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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Mindset and training....

In spring 2015, Ukrainian soldiers began attending the Yavoriv Training Center. Since the initial National Guard deployments in 2015, there have been five additional rotations in support of converting Ukraine from a Soviet mindset to Western standards.

These efforts resulted in the training of more than 10,000 officers every year since 2015. The Ukrainians created a non-commissioned officer corps and began the empowerment of lower levels of the force, especially special operations, to take the fight to the enemy without the heavy burden of bureaucracy.

Today, the Ukrainians are engaging in somewhat of an insurgent fight much like the Mujahideen did against the Russians in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russian doctrine has not changed.

So, what can we learn from this turnaround story? The current conflict highlights not only the need for cutting-edge technology that is easy to use, but more importantly in my view, a fighting force confident in their leadership and trained to fight for its country and that is educated enough to assimilate technology quickly and smart enough to employ to maximum effect. Why are the SEALs so good? Why are Top Gun pilots the best? Education, training and a common cause are the keys to winning.

 

All of which suggests that the future of artillery will include armored and wheeled guns as well as towed weapons for austere theaters or for armies needing simpler weapons.

“There is going to be a mix of artillery,” Johnson said. “What really matters is how you employ them.”
 
It is with Technicals that war is made -

The 14.5mm ZPU-2 is being resurrected as a Portee on the back of a pickup. Modified in Czechia for Ukraine - 115 vehicles supplied

Factory also repairing tanks, SPHs and other systems.


I wonder if they are incorporating those AIMPOINT FCS type ballistic computers into the mounts.

Breaking Defense: What is the conflict in Ukraine teaching us about modern drone warfare?

Lee:
One thing we’re clearly seeing is that, unlike the past 20 years of counterinsurgency and conventional warfare, the life of a drone is nasty, brutish, and short. I’ve seen estimates as low as nine days [due to] electromagnetic spectrum competition and the measures/countermeasures fight going on [as well as] a kinetic fight for these drones. It’s a highly contested environment

For UAS to operate in contested airspace, autonomy is key - Breaking Defense

If I remember correctly a nine day life expectancy for a drone compares favourably with the life expectancy of a Canadian Recce Troop Leader on the Scheldt in WW2, according to George Blackburn.
 
More on the UAS / C-UAS fight

So, for example, the average life expectancy of a fixed-wing UAV on the battlefield is about six flights, a regular quadcopter "lives" only three flights.

Another conclusion is that drones play a vital role primarily for reconnaissance, not for strike missions. So, if units without drones take 30 minutes or more from detection to destruction of targets, the presence of a drone reduces the time to 3-5 minutes.

 
More on the UAS / C-UAS fight




Fundamentals of COA comparison really. This is economy and flexibility trumping survivability. If you're using a 300 dollar drone to help take out a 200K tank, money well spent. If you're using 300k drone and it ends up in a fireball before it can take out a target.... well you get the picture.

Sometimes the best combat effect is the simplest and cheapest. Expensive toys make us risk adverse to use them. 30 years of playing this game with the Taliban should have taught us this lesson.
 
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Fundamentals of COA comparison really. This is economy and flexibility trumping survivability. If you're using a 300 dollar drone to help take out a 200K tank, money well spent. If you're using 300k drone and it ends up in a fireball before it can take out a target.... well you get the picture.

Sometimes the best combat effect isbthe simplest and cheapest. Expensive toys make us risk adverse to use them. 30 years of playing this game with the Taliban should have taught us this lesson.
Before it was kit, it was soldiers...
A scrimmage in a Border Station—
A canter down some dark defile—
Two thousand pounds of education
Drops to a ten-rupee jezail—
The Crammer’s boast, the Squadron’s pride,
Shot like a rabbit in a ride!

No proposition Euclid wrote,
No formulae the text-books know,
Will turn the bullet from your coat,
Or ward the tulwar’s downward blow
Strike hard who cares—shoot straight who can—
The odds are on the cheaper man.
 
And back to the C-UAS fight


Qatar wants a fixed C-UAS system rather than a JLTV mounted one. But what happens if you mount the C-UAS turrets and sensors on autonomous ROGUE Fires type JLTVs for roaming fixed sites?
 
Use of COTS comms?

Ukraine has utilized Starlink and its civvy cell network effectively - it seems.

New Zealand has been following something of the same path. Learning opportunities for Canada?

I’d argue NZ is pretty much a MOTS (Military Off the Shelf) solution.
The only Commercial aspect is the Satellite provider - but all the other systems are ‘standard’ Mil items from industry.



And back to the C-UAS fight


Qatar wants a fixed C-UAS system rather than a JLTV mounted one. But what happens if you mount the C-UAS turrets and sensors on autonomous ROGUE Fires type JLTVs for roaming fixed sites?
I have no idea what you mean by roaming fixed sites, as roaming does not equal fixed.

Qatar is a small nation, and like Israel can get by with fixed installations for many items.

As far as automation of GBAD/CUAS, very few Militaries are willing to allow remote work on a remote platform, as they want a human to be able to ensure Weapon Hold at some piece of the kill chain.
 
I’d argue NZ is pretty much a MOTS (Military Off the Shelf) solution.
The only Commercial aspect is the Satellite provider - but all the other systems are ‘standard’ Mil items from industry.

Seen.

I have no idea what you mean by roaming fixed sites, as roaming does not equal fixed.

Qatar is a small nation, and like Israel can get by with fixed installations for many items.

As far as automation of GBAD/CUAS, very few Militaries are willing to allow remote work on a remote platform, as they want a human to be able to ensure Weapon Hold at some piece of the kill chain.

Relocatable?

Most GBAD systems for static positions are based on systems like this.

1670201831413.png 1670201918139.png

ROGUE Fires basically seems to mean an unmanned vehicle from which weapons can be launched and the vehicle relocated for administration, reloading or moving to a new firing position.

1670202016983.png 1670202089214.png

The Qatari government is interested in the fixed-site version of the Mobile Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Integrated Defeat System shown here during a US infantry training exercise on Oct. 24, 2022. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Spc. Everett Sharp)

So rather than the launcher being fixed to a particular site the battery operators can make the picture more complex by relocating the launchers.

The NASAMS is equipped with three multi-missile launchers (LCHR), each carrying up to six ready-to-fire missiles inside the protective canisters. The purpose of the NASAMS Multi-Missile Launcher is to transport, aim and fire missiles with different characteristics, all mounted on the same launch rail inside the protective canisters. The NASAMS launcher carries up to six AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles and is connected to the FDC (Fire Distribution Center) command post via radio and/or field wire. The mobile launcher can be deployed and remotely controlled up to 25 km away from the FDC. The launcher can fire the six AMRAAMs in seconds against six different targets enabling multiple simultaneous engagements. Up to 12 launchers with 72 missiles can be netted and all missiles are ready to fire. In the firing position, the platform with the launcher is lowered to the ground and four hydraulic jacks can be deployed to stabilize the launch pad during the firing. In a battalion configuration comprising of up to 12 launchers and up to 72 missiles loaded, all missiles can be fired against individual targets in less than 15 seconds.

You can still have "man-in-the-loop" control with remote launchers 25 km away.

Or an ocean away.

1670202513263.png
 
I’m quibbling on autonomous doesn’t equal uncrewed ;)
 
I’m quibbling on autonomous doesn’t equal uncrewed ;)

True but there is now a spectra of autonomy, habitation and crewing.

You can have autonomous crews inhabiting vehicles. Or you can have uninhabited vehicles with autonomous crews. Or you can have inhabited vehicles with crews with no autonomy....

Or you can call me Ray.... :)


 
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