haze.
 
A key deficiency in the ORBATs offered I think is the lack of theatre sustainment forces.
If we want to sustain a Div in combat we will likely need to have a Bde size theatre sustainment command with elements to open and run a SPOD, an APOD and then move fuel, ammunition, food, spares etc. forward to the Div Sustainment Bde.
 
A key deficiency in the ORBATs offered I think is the lack of theatre sustainment forces.
If we want to sustain a Div in combat we will likely need to have a Bde size theatre sustainment command with elements to open and run a SPOD, an APOD and then move fuel, ammunition, food, spares etc. forward to the Div Sustainment Bde.
Tell us more, please.

Got some juicy details?
 
We can't send a division as we are.
I know.
The notion behind some of these napkin forces (like mine) is to create a hybrid structure that will adjust RegF personnel and equipment to:

1) be able to meet peacetime rotational deployments at roughly an SSE scale;

2) facilitate the leadership and training of the ResF by using some RegF pers and equipment;

3) create an establishment structure to facilitate the acquisition of equipment for a future force of one deployable hybrid ResF heavy armoured division and one non-deployable RegF heavier light/mech division.

The first capability outcome is that the heavy division trains for and provides the majority of the rotations for:

1) a forward deployed bde HQ and battle group and flyover forces to round out the Latvia brigade.

2) the forces to sustain that deployed brigade indefinitely; and


3) if necessary a full armoured division.

The second capability outcome is that the light/mech division trains for and provides the forces for the defence of Canada and other discretionary non-European operational deployments as follows:

1) a light/airborne brigade for the defence of Canada - particulalry the north;

2) two coastal regimental groups for the defence of eastern and western coasts;

3) two mechanized brigades for a) other discretionary tasks, b) reinforce and sustain the defence of Canada forces; and c) if the full armoured division deploys, reinforce and sustain the armoured division.

I understand all that- but @ArmyRick did not define the requirement for the NATO contribution, and to the best of my OS knowledge what I've seen on the board we've been asked for a Bde.

My post was inquiring into the necessity /challenging the wisdom of including the bold.

Simply put, is the extra investment required to field and sustain a heavy division over an above that which is required to accomplish 2-1 and 2-2 (the italicized) justified/optimal?

Would the Army be better off investing those PY's and equipment dollars into a more diverse capability set- something like a US Marine Littoral combat capability, US Multi-Domain Task Force Capability, UK Deep Strike Bde, an expeditionary coastal regimental group to support Scandinavia, increased GBAD or LRPF, something novel?

Would the country/military be better off investing those PY's and equipment dollars into the Navy/ AirForce?
 
I understand all that- but @ArmyRick did not define the requirement for the NATO contribution, and to the best of my OS knowledge what I've seen on the board we've been asked for a Bde.
We're not exactly providing a whole brigade. We're sending a persistent brigade HQ, with appropriate advisor staff like arty, engr, etc staff. We also have the elements that form the eFP battlegroup which now also has the majority of a tank squadron and an arty battery besides the one mech company. Other nations are filling out the eFP battlegroup and the Danes are adding a prepositioned battalion plus we are adding a flyover light battalion. So not a full persistent brigade as it appears at the moment.
Simply put, is the extra investment required to field and sustain a heavy division over an above that which is required to accomplish 2-1 and 2-2 (the italicized) justified/optimal?
IMHO, yes. We should not only be looking at current commitments but what forces we might need to use in the future. To put it simply as well; you can't create a division out of whole cloth and CPXs. You need to have a headquarters that is organized for divisional operations and can occasionally exercise as one.

That's not to say that there needs to be a full-time division in place 100% of the time. That's why I make this division a 30/70 division with roughly 5,000 RegF and 10,000 ResF Class A troops. It, and the entire army, needs to be structured to support rotations in Latvia. IMHO, a forward deployed force of 2,200 many of whom are on 6 month rotations will be a very difficult thing to support with an army the size that we have regardless of how its organized.
Would the Army be better off investing those PY's and equipment dollars into a more diverse capability set- something like a US Marine Littoral combat capability, US Multi-Domain Task Force Capability, UK Deep Strike Bde, an expeditionary coastal regimental group to support Scandinavia, increased GBAD or LRPF, something novel?
We need to reassess the CAF's structure. I don't think that we're big enough nor strategically focussed to justify an littoral combat capability, a multi-domain task force or a deep strike brigade. While I believe we need a coastal capability for home defence, I don't think we should target it on Scandinavia. We do need increased GBAD and LRPFs, and I think we currently have enough RegF arty PYs for that as long as we off load much of the gruntwork on to ResF units. These are not capabilities needed on a day to day basis and, together with tube artillery gun lines, could easily be held in a Class A environment. I have the same views about OWUAV and STA artillery. I think that there are other systems, including tanks, recce, infantry, engineers, some logistics functions that could also be ResF Class A held, if the ResF was properly reorganized and trained. Heavy force, including novel combat functions do not have to exist as full-time jobs day to day. There needs to be a sufficient full-time core in all specialties to retain expertise and a career structure, to train the reserves, and to deploy in the case of short notice emergencies.
Would the country/military be better off investing those PY's and equipment dollars into the Navy/ AirForce?
You need a balance and I don't know as to whether right now the balance is out of whack. It also depends on what capabilities you believe each of the RCAF and RCN needs to field that they don't field now.

As far as the RCN is concerned, I think that there too, more work can be done with Class A reservists. And incidentally, I don't consider reservists going on Class B or C deployments as a cost saving. Full-time pay is full-time pay. It's determining which naval capabilities can be held in a stand-by reserve for future operations and which are needed to sail or train full-time for current operations. For example, a ship made up of a 30/70 crew that deploys only for a one month exercise every year, would save money as the ship gets less wear and tear and has a smaller maintenance crew during slack periods. I don't know enough about the navy to work out the best way to make that system work, but it strikes me that a percentage of ships dedicated to full-time service, some to maintenance, and some to reserve service running through rotations would require less full-time crews, better train reservists and save wear and tear on the ships. Personally I'd like to see more armed vessels than we have and possibly long range ground to ship missile batteries manned by navy reservists.

The RCAF is harder. I do look at the US Air Guard and Reserve and see a higher dedication to part-time personnel. I don't know whether our scale is just too low to be able to have some high-end functions, like transports, refuelers and even fighters go to reservists. One place I see a high ability for change is the helicopter fleets. I could easily see over one half of the aviation fleet crews become reservists. The ARNG has shown that as highly practical IMHO. On top of that I see something along the line of an RCAF ResF Air Force Regiment to man a variety of AD and ground based long range strike missile systems.

Short answer, the RCN and RCAF should first see how to better utilize their own PYs and ResF positions. IMHO there are wasted resources there.

Equipment is a bug bear. No one has enough. I've always maintained we could save a billion or two in pers costs and convert it to equipment if we simply trimmed the ND/CAF HQ the way Leslie suggested back in 2011. There's even more to trim there now. OTOH, I don't see a trimming or transferring of Army/Navy/Air Force PYs from one element to the other. I must admit that I'd like to see us go to 2% GDP but quite frankly that would have to come with a very strong restriction in allowing any increase in personnel at the above brigade level and to only minimal increases below that (IMHO primarily in the full time logistics/maintainer field). the vast bulk of the money should go to industry for weapons and munitions.

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We're not exactly providing a whole brigade. We're sending a persistent brigade HQ, with appropriate advisor staff like arty, engr, etc staff. We also have the elements that form the eFP battlegroup which now also has the majority of a tank squadron and an arty battery besides the one mech company. Other nations are filling out the eFP battlegroup and the Danes are adding a prepositioned battalion plus we are adding a flyover light battalion. So not a full persistent brigade as it appears at the moment.
Yes I know, I was outlining what we've been asked for- a known goal that we should be working towards- in contrast to objectives over and above that.
We need to reassess the CAF's structure. I don't think that we're big enough nor strategically focussed to justify an littoral combat capability, a multi-domain task force or a deep strike brigade. While I believe we need a coastal capability for home defence, I don't think we should target it on Scandinavia.
I'll contest that, especially within the parameters of the thread- a new government replacing SSE with a demand list that boils down to:

"You must design the new Canadian Armed Forces to
1. To Protect Canada;
2. To have a standby force prepositioned in Europe for NATO;
3. To have a brigade size force ready to deploy to the arctic within 12 hours;
4. To ensure proper surveillance of all Canadian coastlines; and
5. To have an Air Defence and Coastal Defence Plan in place as part of protecting Canada"

with 2 being satisfied with a Bde with both forward deployed and pre-positioned/flyover elements. To me that doesn't scream heavy division, airborne infantry bde, or really conventional forces at all. Defending Canada, with emphasis on forward defense of the coastal area and its airspace, almost explicitly calls for littoral combat capability. To accomplish the requirements within the context of Canadian geography we need the ability to bring air defense, naval/LRPF strike capability, their associated sensors, and a combat force to patrol and defend into littoral environments featuring some very non-permissive terrain- arctic, mountain etc, with the distances involved lending themselves to needing a high level of strategic mobility and being designed to be effective while very dispersed. Note that the government in the scenario calls for a "bde size force" for arctic deployment- not "a bde". Development of a number of self contained MLR-like units/formations capable of fighting in the various Canadian environments, plus the strategic airlift assets to get them around the country not only better fulfills the government's ask than a host of conventional Bde's, it also could also provide an expeditionary capability with very meaningful strategic implications.
 
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