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C3 Howitzer Replacement

Or maybe the Ukrainians value their gunners more than their guns.

That gun crew's undeground was designed for the long haul. The gun and the gunners were well camouflaged but didn't show much sign of movement and the video didn't indicate much sign of counter-battery. The gunners indicated their main concern was light infantry attacks. In which case the gun is acting like WW1 75s and 18 pdrs - lots of shrapnel.

The lines in the east are fixed. So are the light guns and heavy mortars?

One thing I have noticed watching a couple of gopro videos from the trenches - the trenches seem to be lightly held and the soldiers returning fire stay on the move, dodging from one prepared position to the next. Nobody is lining the trenches for massed rifle fire.
 
There really is no discussion about the gun itself here. The Ukrainians already have a large quantity of old D30s which IMHO are superior to most of the 105mm calibre guns due to robustness, a bit more terminal effects and generally decent range. The sole problem with the D 30 is keeping up the ammo supply.

I'm with @markppcli; the Ukrainians are not going to bite the hand that feeds them. They won't say unfavourable things about equipment they are gifted. 105mm guns are going to increase the ammo supply available to them and that's a great thing.

One comment about the video. That's a well maintained gun position. Decent camouflage and procedures on the gun platform and a well developed "stand easy" bunker.

🍻
D30 though is a 1918 era design originally and sufferers from low accuracy which is the main reason the Ukrainians prefer the 105
 
D30 though is a 1918 era design originally and sufferers from low accuracy which is the main reason the Ukrainians prefer the 105

I often wondered about towing guns by their barrels - while at the same time I read that tankers were discouraged from crawling out on their guns to clean them.

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D30 though is a 1918 era design originally and sufferers from low accuracy which is the main reason the Ukrainians prefer the 105
The D30 was developed after WW2 and entered Soviet service in 1963, decades after the US 105mm M2A1.


I haven't seen much in the way of a substantive evaluation of its accuracy although Soviet artillery tended more to mass neutralization than accuracy. I also expect that Soviet ammunition quality standards had as much to do with accuracy as the gun itself.

🍻
 
I often wondered about towing guns by their barrels - while at the same time I read that tankers were discouraged from crawling out on their guns to clean them.

View attachment 76466
Artillery pieces aren’t worried about a series of gyros being messed about. We won’t even drive a LAV without a barrel in in case we screw up something in the stabilization system.
Or maybe the Ukrainians value their gunners more than their guns.

That gun crew's undeground was designed for the long haul. The gun and the gunners were well camouflaged but didn't show much sign of movement and the video didn't indicate much sign of counter-battery. The gunners indicated their main concern was light infantry attacks. In which case the gun is acting like WW1 75s and 18 pdrs - lots of shrapnel.

The lines in the east are fixed. So are the light guns and heavy mortars?

One thing I have noticed watching a couple of gopro videos from the trenches - the trenches seem to be lightly held and the soldiers returning fire stay on the move, dodging from one prepared position to the next. Nobody is lining the trenches for massed rifle fire.
could be, could be the risk is worth the reward for having the guns dig in better.

Again I argue there is risk in making generalizations of go pros. We don’t know how common that is, or any of the context. We are also only seeing the survivors. Content does not equal data.
 
Close, originally was the M1920, which failed and was refined into the M1, then the M2, then the M101 post ww2
The entire way the US Army reacted to it's performance during WW I had never ceased to amaze me. It's ruthless restructuring and development of doctrine and planning .
They quite literally laid the groundwork for winning the next war almost before the ink had dried on the armistice documents.
 
The entire way the US Army reacted to it's performance during WW I had never ceased to amaze me. It's ruthless restructuring and development of doctrine and planning .
They quite literally laid the groundwork for winning the next war almost before the ink had dried on the armistice documents.

Pershing's inspection of the 1st Infantry Division enters the chat ;)


WHEN MARSHALL MET PERSHING​


Oct. 3, 1917, is the centennial of General John J. Pershing’s inspection of the 1st Infantry Division at Gondrecourt, France. This obscure event would not only have significant repercussions for the American effort in the next world war, but also offer lessons for leadership development in the U.S. military a century later.

When Pershing assumed command of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), which was created and deployed to France after the United States entered World War I in April 1917, he essentially had to create and organize an army from scratch. In the spring of 1917 no U.S. divisions existed anywhere but on paper. Moreover, upon arriving in France, Pershing was constantly pressured by British leaders to relinquish his troops and integrate them into the British Army. He needed combat-ready forces to strengthen his hand in this debate and prevent the AEF from being stillborn. With few other units yet to reach France, Pershing took an inordinate interest in the summer and fall of 1917 in the first American unit to arrive, the 1st Division.

As the division conducted training in Lorraine, Pershing frequently visited its headquarters on short notice to check on its progress. A previous review with French President Raymond Poincaré on Sept. 6, 1917, was a disaster, and Pershing took out his frustration on the 1st Division’s commander, Major General William L. Sibert. Pershing inspected the 1st Division again on Oct. 3, this time at Gondrecourt to watch a demonstration of a new method for attacking an entrenched enemy. After the demonstration, Pershing called upon Sibert for a critique. Although Sibert possessed a brilliant record as an engineer, he had little experience with infantry tactics and had only witnessed the demonstration for the first time alongside Pershing. Consequently, his comments were halting and confused.

Pershing then called upon two other staff officers whose responses were also unsatisfactory. The general erupted and “just gave everybody hell,” particularly Sibert, whom he dressed down in front of his own officers. The division showed little for the time it had spent in training, Pershing snapped. They had not made good use of the time, and had not followed instructions from AEF headquarters at Chaumont regarding open warfare formations. Pershing excoriated Sibert, questioning his leadership, his attention to details in training, and his acceptance of such poor professionalism.

The 1st Division staff felt a possessive affection for their commander, and as Pershing turned to leave, the tall major who had been serving as acting chief of staff spoke up, angrily protesting Pershing’s unfairness. Pershing was in no mood to listen and began to walk away. Suddenly, he felt the major’s hand grabbing his arm.

“General Pershing,” the major said, “there’s something to be said here and I think I should say it because I’ve been here the longest.”

Pershing turned back and gave the impertinent young officer a cold, appraising glance. “What have you got to say?”

A torrent of facts poured forth: the promised platoon manuals that never arrived and had set back training; the inadequate supplies that left men walking around with gunnysacks on their feet; the inadequate quarters that left troops scattered throughout the countryside, sleeping in barns for a penny a night; the lack of motor transport that forced troops to walk miles to the training grounds. Finally, the deluge subsided.
Pershing looked at the major and calmly said: “You must appreciate the troubles we have.”

The major replied, “Yes, I know you do, General, I know you do. But ours are immediate and every day and have to be solved before night.”
General Pershing eyed the major narrowly and then turned to leave, the 1st Division staff looking nervously at the ground in stunned silence. After a while, Sibert gratefully told Major George C. Marshall that he should not have stuck his neck out on his account, and the rest of the staff predicted that Marshall’s military career was finished. Marshall shrugged off his friends’ condolences, saying: “All I can see is that I may get troop duty instead of staff duty, and certainly that would be a great success.”

Yet no retribution for the incident ever came. Instead, whenever the AEF commander visited 1st Division from Chaumont, he would find a moment to pull Marshall aside to ask how things were really going. Pershing had finally found an officer who would tell him the unvarnished truth rather than gloss over inadequacies. Marshall eventually received orders transferring him to the AEF General Staff to work under Colonel Fox Conner, the head of the AEF’s Operations section. Together, they would form the core of the group that planned the two great U.S. offensives of the war — Saint Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne. Pershing was impressed, and after the Armistice asked Marshall to become his aide.


 
The D30 was developed after WW2 and entered Soviet service in 1963, decades after the US 105mm M2A1.



I haven't seen much in the way of a substantive evaluation of its accuracy although Soviet artillery tended more to mass neutralization than accuracy. I also expect that Soviet ammunition quality standards had as much to do with accuracy as the gun itself.

🍻
Production quality also seems lacking
 
Production quality also seems lacking
The Soviets made no pretense to prefer simplicity of manufacture and operation and mass to machined quality. That said they came up with some interesting innovations such as the early autoloaders in their tanks and SPs (notwithstanding that little Jack-in-the-box flying turret defect)

:giggle:
 
Pershing's inspection of the 1st Infantry Division enters the chat ;)


WHEN MARSHALL MET PERSHING​


Oct. 3, 1917, is the centennial of General John J. Pershing’s inspection of the 1st Infantry Division at Gondrecourt, France. This obscure event would not only have significant repercussions for the American effort in the next world war, but also offer lessons for leadership development in the U.S. military a century later.

When Pershing assumed command of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), which was created and deployed to France after the United States entered World War I in April 1917, he essentially had to create and organize an army from scratch. In the spring of 1917 no U.S. divisions existed anywhere but on paper. Moreover, upon arriving in France, Pershing was constantly pressured by British leaders to relinquish his troops and integrate them into the British Army. He needed combat-ready forces to strengthen his hand in this debate and prevent the AEF from being stillborn. With few other units yet to reach France, Pershing took an inordinate interest in the summer and fall of 1917 in the first American unit to arrive, the 1st Division.

As the division conducted training in Lorraine, Pershing frequently visited its headquarters on short notice to check on its progress. A previous review with French President Raymond Poincaré on Sept. 6, 1917, was a disaster, and Pershing took out his frustration on the 1st Division’s commander, Major General William L. Sibert. Pershing inspected the 1st Division again on Oct. 3, this time at Gondrecourt to watch a demonstration of a new method for attacking an entrenched enemy. After the demonstration, Pershing called upon Sibert for a critique. Although Sibert possessed a brilliant record as an engineer, he had little experience with infantry tactics and had only witnessed the demonstration for the first time alongside Pershing. Consequently, his comments were halting and confused.

Pershing then called upon two other staff officers whose responses were also unsatisfactory. The general erupted and “just gave everybody hell,” particularly Sibert, whom he dressed down in front of his own officers. The division showed little for the time it had spent in training, Pershing snapped. They had not made good use of the time, and had not followed instructions from AEF headquarters at Chaumont regarding open warfare formations. Pershing excoriated Sibert, questioning his leadership, his attention to details in training, and his acceptance of such poor professionalism.

The 1st Division staff felt a possessive affection for their commander, and as Pershing turned to leave, the tall major who had been serving as acting chief of staff spoke up, angrily protesting Pershing’s unfairness. Pershing was in no mood to listen and began to walk away. Suddenly, he felt the major’s hand grabbing his arm.

“General Pershing,” the major said, “there’s something to be said here and I think I should say it because I’ve been here the longest.”

Pershing turned back and gave the impertinent young officer a cold, appraising glance. “What have you got to say?”

A torrent of facts poured forth: the promised platoon manuals that never arrived and had set back training; the inadequate supplies that left men walking around with gunnysacks on their feet; the inadequate quarters that left troops scattered throughout the countryside, sleeping in barns for a penny a night; the lack of motor transport that forced troops to walk miles to the training grounds. Finally, the deluge subsided.
Pershing looked at the major and calmly said: “You must appreciate the troubles we have.”

The major replied, “Yes, I know you do, General, I know you do. But ours are immediate and every day and have to be solved before night.”
General Pershing eyed the major narrowly and then turned to leave, the 1st Division staff looking nervously at the ground in stunned silence. After a while, Sibert gratefully told Major George C. Marshall that he should not have stuck his neck out on his account, and the rest of the staff predicted that Marshall’s military career was finished. Marshall shrugged off his friends’ condolences, saying: “All I can see is that I may get troop duty instead of staff duty, and certainly that would be a great success.”

Yet no retribution for the incident ever came. Instead, whenever the AEF commander visited 1st Division from Chaumont, he would find a moment to pull Marshall aside to ask how things were really going. Pershing had finally found an officer who would tell him the unvarnished truth rather than gloss over inadequacies. Marshall eventually received orders transferring him to the AEF General Staff to work under Colonel Fox Conner, the head of the AEF’s Operations section. Together, they would form the core of the group that planned the two great U.S. offensives of the war — Saint Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne. Pershing was impressed, and after the Armistice asked Marshall to become his aide.


Better insight into Marshall was probably his relationship with MacArthur. As subordinate and later superior…
 
More Surface Launched Missiles - in this case the AARGM-ER


The U.S. Navy is set to demonstrate the ability to fire an AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Extended Range, or AARGM-ER, from a ground-based launcher this year

container-launcher-model.jpg
mk-70-launchers-trucks.jpg


In 2018, Northrop Grumman displayed a model of a containerized launcher for AARGM-ER, which The War Zone was the first to report on. The Navy's new Mk 70 Mod 1 Expeditionary Launcher, a containerized derivative of the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) that is used on various U.S. and foreign warships, could be another potential option. Another possibility would be to just launch the missile from the ground using a test fixture of some kind.

Why the interest in Ground Launched systems?

A highly-mobile ground-based launcher loaded with AARGM-ERs should be able to readily engage any air defense radars that might pop up within its range and rapidly reposition itself in response to the emergence of new threats. If positioned closer to forward operating areas, the system could potentially swing to action faster than waiting for an aircraft carrying one of these missiles to arrive on scene. As a result, this would create a persistent SEAD/DEAD threat that could keep enemy emitters from turning on, and would require considerable resources to even attempt to neutralize preemptively.

The AGM-88G's networked nature means that it could also be launched using information from offboard sensors or essentially fired 'blind' toward a general and then get updated data on the location of the target in flight. All of this only adds further flexibility, as well as an added degree of unpredictability for enemy forces trying to evade detection and targeting.

Presumably the enemy emitters being persistently suppressed would include jammers - making the airwaves safe for GPS and UAS systems.

Also, I am going to guess, Ukraine's difficulty in getting aircraft into the air but relative ease in launching missiles of various types may have some people rethinking the balance among guns, missiles, UAS's and planes.

Another factor is the increasing platform independence and autonomy of various missiles.....

GMRLS missiles
GL-SDBs
Harpoons and NSMs
Storm Shadows
Brimstones
Heros, Spikes and Switchblades
NASAMS and Sidewinder, AMRAAM, ESSM, IRIS...

Guns and mortars still have their place but missiles seem to becoming a greater part of the effort.

The USMC is contemplating the AMRAAM on a Cobra ATV.

 
Guns and mortars still have their place but missiles seem to becoming a greater part of the effort.
Missiles are more expensive, so everything has its place.

IMHO the range band for missiles is the big plus.
Mortars <10km
Guns <50km
Rockets <150km
Missiles —->
 
Missiles are more expensive, so everything has its place.

IMHO the range band for missiles is the big plus.
Mortars <10km
Guns <50km
Rockets <150km
Missiles —->

Rockets and Missiles - a distinction without a difference since the arrival of the GMRLS.

As to 50 km guns - Yup! You can pump up a round to 50 km with a rugged enough barrel, a tight enough driving band, a heavy enough breech and a big enough charge - for a limited number of rounds.

Mortars are good - simple and cheap and short range.
Rockets/Missiles - the round is expensive (but getting cheaper) but the launcher is very inexpensive - and can also be the storage container.
And rockets require smaller crews.


The world continues to change.
 
Going to contest the costing of the Missile as "expensive".

Is it more expensive than a Fighter Squadron or wing with replacement aircraft and long, clean runways?
Is it more expensive than all the moving parts and people associated with the gun batteries of a cannon regiment?

The cannon rounds are cheaper but how about cost of getting the round from the factory to the target?
 
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