- Reaction score
- 8,198
- Points
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Tackling them one at a time.
They are everybody's Multi-Tool.
If by that you mean that they have given up tanks....
I know the US Army has talked up its new division focus but the Lego block, the Module, is still the Brigade Combat Team, at least for administration purposes. I counted the BCTs and allowed for the Marine regiments to stand in as BCT Equivalents.
This is what I ended up with
65 BCT Equivalents,
36 Regular and 29 in the Marine Reserves and the National Guard.
41 of the 65 BCTE were IBCTs (Light Infantry, including Abn and Marines),
19 Regular and 22 in the Marine Reserves and the National Guard
6 of the BCTE were SBCTs (Stryker borne infantry),
4 Regular and 2 in the National Guard
14 of the BCTE were ABCTs (Armored BCTs),
11 Regular and 3 in the National Guard
In addition there are 2 MLRs in the Marines and 2 ACRs in the Guard.
To my way of seeing things 2/3 of the US close combat force is Light Infantry. 1/3 of it is Combined Arms. Of that only 3 ABCTs of the Total Force 65 are NG ABCTs. 5 if you include the Guard's 2 ACRs.
Going a bit further, to the divisional level, the US is working to field 24 Divisions.
3 active USMC divisions and 1 USMC reserve division
12 active army divisions and 8 NG divisions.
The NG divisions seem to be something of a work in progress.
The BCTs are solidly established but the divisional enablers and the divisions themselves seem to be still in flux.
The 12 active Army divisions are found in three parent Corps,
I,III and XVIII with each Corps having 4 subordinate divisional HQs
But....
In XVIII Corps, while 10th Mtn, 82nd Abn and 101st Abn are up to strength 3 Inf is down a BCT. So three full strength divisions and one division minus.
In III Corps, 1 Cav, 1 Armd and 4 Inf (1x ABCT + 2x SBCT) are up to strength 1 Inf is down a BCT. So again, three full strength divisions and one division minus.
Then there is I Corps.
4 division HQs, 2 Inf, 7 Inf, 11 Abn and 25 Inf.
2 Inf HQ is permanently attached to 8th Army in Korea, but it has 0 BCTs on the ground.
7 Inf HQ is located in Seattle with 2 active SBCTs and one NG SBCT on call for 2 Inf.
11 Abn is now tasked to Alaska Command of NORTHCOM but it is down a BCT and the two BCTs it has are down an Inf Bn each.
25 Inf on Hawaii is similarly organized to 11 Abn, a division minus with two BCTs minus.
Why do I bring this up? I keep hearing the arguments for:
1, the 3 infantry battalion brigades and
2, the 3 brigade divisions and
3, the need for heavy forces and
4, the popularity of the heavy forces in the National Guard.
I am not seeing it.
I am seeing an extraordinary amount of variability in formation structure within the US field forces.
When I say the CAF needs to look more like the USMC I am not talking about splashing ashore from Amphibs. I am talking about the tight integration of the Marines' elements and the focus on the expeditionary effort. I am talking about a Canadian Expeditionary Force, or if you prefer, a Force Mobile Command.
Don't want Mounties with cannon etc. The rising threat is public disorder and general security. That is where the Mounties need more Mounties to manage they jobs they are currently doing.
Those jobs go to the RCAF assets assigned to NORAD/NORTHCOM.
If the threat becomes greater than can be managed with a 9mm and attitude then the Mounties have their own upgunned response teams. If that doesn't work then you can call in the NORAD/NORTHCOM elements.
I am looking for a clean separation between the Defence of Canada force and the Expeditionary Force and that separation extends to the Reserve structure.
I am looking at the Expeditionary Reserves as being ex Regulars. Perhaps they continue the Militia based structure. Perhaps they go the SuppList Individual Reserve route and the Militia becomes the Defence of Canada force.
No. Neither is true. I know how the Guard has been used. I also know that the consent of the governed is being tested in the US, and a lot of other places, and in the US the Guard's employment is, in my opinion, a contributing factor.
But that Federal funding comes from taxpayers that live in states and are paying taxes to supply emergency services. They are getting their own money back - if the Feds aren't spending more than they take and have to borrow to cover their obligations.
That's an opinion. One I don't share.
The Federal government has shifted. The Federal Army has shifted. How far have the Guardsmen and their Governors shifted?
See above re testing the consent of the governed. Ultimately everyone is a volunteer. Just because the President says a thing doesn't make it so.
Those communities can be exploited as watchmen for the unmanned stations. And put a bit of coin in their pockets at the same time.
Except when they are guarding subways and The Capitol.I think you are conflating the issues.
The National Guard, and Reserves are not solely a domestic tool. In fact Domestically they are primarily a tool for Natural Disaster Response. As far as a Military Force, they are primarily Expeditionary.
They are everybody's Multi-Tool.
Pre 2018 I would have agreed, but the USMC now has been transformed into a very Pacific oriented force. They have given the ‘Army role’ over to the Army, and pivoted hard back to Amphibious and Littoral operations.
If by that you mean that they have given up tanks....
I know the US Army has talked up its new division focus but the Lego block, the Module, is still the Brigade Combat Team, at least for administration purposes. I counted the BCTs and allowed for the Marine regiments to stand in as BCT Equivalents.
This is what I ended up with
65 BCT Equivalents,
36 Regular and 29 in the Marine Reserves and the National Guard.
41 of the 65 BCTE were IBCTs (Light Infantry, including Abn and Marines),
19 Regular and 22 in the Marine Reserves and the National Guard
6 of the BCTE were SBCTs (Stryker borne infantry),
4 Regular and 2 in the National Guard
14 of the BCTE were ABCTs (Armored BCTs),
11 Regular and 3 in the National Guard
In addition there are 2 MLRs in the Marines and 2 ACRs in the Guard.
To my way of seeing things 2/3 of the US close combat force is Light Infantry. 1/3 of it is Combined Arms. Of that only 3 ABCTs of the Total Force 65 are NG ABCTs. 5 if you include the Guard's 2 ACRs.
Going a bit further, to the divisional level, the US is working to field 24 Divisions.
3 active USMC divisions and 1 USMC reserve division
12 active army divisions and 8 NG divisions.
The NG divisions seem to be something of a work in progress.
The BCTs are solidly established but the divisional enablers and the divisions themselves seem to be still in flux.
The 12 active Army divisions are found in three parent Corps,
I,III and XVIII with each Corps having 4 subordinate divisional HQs
But....
In XVIII Corps, while 10th Mtn, 82nd Abn and 101st Abn are up to strength 3 Inf is down a BCT. So three full strength divisions and one division minus.
In III Corps, 1 Cav, 1 Armd and 4 Inf (1x ABCT + 2x SBCT) are up to strength 1 Inf is down a BCT. So again, three full strength divisions and one division minus.
Then there is I Corps.
4 division HQs, 2 Inf, 7 Inf, 11 Abn and 25 Inf.
2 Inf HQ is permanently attached to 8th Army in Korea, but it has 0 BCTs on the ground.
7 Inf HQ is located in Seattle with 2 active SBCTs and one NG SBCT on call for 2 Inf.
11 Abn is now tasked to Alaska Command of NORTHCOM but it is down a BCT and the two BCTs it has are down an Inf Bn each.
25 Inf on Hawaii is similarly organized to 11 Abn, a division minus with two BCTs minus.
Why do I bring this up? I keep hearing the arguments for:
1, the 3 infantry battalion brigades and
2, the 3 brigade divisions and
3, the need for heavy forces and
4, the popularity of the heavy forces in the National Guard.
I am not seeing it.
I am seeing an extraordinary amount of variability in formation structure within the US field forces.
Canada can’t afford to do that. As it also needs an Army to do Army things.
When I say the CAF needs to look more like the USMC I am not talking about splashing ashore from Amphibs. I am talking about the tight integration of the Marines' elements and the focus on the expeditionary effort. I am talking about a Canadian Expeditionary Force, or if you prefer, a Force Mobile Command.
The RCMP isn’t organized anymore as a force with cannon and cavalry. You’d need to greatly increase its numbers and budget to make it a viable force for that.
Don't want Mounties with cannon etc. The rising threat is public disorder and general security. That is where the Mounties need more Mounties to manage they jobs they are currently doing.
That is precisely why I am separating the Civil from the Military. Yellow craft are Transport and SAR. They do not need to be armed. They do not need to conduct patrols.Yellow SAR isn’t a military tool, even though it’s conducted by the RCAF, you’d need to dramatically increase its capabilities and budget to use as a patrolling force or anything beyond its current mandate.
Those jobs go to the RCAF assets assigned to NORAD/NORTHCOM.
CCG works for DFO. DFO agents are armed. CCG transports Mounties on occasion. Mounties are armed.The CCG, well it’s been very clear it doesn’t want any sort of LE role, and you’d be hard pressed to dramatically change its culture.
If the threat becomes greater than can be managed with a 9mm and attitude then the Mounties have their own upgunned response teams. If that doesn't work then you can call in the NORAD/NORTHCOM elements.
Agreed on the Rangers - not looking for them to do anything more, militarily, than they currently are. When I talked about expanding their capabilities I was thinking of better equipping the community patrols in the north to manage civil emergencies.Agreed on the Rangers, but I think you also need to be realistic in what they offer, and I think you’d get a lot more bang for one’s buck with have Arctic Coy’s that go out routinely with Ranger patrols.
That speculation was based on adding to the ranks of the Ranger establishment a more military force to manage the threat in the urban environment.I don’t think you would find a lot of Rangers who have any interest in that.
I am looking for a clean separation between the Defence of Canada force and the Expeditionary Force and that separation extends to the Reserve structure.
I am looking at the Expeditionary Reserves as being ex Regulars. Perhaps they continue the Militia based structure. Perhaps they go the SuppList Individual Reserve route and the Militia becomes the Defence of Canada force.
If you actually believe that you have been asleep since WW2 and willfully the 1980’s.
No. Neither is true. I know how the Guard has been used. I also know that the consent of the governed is being tested in the US, and a lot of other places, and in the US the Guard's employment is, in my opinion, a contributing factor.
So set up for Expeditionary.
Or perhaps to support Expeditionary if you prefer to look at it that way.
But it’s heavily augmented by Federal funding even when not Federalized.
But that Federal funding comes from taxpayers that live in states and are paying taxes to supply emergency services. They are getting their own money back - if the Feds aren't spending more than they take and have to borrow to cover their obligations.
Let’s be honest the Guard was initially a check on the Federal Government. But now it’s simply a method of expansion for the active military.
That's an opinion. One I don't share.
Again, that isn’t the driving purpose anymore. There are still guard units being deployed overseas. The Guard has shifted…
The Federal government has shifted. The Federal Army has shifted. How far have the Guardsmen and their Governors shifted?
And?
The support wasn’t solely an issue related to the NG, that was issues related to any of the units that didn’t have an umbrella entity supporting them. Believe me you can find very similar complains about the supply in the detached regular army entities as well.
As for the other issues. Well, the did fix the Guard pay issues, as well as the other issues related to finance, as they forced mortgage companies and banks to freeze loans and mortgages for deployed members, so they wouldn’t need to pay while away.
As far as being gone for 18months, well a lot of units did that, not just ARNG.
See above re testing the consent of the governed. Ultimately everyone is a volunteer. Just because the President says a thing doesn't make it so.
I think a modern torpedo fort has value, coupled with sensors. If you have good OPSEC about it's capabilities and limitations, its mere presence puts a wrinkle in your opponents plans, which is really a forts primary purpose. A fort should be strong enough or capable enough to never have to fire a shot in anger.
Underestimating such coastal defense can come at great cost.
The Choke Points are where they are. We have difficulty getting people to man Goose Bay and Cold Lake. Establishing outposts in the High Arctic would challenge recruiters. Luckily most of the Choke Points are proximate to existing hamlets - luck resulting from enforced relocations in some cases.I don’t disagree in that. But I’d rather have additional purposes to fixed structures as well. As I don’t see an unmanned option viable for that.
Those communities can be exploited as watchmen for the unmanned stations. And put a bit of coin in their pockets at the same time.