Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[rmc_wannabe]

Canada is essentially a country that needs expeditionary forces. Our defence is, fortunately, based on strengthening the deterrence capabilities of other countries.

Our last real domestic war was 1814 with scares in 1867 and 1870/71 and some internal bothers in 1837/8, 1869/70 and 1885.

The difficulty in "projecting a large conventional force from Canada to Europe" has been solved very well three times (WW1, WW2, and the Cold War). It is merely a problem looking for the right solution.

The real question is: if we're not prepared to project a large force, why do we even bother keeping one? Let's face it, the country is right now paying good dollars for a force that, in payroll numbers, is the size of one average full-time division and one average part-time division. ... And yet it is capability poor to the point where deploying a properly equipped battlegroup is a challenge. Does any of that make sense?

The problem is that we have relied on that "we can always mobilize a large conventional force...we did it before, right?" as a valid COA.

It's not.

In all 3 of our last big mobilizations, we showed up poorly equipped, poorly trained, and ready to fight the wars of tomorrow with yesterday's tech and tactics. Same can be said about Afghanistan.

We fiddle, dawdle, and piss away time, money, and effort in peace time and wonder why we are caught with our pants down the next time we are told "Gentlemen, Orders..."

It's gotten worse as warfare has become more technologically driven. Weapons systems are far more expensive, harder to produce, and need more time Instructing than generations prior.

Whatever happens in Force 2025, unless we're actively at War within a NATO context, we're still going to be chasing our tail.

 

[Kirkhill]

Canada is essentially a country that needs expeditionary forces. Our defence is, fortunately, based on strengthening the deterrence capabilities of other countries.

Our last real domestic war was 1814 with scares in 1867 and 1870/71 and some internal bothers in 1837/8, 1869/70 and 1885.

The difficulty in "projecting a large conventional force from Canada to Europe" has been solved very well three times (WW1, WW2, and the Cold War). It is merely a problem looking for the right solution.

The real question is: if we're not prepared to project a large force, why do we even bother keeping one? Let's face it, the country is right now paying good dollars for a force that, in payroll numbers, is the size of one average full-time division and one average part-time division. ... And yet it is capability poor to the point where deploying a properly equipped battlegroup is a challenge. Does any of that make sense?

Our regular army needs to deploy over expeditionary distances. Agreed.

Our internal distances are similar to the distances we have to cover to support our closest geographical allies.

We have allies that require support that inhabit lands at our latitudes, with our seasons, our environment and our terrain.

Kit that works there, tactics and procedures that work there will work here.

Our problem is that we are stuck in Flanders when we should be focusing on Finnmark.

AMFL and CAST Bde and not 4 CMBG.
101st Division and not 1st Cav.
Gage, Moore and de Rottenberg and not Dundas and Frederick

 

[daftandbarmy]

The problem is that we have relied on that "we can always mobilize a large conventional force...we did it before, right?" as a valid COA.

It's not.

In all 3 of our last big mobilizations, we showed up poorly equipped, poorly trained, and ready to fight the wars of tomorrow with yesterday's tech and tactics. Same can be said about Afghanistan.

We fiddle, dawdle, and piss away time, money, and effort in peace time and wonder why we are caught with our pants down the next time we are told "Gentlemen, Orders..."

It's gotten worse as warfare has become more technologically driven. Weapons systems are far more expensive, harder to produce, and need more time Instructing than generations prior.

Whatever happens in Force 2025, unless we're actively at War within a NATO context, we're still going to be chasing our tail.

To be fair, except for the Dictatorships, just about every First World Nation has been in the same position since WW2. And before.

 

[Kirkhill]

General Money describes the Battle of Bunker Hill between “undisciplined peasantry… and the best… regiments in the British service, the raw peasants of the country… killed and wounded, out of 2000, no less than 1054 British officers and soldiers.” Money in effect highlighted the limitations of rigid formations when facing free moving, irregular troops.

We have been here before. The Regular vs the Irregular. The same battle the Russians are facing.

A Brief History of British Light Infantry until 1800​

By Adam Barnes

The 18th Century saw massive steps forward in the tactics of warfare, with a shift from hand to hand combat in a meat grinder of pikes, supported by muskets, to lines of infantry, armed with muskets firing volleys at each other. Within the British Army, these developments grew further, with a more organised restructuring of the Regimental System and the increasing importance of the two flank companies, consisting of one company of Grenadiers and another of Light Infantry, within the Battalion’s line.

It wasn’t until 1758, during the Seven Years War, that all British infantry battalions were ordered to train up one company as designated Light Infantry companies. Many units went further with this, adapting uniform and equipment to allow greater speed and freedom of movement across the battlefield. However, the life of the Light Infantryman was short lived as, with the end of the Seven Years War, the need for Light Infantry diminished and these light troops returned back into the line as regular infantry.

It was not until the American War of Independence where the need for Light Infantry would rear it’s head once again, for example ,General Money describes the Battle of Bunker Hill between “undisciplined peasantry… and the best… regiments in the British service, the raw peasants of the country… killed and wounded, out of 2000, no less than 1054 British officers and soldiers.” Money in effect highlighted the limitations of rigid formations when facing free moving, irregular troops.

These limitations were answered in part by the formation of two “Legions” of Light Infantry, Simcoe’s ‘Queens Rangers’ and Tarleton’s ‘British Legion’, who were able to fight their own petit guerres against rebel forces. Alongside these, other light infantry units were also raised; such as ‘Ferguson’s Sharpshooters’ in 1776, who were armed with rifles, one of the first instances of a regular Army unit employing rifles. By 1779, Ferguson’s Sharpshooters had effectively been destroyed, and the rifle had mostly been removed from service.

Simcoe's Queen's Rangers


With the cessation of hostilities in America another decline in the need for Light Infantry occurred, and by the 1790s, very few units retained the skills and training necessary for Light Infantry to carry out their duties effectively. Across Britain, there remained very little support for Light Infantry, with players such as Sir David Dundas claiming that large scale introduction of Light Infantry would be of the most fatal consequence. However there was another train of support towards the introduction of a permanent Light Infantry corps from General Money and General Sir John Moore.

1799 saw a huge turning point, after a disastrous campaign to Flanders. Plans were quickly drawn up to devise a programme for the creation of the first permanent regiments of Light Infantry in the British Army. This coincided with an appeal to the government from Colonel Coote Maningham and Lieutenant Colonel William Stewart, pointing out the potential importance of a corps of infantry armed with rifles. Thus, on January 17th 1800, the Experimental Corps of Riflemen with its manpower coming from ‘volunteers’ from fourteen regiments under the instruction of Colonel Coote Manningham and Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. William Stewart was formed.

Light troops have utility on many battlefields, especially our domestic ones and the flanks of our NATO allies. They also have utility in all the brushfire wars and peacekeeping missions.

We should be buying helicopters and not tanks.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

To be fair, except for the Dictatorships, just about every First World Nation has been in the same position since WW2. And before.

Fair indeed. I'm not advocating a military industrial overhaul to see "Canada rise to glory again.." I just worry that we are the grasshopper and not the ants.

We divest capabilities faster than we replenish them. At a rate faster than most of our allies. It's going to come back and bite us in a way "convening" can't salvage.

 

[ArmyRick]

I would pay good money to see a cement truck bale hay…

I used 400 liter recycling bins one year.

 

[KevinB]

We should be buying helicopters and not tanks.

But in true CAF fashion you have too few of both...

 

[Kirkhill]

But in true CAF fashion you have too few of both...

Note the use of the word SHOULD. I would ditch the tanks and start building Combat Aviation Brigades - at least 2 of them preferably 3, maybe 4 if there was a strong reserve component.

I like Alaska and Washington as Guard models.

 

[daftandbarmy]

We should be buying helicopters and not tanks.

Yes. Of course.

If, for the first time since WW1, we want to be considered, literally, lightweights with no say in how things play out globally.

Realpolitik is about national survival, and global influence, and it's expensive.

"The Pope... How many Divisions has he got?"

Josef Stalin to French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval on May 13, 1935

 

[Skysix]

Note the use of the word SHOULD. I would ditch the tanks and start building Combat Aviation Brigades - at least 2 of them preferably 3, maybe 4 if there was a strong reserve component.

I like Alaska and Washington as Guard models.

Oregon too. G-1/189 Medevac is often at Maple Resolve.

 

[markppcli]

And before I go... why isn't the height of the suspension adjustable?

It might make the beast a little less tippy on the highways.

Couldn’t care less about its highway performance; I care about it rolling every time it’s in a training area. That being said, height management systems rely on sensors that are generally external and are very easily damaged when driving cross country.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yes. Of course.

If, for the first time since WW1, we want to be considered, literally, lightweights with no say in how things play out globally.

Realpolitik is about national survival, and global influence, and it's expensive.

"The Pope... How many Divisions has he got?"

Josef Stalin to French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval on May 13, 1935

How many divisions does Canada operate within the Arctic Circle?

How many can it get to Alaska or Finnmark?

Or Hans Island?

The Front has changed. We were facing West and contemplating an About Turn to the East. Now we are being expected to change front and reform on the left flank with the Americans on our new left and JEF on our new right.

We are being asked to hold fast in the centre, our home turf.

Our flanks are all heavily invested in anti missile defences and Northern mobility. And yes there are some tanks on the right flank, in position, but ATVs and air and sea mobility are more prevalent on both flanks.

How seriously will we be taken if we can't hold the centre?

 

[GR66]

The article made me shudder considerably.
Look at the authors background -- He's indirectly advocating for a SOF led guerilla specific force to be a porcupine.

They must develop asymmetric approaches based on systems that are small, numerous, smart, stealthy, fast, mobile, low-cost, survivable, effective, easy to develop, maintain and preserve, and difficult to detect and counter.

He is asking for the unlikely and more likely impossible. It's got a lot of buzzwords, but...

Simply put, small NATO members must develop technology-enabled, resistance-based porcupine strategies.
Wait - he wanted low cost right?

This approach cannot be ad hoc or haphazard, based on loosely defined amateur homeland defense forces. It demands state-owned, purpose-built, professional military organizations and tailored hardware to succeed.
Again - how is this low cost, or survivable, let alone easy to develop?

Just like prior paradigms, this transformation requires military formations, rank systems, career paths, training and education pipelines, and weapon systems built for a specific type of war. While some foundations will survive, most solutions should radically depart from current approaches. Universally accepted principles that have long shaped conventional militaries should be fundamentally reimagined, if not abandoned entirely. Previously sacred elements of modern military culture should become relics.

Small members could employ more affordable, independently sustainable defense approaches, strategies that would enable their success even if left to fight alone. At the same time, instead of having weak, conventional tripwires along its eastern flank, NATO would have multiple layers of credible, independently capable porcupines supported by the conventional might of larger NATO states. A collective resistance-grounded defense concept would present a stronger deterrent, significantly raising the costs of aggression compared to a resurrected Cold War deterrence paradigm.

I think it's absolute folly, and I am a big fan of SOF applications -- but I fail too see how this would slow Russia at all.
independently sustainable defense approaches : what does this really mean in actuality on the ground?
All Russia is going to see is a weak state - and if noting more it will boost their aggression.

The more meaningful takeaway that I got from the article was the idea that it doesn't necessarily make sense for every NATO member to try and emulate US military capabilities in miniature. Each nation could/should look at their own particular defence requirements and capabilities to try and come up with a force structure (and suite of equipment) which is both effective and sustainable for their own defence and can also be an effective contribution to the larger strategic defence goals of the alliance.

Any specific suggestions made by the author of the article to my mind undermine his general argument as obviously the defence requirements for each NATO member nation will be unique and therefor require unique solutions. Obviously the defence needs and alliance contributions that make sense for Estonia will be different than those of Montenegro.

For example, for Canada I think that commonality of equipment with the US makes total sense due to our physical proximity and the massive defence industry output of the US compared to our own. Is that the case for Romania? Does it make more sense for them to align their structure and equipment more in line with their near neighbours like Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland?

I'm simply saying that the author may have a point in suggesting that each member nation when looking at their defence capabilities should examine whether the the best option is augmenting the military capabilities of the US by generating forces which plug into the American model or if they can better contribute by providing capabilities that can complement US military capabilities.

Obviously these decisions shouldn't be made in isolation but rather in consultation with the alliance as a whole so that you don't just have nations saying "here's what we have...what can you do with it" but rather a logical examination of what each nation's strengths and weaknesses are and how those strengths can be leveraged and the weaknesses compensated for.

 

[KevinB]

The more meaningful takeaway that I got from the article was the idea that it doesn't necessarily make sense for every NATO member to try and emulate US military capabilities in miniature. Each nation could/should look at their own particular defence requirements and capabilities to try and come up with a force structure (and suite of equipment) which is both effective and sustainable for their own defence and can also be an effective contribution to the larger strategic defence goals of the alliance.

I agree with that in principle, however the author veered from that and advocated no real conventional force structure.

Any specific suggestions made by the author of the article to my mind undermine his general argument as obviously the defence requirements for each NATO member nation will be unique and therefor require unique solutions. Obviously the defence needs and alliance contributions that make sense for Estonia will be different than those of Montenegro.

Agreed, and I don’t think that anyone is suggesting that everyone have a symmetrical force scaled per means as other countries.

For example, for Canada I think that commonality of equipment with the US makes total sense due to our physical proximity and the massive defence industry output of the US compared to our own. Is that the case for Romania? Does it make more sense for them to align their structure and equipment more in line with their near neighbours like Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland?

All of the former WP NATO members are conducting an ongoing divestment of their WP equipment. Most of that was given to Ukraine for very favorable exchange with US kit.

I'm simply saying that the author may have a point in suggesting that each member nation when looking at their defence capabilities should examine whether the the best option is augmenting the military capabilities of the US by generating forces which plug into the American model or if they can better contribute by providing capabilities that can complement US military capabilities.

Agreed, however we have STANAG for a reason. There needs to be a degree of commonality in terms of ammunition etc. if Ukraine has taught anything it should be the US DoD is the only country in NATO that truly has ‘break in case of war’ stockpiles of equipment and ammunition.
Most NATO countries have empty cupboards in that respect, and are not self sufficient when tapped beyond annual training.

Obviously these decisions shouldn't be made in isolation but rather in consultation with the alliance as a whole so that you don't just have nations saying "here's what we have...what can you do with it" but rather a logical examination of what each nation's strengths and weaknesses are and how those strengths can be leveraged and the weaknesses compensated for.

Agreed.
However down here we have a large force that has a number of different capabilities.

Not everyone needs to have an Abrams/Bradley based ABCT’s and DIV that link with V Corps in Poland.
Perhaps XVIII Airborne is a better fit, or the USMC or…

 

[Skysix]

height management systems rely on sensors that are generally external and are very easily damaged when driving cross country.

That seems dumb. What is wrong with simple multi position switch and presets? Say differential to road height in inches plus 0, 3, 6, 9, 12 (or whatever the maximum travel is)

Or the metric equivalent thereof

 

[KevinB]

That seems dumb. What is wrong with simple multi position switch and presets? Say differential to road height in inches plus 0, 3, 6, 9, 12 (or whatever the maximum travel is)

Or the metric equivalent thereof

Even automated systems are subject to damage. Most rely on simple hydraulic adjustments and not mechanical locks, which result in great strain on the hydraulic with significant impacts. Those that ohave a hydraulic adjustment from different Mech lock systems still rely on a generally exposed hydraulic cable that can be torn or otherwise damaged leaving the vehicle in one mode of travel.
The only way to have a significantly robust system is a manual adjustment that is fairly awkward to do quickly in the field.

 

[Weinie]

Even automated systems are subject to damage. Most rely on simple hydraulic adjustments and not mechanical locks, which result in great strain on the hydraulic with significant impacts. Those that ohave a hydraulic adjustment from different Mech lock systems still rely on a generally exposed hydraulic cable that can be torn or otherwise damaged leaving the vehicle in one mode of travel.
The only way to have a significantly robust system is a manual adjustment that is fairly awkward to do quickly in the field.

Or we could have built a fit for purpose vehicle in the first place, making moot of this TAPV derail.

 

[KevinB]

Or we could have built a fit for purpose vehicle in the first place, making moot of this TAPV derail.

Common sense isn’t…

 

[markppcli]

That seems dumb. What is wrong with simple multi position switch and presets? Say differential to road height in inches plus 0, 3, 6, 9, 12 (or whatever the maximum travel is)

Or the metric equivalent thereof

It does that. But the pressure sensors and vale’s have parts on the outside. Very annoying

 

[markppcli]

Or we could have built a fit for purpose vehicle in the first place, making moot of this TAPV derail.

I don’t know that the possible tasks and failings of our largest military vehicle purchase in decades is that much of a derail in a discussion on army restructure. What a TAPV can and can’t do is a concept that has to be central to that surely?